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Introduction
These materials summarize and explain the significance of various recent decisions of the
Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery, and the Federal District Court for the District
of Delaware regarding Delaware corporate law. These materials also highlight amendments to
the Delaware General Corporation Law which became effective on August 1, 2006.
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I.

RECENT DECISIONS OF DELAWARE COURTS.
A.

Business Combinations.
1.

Lock-Ups.
a.

Orman v. Cullman, C.A. No. 18039 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).

In Orman v. Cullman, C.A. No. 18039. (October 20, 2004), the plaintiff brought suit
against the board of directors of General Cigar Holdings, Inc. ("General Cigar") for breach of
their fiduciary duties in negotiating a minority squeeze-out merger transaction with Swedish
Match AB ("Swedish Match") which included a lock-up voting agreement with General Cigar's
controlling stockholders. The lock-up agreement required the controlling stockholders to vote
against any alternative acquisition proposal for 18 months following a termination of the merger
agreement. Applying Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., the Court of Chancery concluded that
the lock-up agreement with General Cigar's controlling stockholders did not coerce the General
Cigar stockholders to approve the merger and, therefore, granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
General Cigar was founded in 1906 by the Cullman family. In 1997, General Cigar
became a public company. The Cullman family, however, retained control over General Cigar
by virtue of their exclusive control over the Class B common stock (which entitled the holders
thereof to ten votes per share). In 1999, Swedish Match contacted General Cigar to discuss the
possibility of acquiring a significant stake in General Cigar, with certain Cullman family
members maintaining management responsibility. The board of directors of General Cigar
formed a special committee to advise and make recommendations to the full board concerning
the transaction with Swedish Match.
The negotiations between General Cigar and Swedish Match resulted in an agreement
whereby General Cigar would merge with a subsidiary of Swedish Match, with the public
stockholders of General Cigar receiving $15 per share (a significant premium over the market
price). As a condition to entering into the merger agreement, Swedish Match required the
Cullmans to enter into a voting agreement in which they agreed not to sell their shares and to
vote their shares against any alternative acquisition proposal for a period of one year following
the termination of the merger agreement. In exchange for an increase in the merger
consideration to the public stockholders to $15.25 per share, Swedish Match required the
Cullmans to increase the restricted period in the voting agreement to eighteen months. The
merger agreement allowed the board of General Cigar to entertain unsolicited acquisition
proposals if, upon recommendation of the special committee, the board concluded that such a
proposal was bona fide and would be more favorable to the public stockholders than the merger
with Swedish Match. The merger agreement also permitted the board to withdraw its
recommendation of the merger agreement if the board concluded, upon consultation with outside
counsel, that its fiduciary duties so required. The merger agreement required that the merger
agreement be submitted to the General Cigar stockholders for a vote, but importantly provided
that the merger could not proceed without the approval of a "majority of the minority" (i.e., a
majority of the public stockholders). The merger agreement did not contain a termination fee.
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The plaintiff, relying on Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. and
NCS, argued that the members of the Cullman family on the board of directors of General Cigar
breached their fiduciary duties by entering into the voting agreement. The Court found plaintiff's
reliance on Paramount and NCS misplaced. While the Court agreed that a provision of a
contract purporting to require a director to act in a manner as to limit the exercise of fiduciary
duties would be unenforceable, the provisions of the voting agreement in the present case only
limited the Cullmans' ability to act in their capacity as stockholders. Thus, the Cullmans could
still have exercised their duties as directors to vote to withdraw their recommendation of the
merger.
The Court of Chancery then turned to the remaining issue of whether the public
stockholders of General Cigar were impermissibly coerced to vote for the merger because of the
lock-up provision required by Swedish Match as part of the transaction. The Court noted that in
NCS a bare majority of the Supreme Court held that deal protection devices, even when those
devices protect a merger that does not result in a change of control, require the enhanced scrutiny
set forth in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The first step of the
Unocal analysis requires a board to show that they have reasonable grounds for believing that a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed without the deal protection measures. The
second step requires the board to show that the deal protection devices are not coercive or
preclusive and are within the range of reasonable responses to the danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness.
Applying the first step of Unocal, the Court found that if the board had not included the
deal protection devices demanded by Swedish Match, General Cigar risked losing the transaction
and being left with no comparable alternative transaction. Like NCS, this was reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.
With respect to the second step of the Unocal analysis, the Court held that the standard
for determining if deal protection devices are coercive is whether they "have the effect of causing
the stockholders to vote in favor of the proposed transaction for some reason other than the
merits of that transaction." (quoting Williams v. Geier). The Court found that because the
merger with Swedish Match would not have occurred without the deal protection devices, such
devices were an "integral part of the merits of the transaction." Furthermore, unlike NCS, the
deal protective devices in this case were not tantamount to "a fait accompli." The Court held:
The public shareholders were free to reject the proposed deal, even
though, permissibly, their vote may have been influenced by the
existence of deal protection measures. Because General Cigar's
public shareholders retained the power to reject the proposed
transaction with Swedish Match, the fiduciary out negotiated by
General Cigar's board was a meaningful and effective one -- it
gave the General Cigar board power to recommend that the
shareholders veto the Swedish Match deal. That is to say, had the
board determined that it needed to recommend that the General
Cigar's shareholders reject the transaction, the shareholders were
fully empowered to act upon that recommendation because the
public shareholders (those not "locked-up" in the voting
2
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agreement) retained the power to reject the proposed merger. For
these reasons, I conclude as a matter of law that the deal protection
mechanisms present here were not impermissibly coercive.
The Court then turned to the last part of the Unocal analysis to determine whether the
deal protection devices were within the range of reasonable responses to the danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness. The Court found that without the deal protection devices there would
have been no merger and the General Cigar stockholders could have lost the significant premium
being offered by Swedish Match. The Court held that, because there was no competing bid for
General Cigar, the board would be given broad latitude regarding its decision to recommend the
Swedish Match merger. Thus, in light of the effective fiduciary out and the ability of the public
stockholders to vote down the merger, the Court concluded that the "Cullman lock-up hardly
seems unreasonable, given the absence of other deal protection devices in this particular
transaction and given the buyer's understandable concern about transaction costs and market
uncertainties."
b.

Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del.
2003).

In Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003), the Delaware
Supreme Court issued a sharply divided opinion refusing to enforce a fully locked-up agreement
between a bidder and a target in the face of a greater offer by a third party in circumstances that
caused the Court of Chancery to conclude that the lock-up was justifiable. The case concerns a
challenge to a merger (the "Merger") between NCS Healthcare, Inc. ("NCS") and Genesis Health
Ventures, Inc. ("Genesis"). NCS was at the time a publicly traded, insolvent corporation. After
exploring strategic alternatives for over two years, NCS entered into an exclusivity agreement
with Genesis which contemplated all of NCS's senior debt being paid and NCS's stockholders
receiving shares of Genesis and which prohibited NCS from discussing potential business
combination transactions with other third parties for a short period of time. Thereafter,
Omnicare, Inc. ("Omnicare") sent NCS a letter outlining a proposed acquisition in which, subject
to a number of contingencies, all of NCS's debt would be paid and the stockholders of NCS
would receive more consideration than they would receive in the transaction with Genesis.
After considering, inter alia, the exclusivity agreement's prohibition against negotiating
with other third parties, the increased offer price received from Genesis after informing Genesis
of the Omnicare proposal, the risks attendant with allowing the exclusivity agreement to expire
without reaching an agreement with Genesis, and the terms of an acquisition agreement
demanded by Genesis, NCS entered into a merger agreement with Genesis pursuant to which
NCS's creditors would be paid in full and NCS's stockholders would receive additional Genesis
stock. The merger agreement included a provision requiring the board of directors of NCS (the
"Board") to submit the merger agreement to the stockholders of NCS regardless of whether the
Board continued to recommend the Merger. As a condition to the Merger, Genesis demanded
that Mr. Outcalt and Mr. Shaw, directors of NCS who together owned a majority in voting power
of the outstanding capital stock of NCS, enter into voting agreements to vote in favor of the
Merger. After the announcement of the Merger, Omnicare submitted an unconditional proposal
to NCS that would result in the NCS stockholders receiving more consideration than they would
receive in the Merger. As a result of the Omnicare proposal, the Board withdrew its
3
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recommendation that the stockholders vote in favor of the merger agreement and NCS's financial
advisors withdrew their fairness opinion.
The plaintiffs challenged the deal protection devices. The plaintiffs argued that the
voting agreements signed by Outcalt and Shaw, when coupled with the requirement that the
Board submit the merger agreement to the stockholders, regardless of the Board's
recommendation, constituted "defensive reactions" under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and that the defensive devices were impermissibly preclusive,
coercive and unreasonable. While noting that this aspect of the merger agreement required
special scrutiny, the Court of Chancery held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the Board acted
unreasonably and upheld the protective measures. The Delaware Supreme Court, by a vote of
three to two, disagreed and reversed the Court of Chancery's denial of a preliminary injunction.
In so holding, the Supreme Court held that the Board's decision to adopt the defensive devices to
completely lock-up the Merger required "special scrutiny" under Unocal, but also held that the
record did not support the Court of Chancery's conclusion that the protective devices adopted by
the Board were reasonable and proportionate to the threat the Board perceived from the potential
loss of the Merger.
The Supreme Court first noted that a "board's decision to protect its decision to enter
[into] a merger agreement with defensive devices against uninvited competing transactions that
may emerge is analogous to a board's decision to protect against dangers to corporate policy and
effectiveness when it adopts defensive measures in a hostile takeover contest." Id. at 932. Thus,
a board does not have unfettered discretion to defeat any perceived threat to a merger by
protecting it with any coercive or preclusive means available. The Supreme Court, therefore,
concluded that the enhanced scrutiny of Unocal applied to the Board's decision to adopt the deal
protection devices.
In applying the Unocal analysis, the Supreme Court held that the Board was required to
show that their defensive response was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id. at 935
(citations omitted). In order to do so, the Board first had to establish that the deal protection
devices were not "coercive" or "preclusive" and then demonstrate that its response was within
the "range of reasonable responses" to the threat perceived. Id. The Supreme Court held that
"any stockholder vote would have been robbed of effectiveness by the impermissible coercion
that predetermined the outcome of the [M]erger without regard to the merits of the [Merger] at
the time the vote was scheduled to be taken." Id. at 936. The deal protective devices also
precluded the consideration of any superior proposal. Thus, the protective provisions were both
preclusive and coercive because they accomplished a fait accompli. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held the deal protection devices unenforceable.
The Supreme Court also held that the absence of an effective fiduciary out clause
invalidated the deal protection devices because they limited the Board's ability to exercise their
fiduciary duties. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted:
The [Board] could not abdicate its fiduciary duties to the minority
by leaving it to the stockholders alone to approve or disapprove the
merger agreement because two stockholders had already combined

4
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to establish a majority of the voting power that made the outcome
of the stockholder vote a foregone conclusion.
*

* *

The directors of a Delaware corporation have a continuing
obligation to discharge their fiduciary responsibilities, as future
circumstances develop, after a merger agreement is announced. ...
Instead of agreeing to the absolute defense of the [Merger] from a
superior offer, however, the [Board] was required to negotiate a
fiduciary out clause to protect the NCS stockholders if the
[Merger] became an inferior offer. By acceding to Genesis'
ultimatum for complete protection in futuro, the [Board] disabled
itself from exercising its own fiduciary obligations at a time when
the [Board's] own judgment is most important, i.e. receipt of a
subsequent superior offer.
Id. at 937, 938.
In a rare dissenting opinion, now-retired Chief Justice Veasey, joined by now Chief, and
then Justice, Steele, disagreed with the majority's decision that the deal protection devices were
unenforceable. Chief Justice Veasey was troubled by what he perceived to be a new rule
adopted by the majority, namely a per se prohibition on a board's ability to act in concert with a
controlling stockholder to lock-up a merger no matter how compelling the circumstances. The
Chief Justice argued that the majority reviewed the protective provisions out of context instead
of reviewing the entire bidding process. In the case at hand, only Genesis was offering a value
enhancing transaction, but only in exchange for certainty that the Merger would close. The
Chief Justice noted that "lock-ups" permit a target board and bidder to "exchange certainties"
which can be valuable to the parties and argued that "[s]ituations will arise where business
realities demand a lock-up so that wealth-enhancing transactions may go forward. Accordingly,
any bright-line rule prohibiting lock-ups could, in circumstances such as these, chill otherwise
permissible conduct." Id. at 942.
The Chief Justice questioned the applicability of Unocal to the case. Notably,
Omnicare's "hostile" offer did not occur until after NCS conducted a market search and entered
into the locked-up transaction with Genesis. Thus, there was no "specter of self-interest" since
the Board was not reacting to any threat in an attempt to entrench itself in office. The Chief
Justice further argued that the majority misapplied the concepts of "coercion" and "preclusion" to
preempt the proper proportionality balancing of Unocal. Id. at 943. In this respect, the Chief
Justice noted that the deal protection devices were not adopted to fend off an existing hostile
action but rather were adopted because they were required by Genesis for Genesis to proceed
with the Merger. The Chief Justice stated that the test for coercion should be whether the Board
took actions that "have the effect of causing the stockholders to vote in favor of the proposed
transaction for some reason other than the merits of that transaction." Id. at 944 (citation
omitted). Here, the deal protection devices were integral to the merits of the transaction. Outcalt
and Shaw were fully informed stockholders and they, in their capacity as stockholders, made the
decision to commit themselves to enter into the voting agreements. Thus, Outcalt and Shaw
5
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were not coerced to vote in favor of the Merger. To the extent any minority stockholders felt
coerced to vote in favor of the Merger, such coercion was meaningless because the outcome was
already determined. Chief Justice Veasey also argued that even though the voting agreements
may have precluded an overriding vote against the Merger, they were not preclusive within the
meaning of Unocal because the minority vote was meaningless as a result of the non-coerced
vote of the majority stockholders.
Therefore, the majority should have applied the
proportionality prong of Unocal and concluded that the deal protection devices were reasonable
because they were the only way Genesis would agree to the Merger, which at the time was the
only value-enhancing transaction available to NCS.
Chief Justice Veasey also rejected the majority's rule that it was a per se violation of
fiduciary duty to fail to negotiate a fiduciary out in an otherwise locked-up transaction. In the
instant case, Genesis, the only bidder at the time proposing a value-enhancing transaction, made
it clear that a fiduciary out was unacceptable. Chief Justice Veasey rejected the majority's
reliance on Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993),
distinguishing the facts in QVC where a board turned away from a superior proposal to lock-up a
less valuable deal and the facts in the present case where the Board committed itself to the only
value-enhancing transaction available. Furthermore, in the view of the Chief Justice, a board
should not have a special duty to protect the minority stockholders from a controlling
stockholder unless the controlling stockholder is on both sides of the transaction. The Chief
Justice closed by expressing his hope that the majority's decision would be narrowly interpreted.
In addition to joining the Chief Justice's dissent, Justice Steele wrote a separate dissent.
2.

Third-Party Mergers and Hostile Takeovers.
a.

In re CompuCom Systems, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 499-N
(Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2005).

In In re CompuCom Systems, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 499-N, Lamb, V.C. (Del. Ch.
Sept. 29, 2005), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted in favor of a Delaware corporation, its directors and its
controlling stockholder in response to plaintiff's claim that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties in connection with the sale of the corporation to a third party. The factors that
influenced the Court's decision included the use of a special committee process, which included
an 18-month search for a buyer, as well as the use of outside legal and financial advisors,
absence of strong lock-ups or other deal-protection devices in the merger agreement and the fact
that no better offer ever emerged.
In August 2002, the board of directors (the "Board") of CompuCom Systems, Inc.
("CompuCom") created a special committee of the Board (the "Special Committee") comprised
of purportedly independent directors to either find a buyer for the shares of stock of CompuCom
held by its controlling stockholder, Safeguard Scientifics, Inc. ("Safeguard"), or in the
alternative, put CompuCom up for sale. At the time of the disputed transaction, Safeguard was
the owner of 48% of CompuCom's common stock and 100% of its preferred stock, and held 51%
of the voting power with regard to an acquisition and 58% of the voting power with regard to the
election of the Board. The Special Committee selected and retained its own financial and legal
advisors and spent 18 months exploring various strategic options, but was unable to locate a
6
RLF1-3052265-3

suitable deal. In 2004, CompuCom received an offer from Platinum Equity Capital Partners,
L.P. ("Platinum") to buy CompuCom. After several rounds of negotiations, CompuCom and
Platinum entered into a merger agreement whereby the holders of all shares of common stock
received $4.60 per share, and Safeguard received a total of $15 million plus accrued and unpaid
dividends for the preferred stock. The total consideration for the transaction was $254 million,
of which Safeguard received approximately $128 million. The financial advisors for both
CompuCom and the Special Committee rendered fairness opinions, and the transaction was
recommended by the Special Committee and approved by the full Board.
Plaintiffs, former minority stockholders of CompuCom, challenged the sale of
CompuCom on the grounds that the Board was dominated and controlled by Safeguard and
improperly agreed to sell CompuCom in order to satisfy Safeguard's pressing need for cash. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to comply with their fiduciary duties by structuring a
sale that improperly favored Safeguard to the detriment of the minority stockholders, and that the
defendants sought to discourage the assertion of appraisal rights by the minority stockholders by
disseminating a materially false and misleading proxy statement.
The plaintiffs alleged that Safeguard's impetus for selling CompuCom was that it needed
cash for itself and for its founder and former CEO, Warren V. Musser, and that it began
liquidating investment assets in companies in which Musser also invested, including
CompuCom, at fire sale prices. Included among the plaintiffs' assertions was the fact that the
acquisition price of $4.60 per share of common stock of the Company represented a discount to
the closing price of $4.84 on the day before the acquisition was announced.
In holding that the plaintiffs were unable to successfully rebut the presumption of the
business judgment rule, the Court noted that the Special Committee spent 18 months searching
for an appropriate transaction – a fact inconsistent with the plaintiffs' "fire sale" accusation. The
Court also gave weight to the use by the Special Committee of independent legal and financial
advisors and the fact that the merger agreement did not contain strong lock-ups or other dealprotection provisions that would have prevented the emergence of a competing bid. In
addressing the fact that the acquisition price paid by Platinum represented a discount to the
market price, the Court noted that the public trading price of the Company's shares fluctuated
during the negotiating period across a wide range from as low as $4.16 to as high as $5.99.
The plaintiffs also questioned the independence of most of the members of the Special
Committee due to their purported connections to Safeguard. The Court held that the plaintiffs
did not show that the Special Committee was dominated and controlled by Safeguard. The Court
noted the significance of the fact that at the time of the transaction, none of the members of the
Special Committee were employed by CompuCom, Platinum or Safeguard and stated that the
alleged conflicts of the Special Committee members did not appear to be material enough to
preclude a finding of independence. The Court stated,"'[o]ur cases have determined that personal
friendships, without more; outside business relationships, without more ... are each insufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt of a director's ability to exercise independent business judgment.'"
The plaintiffs also claimed that CompuCom's proxy statement was misleading and
omitted certain facts, and that these alleged defects dissuaded the Company's stockholders from
pursuing their statutory appraisal rights. However, CompuCom issued a supplement to the proxy
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statement in order to avoid any argument that CompuCom should have included certain factual
information on the issues identified by the plaintiffs in its proxy filings. CompuCom also
postponed the stockholder meeting and vote in order to allow the stockholders sufficient time to
evaluate the supplemental information. The Court held that the proxy supplement filed by
CompuCom cured any alleged defects.
This opinion demonstrates the continued importance of the special committee process,
including the use of independent legal and financial advisors, particularly in transactions
involving a controlling stockholder.
b.

In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch.
2005).

In In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005), the Delaware
Court of Chancery held that where directors of a Delaware corporation have made a conscious
effort to employ a thorough and independent process to explore strategic alternatives, they will
be afforded broad discretion in structuring the exploration process in general and deal-protection
devices in particular.
In January 2004, the board of directors of Toys "R" Us, Inc. (the "Company") began a
lengthy, publicly announced search for strategic alternatives that ultimately led to the sale of the
entire Company to a group led by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (the "KKR Group"). The
board, in consultation with expert advisors, considered a wide array of options, including (i) a
sale of the entire Company and (ii) a sale of the Company's toy retailing business ("Global
Toys") while retaining the baby products retailing business ("Babies"). Based on the Company's
market canvass (and somewhat erroneous information from their financial advisors),2 the board
determined that no one was interested in buying the entire Company and that the best strategic
option would be to sell Global Toys, while retaining Babies. As the sale of Global Toys was
nearing completion, one of the bidders expressed an interest in buying the entire Company. In
light of this expression of interest, the executive committee of the board solicited bids for the
entire Company from the final bidders for Global Toys, after a short period of due diligence.
The KKR Group submitted the ultimate winning bid, which was $1.50 per share higher than the
next most favorable bid.
The plaintiffs alleged that the Company's board failed to fulfill its duty to act reasonably
in pursuit of the highest attainable value for the Company's stockholders, and that the board's
decision to conduct a brief auction for the entire Company from the final bidders rather than
conducting a new, "full-blown" search for buyers was unreasonable. The plaintiffs also
complained that the board unreasonably locked up the KKR Group's bid by agreeing to
draconian deal termination measures that precluded any topping bid.

2

Although the financial advisors had only received written offers for Global Toys, they
had also received some oral interest from buyers willing to purchase the entire Company, which
they had failed to pass on to the Company.
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In denying plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the transaction preliminarily, the Court described
in detail the efforts of the Company to conduct a fair, thorough and independent process, which
included consultation with two outside financial advisors, separate legal counsel for the board
and the Company, and an instruction from the board to key management employees not to
discuss the possibility of working for any of the bidders until authorized to do so by the board.
The Court also emphasized the fact that nine of the Company's ten directors were independent.
The Court also noted the fact that the winning KKR Group bid was at or above the top of
virtually all of the valuation ranges employed by the financial advisors. In response to the
plaintiffs' duty of loyalty allegations against the CEO, the Court noted that a winning bid by the
KKR Group might leave the CEO without a job and that the CEO's financial interests were
aligned with the stockholders because his compensation package was largely comprised of stock
and options.3
The Court did note, however, the few instances where the Company's process could have
been improved. Specifically, the Court criticized the Company's financial advisor for neglecting
to inform the Company of the informal interest it received regarding possible purchases of the
entire Company, and was critical of the financial advisor's desire to provide financing to the
buyer: "[It] is advisable that investment banks representing sellers not create the appearance that
they desire buy-side work, especially when it might be that they are more likely to be selected by
some buyers for that lucrative role than by others." However, because the Company insisted that
its financial advisor refrain from holding discussions with potential buyers until after the
transaction was approved and a fairness opinion was rendered not only by the lead financial
advisor but by another advisor as well, the Court stated that although this chain of events "tends
to raise eyebrows," the Court could not conclude that the financial advisor's work prior to
approval of the transaction was tainted in any way.
In response to the plaintiffs' claim that the Company should have conducted a more
thorough bidding process upon its decision to switch from a sale of Global Toys to a sale of the
entire Company, the Court gave great deference to the defendants' arguments that (i) there had
been sufficient publicity regarding the Company's intention to explore strategic alternatives and
that anyone who would be interested in making a bid would have likely already done so, and (ii)
the Company did not want to give up the "bird in hand" (i.e., the bid for Global Toys) by
conducting a long bidding process for the entire Company. Similarly, the Court recognized the
Company's need to consent to some deal-protection measures in order to keep the most
advantageous deal for its stockholders from falling apart. Furthermore, the Court viewed the fact
that two of the groups that had previously been competing against each other in the bidding for
Global Toys joined forces to bid for the entire Company as a positive, rather than a negative,
development. Indeed, the Court said that this "emerging practice among financial buyers"
benefits stockholders in that it permits buyers "to make bids that would be imprudent, if pursued
in isolation."

3

The Court also noted that "to be an inside or non-independent director is not a crime, it
is a status. And that fact cannot be forgotten by those who apply, or those who make, corporate
law. To do otherwise is to risk boardrooms devoid of the very members with the best capacity to
help management craft and implement a sound business plan."
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While the Court declined to invalidate a 3.75% break-up fee coupled with a matching
right, it should be noted that the Court expressly refused to give either a blanket endorsement of
break-up fees below a certain percentage or a blanket disapproval of break-up fees above a
certain percentage,4 stating instead that it was approving the 3.75% break-up fee (and
corresponding matching rights) in the context of the thorough process that was employed by the
Company, implying that a similar (or even a lower) break-up fee coupled with a less pristine sale
process might not receive the Court's approval. The Court also pointed out that the Company's
negotiators were able to bargain the break-up fee down from 4% to 3.75% and were able to
reduce the fee that would have to be paid in the event of a "naked no vote" from $50 million to
$30 million. The final merger agreement also contained a no-shop clause that was relatively
non-restrictive and permitted the consideration of unsolicited bids.
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the financial advisor was conflicted because its
engagement letter stated that it would earn substantially greater fees for a sale of the entire
Company versus a smaller transaction (i.e., an acquisition of just Global Toys). The Court found
that this fee structure did not taint the firm's work.
This opinion provides judicial guidance on a number of practices and issues that have
arisen in the current deal climate and have not been recently addressed by the Delaware courts.
Practitioners who wish to use this opinion as a roadmap for structuring a deal should take care to
note, however, the Court's emphasis on the length and public nature of the processes employed
by the Company, the overwhelming independence of the board, the Court's refusal to provide a
fixed percentage that is acceptable for a break-up fee, and the Court's general distaste for the
practice of financial advisors of the seller providing buy-side financing.
c.

In re MONY Group Inc., S'holders Litig., 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch.
2004).

In February 2004, the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed a number of important
issues for those negotiating the acquisition of public companies in its decision to grant a
preliminary injunction of the proposed merger of the MONY Group, Inc. ("MONY"). In re
MONY Group, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 2004). Specifically, in the
February decision, the MONY stockholders challenged the proposed stock-for-cash merger of
MONY with and into a subsidiary of AXA Financial Inc. ("AXA"). The plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction based on a variety of claims, including that the MONY board of directors
breached its Revlon duties by failing to conduct an auction in a sale-of-control transaction. The
Court determined to grant the preliminary injunction. A week after this first injunction was
issued, the defendant directors postponed the stockholder meeting until May 18, 2004 and
changed the record date to April 8, 2004. The plaintiffs then sought a second injunction
requiring the defendants to make corrective disclosures and invalidating all of the proxies.

4

The Court cited a prior case where the Court condemned a 6.3% termination fee and
stated that such a high termination fee would present a rather high barrier to a second bidder,
implying that such a fee may not be valid even with a pristine sale process.
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In November 2002, the board of directors of MONY authorized MONY's chairman and
CEO, Michael I. Roth ("Roth"), to begin exploring strategic alternatives after consultation with
MONY's financial advisor, Credit Suisse First Boston LLC ("CSFB"). In 2001 and 2002,
MONY had posted significant losses, and in October 2003, MONY had its financial strength
ratings downgraded by four major rating firms. The MONY board considered and rejected the
idea of publicly auctioning MONY out of fear that a failed auction would reveal the company's
weaknesses and provide competitors with information that they could use to steal its career
agents.
In December 2002, AXA expressed an interest in acquiring MONY at a price of between
$26 and $26.50 in cash per MONY share. AXA and MONY negotiated the transaction price
over the course of the ensuing nine months, during which time the MONY board and Roth were
able to extract several concessions from AXA. The parties ultimately agreed on a price of $31 in
cash for each MONY share. During the course of these negotiations, the MONY board decided
to re-evaluate certain change-in-control agreements between the company and its senior
management (the "CICs") that would be triggered by a change-in-control transaction. The
MONY board engaged a consulting firm to analyze the CICs. Based on the consultant's advice,
the MONY board decided: (i) not to renew the CICs (which were worth 15.4% of the proposed
transaction with AXA) when they expired in December 2003; (ii) to offer management CICs a
lower payout that represented only five to seven percent (5-7%) of the transaction value; and (iii)
to forbid Roth from engaging in further negotiations with AXA until new CICs were in place. In
July 2003, MONY's management signed the new CICs. In September, negotiations with AXA
resumed and Roth was able to gain additional concessions from AXA after informing AXA
about the new CICs.
In September 2003, AXA and MONY signed a definitive merger agreement that
contained a non-solicitation provision with a broad fiduciary out, as well as a termination fee that
represented 3.3% of MONY's equity value and 2.4% of the transaction value in the event of
termination of the merger agreement for a superior proposal. During the five-month period
between the announcement of the AXA-MONY transaction and the initiation of this litigation,
no third party made a competing proposal for MONY. The first injunction was granted because
the Court found that the MONY board breached its duty of disclosure by failing to disclose how
the payments to be made under the new CICs compared to payments made in similar
transactions, as a percentage of the aggregate transaction value, and certain undisclosed analyses
indicated that the payments under the CICs would exceed those paid in 75% of comparable
transactions as a percentage of deal value.
In seeking their second injunction, the plaintiffs made several disclosure claims, as well
as allegations that the directors had breached their fiduciary duties by using old proxies and
changing the record and stockholder meeting dates.
On March 30, 2004, MONY filed revised proxy materials with the SEC which indicated
that MONY intended to vote proxies received for the February 24, 2004 special stockholders'
meeting at the May 18, 2004 special stockholders' meeting. The plaintiffs claimed that the use of
the old proxies should not be allowed because such use would be inequitable. The Court noted
that decisions made by boards of directors are usually upheld under the business judgment rule.
However, in the conduct of the election of directors, "action designed principally to interfere
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with the effectiveness of a shareholder vote, even if that action is taken in good faith honestly
and competently is not an action that may be left to the Board's business judgment." Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp, 564 A.2d at 654 (Del. Ch. 1988). When the matter to be voted on does
not touch on issues of directorial control, courts will apply the exacting Blasius standard
sparingly and only in circumstances in which self-interested or faithless fiduciaries act to deprive
stockholders of a full and fair opportunity to participate in the matter and to thwart what appears
to be the will of a majority of the stockholders. The Court also stated that once the board of
directors deems a merger agreement favorable, it may employ various legal powers to achieve a
favorable outcome on a shareholder to approve a merger agreement. A board cannot coerce the
shareholder vote by agreeing to unduly high termination fees or other structural devices that
force stockholders to vote in favor of a transaction for these reasons, not related to its merits. A
board of directors also cannot mislead the stockholders or engage in other fraudulent or
inequitable practices. The Court noted in this case that setting a new meeting and record date did
not fall within the category of prohibited acts of boards of directors.
The Court concluded that the Board discharged its fiduciary duties in its decision to
postpone the meeting and set a new record date, which were done in response to this Court's
injunction and the amendments made to the merger agreement. The Board had to delay the
meeting to allow for the preparation, filing and distribution of supplemental proxy material. The
Board did not simply rubber stamp Roth's recommendations; in fact, the record indicated that the
Board considered what would happen should the deal be voted down and openly discussed
continuing MONY's business with new management. The Court concluded that the Blasius
standard was not necessary in this non-election context and the judgment to set the new record
and meeting dates appeared reasonable in the circumstances. The Court found that in this case
the Board detected a threat of not being able to get enough stockholders to approve the merger.
In response to this threat, the Board changed the record date, which was not preclusive of a full
and fair vote but enfranchised stockholders who were equity owners of the corporation and who
would not use the vote.
The In re MONY decisions are significant in several respects. First, the February decision
confirms that Revlon does not require a board of directors of a Delaware corporation to conduct
an auction in all change-of-control transactions or, in particular, in those transactions in which
the target board has established a "floor" for the transaction and the parties have agreed to a nonsolicitation agreement with a broad fiduciary out that allows for a post-agreement market check.
Second, the April decision indicates that the exacting Blasius standard is not necessarily
implicated by the moving of stockholder meeting and resetting of a record date.
3.

Material Adverse Change/Material Adverse Effect Clauses.
Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., C.A. No. 20502 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29,
2005).

In Frontier Oil Corporation v. Holly Corporation, CA No. 20502 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29,
2005), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed claims of repudiation and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of a merger agreement containing a
fiduciary out clause and other customary termination provisions. The claims and counter-claims
at issue arose in connection with the proposed merger of two independent petroleum refiners,
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Frontier Oil Corporation, a Wyoming corporation ("Frontier"), and Holly Corporation, a
Delaware corporation ("Holly").
Prior to the execution of the merger agreement, Holly's counsel, in the course of due
diligence, uncovered a news article describing plans by activist Erin Brockovich and related
plaintiffs' law firms to bring a mass tort claim alleging that students attending Beverly Hills High
School suffered from a disproportionate incidence of cancer attributable to the release of toxic
chemicals from oil drilling activities adjacent to the high school. A predecessor of Frontier had
operated the drilling facility in the past.
Confronted with this information, the Holly board did not initially approve the merger
agreement, but instead directed management to pursue various options, including bolstering
Frontier's representations and warranties and strengthening the definition of "material adverse
effect" or an "MAE" in the merger agreement. As a result, several changes to the agreement
were made. For example, the definition of an MAE in the merger agreement was modified to
include "results of operations" and "prospects." Likewise, the Schedule to the agreement was
modified to provide that the disclosure of the "threatened" litigation did not operate to remove
this prospective litigation from Frontier's representation that there were no pending or threatened
suits that could reasonably be expected to have an MAE.
The merger agreement, as executed, contained several customary termination provisions,
including, inter alia, the right of each party to terminate the agreement if the other party's
representations or warranties were or became inaccurate or if threatened litigation would be
expected to have an MAE. The agreement also provided termination rights upon the exercise of
a fiduciary out by the board of Holly or Frontier. Exercise of the fiduciary out required payment
of a break-up fee of $15 million (plus reimbursement of expenses up to $1 million).
Following the execution of the merger agreement, tort litigation was actually filed, and
the parties learned that Frontier had, through leases and related agreements, guaranteed certain
obligations at the oil production site. During the same period, Lehman Brothers made a
presentation to Holly suggesting that Holly's pipeline assets were so undervalued that Frontier
could potentially recoup more than 100% of the merger price simply by securitizing Holly's
pipeline assets in a so-called Master Limited Partnership ("MLP").
After Holly's board expressed concern about proceeding with the merger, the parties
engaged in almost a month of further negotiations. Thereafter, the parties reached agreement on
a restructured deal which provided that the Holly stockholders could choose between a
transaction with a nominally higher value or one with nominally lower value but a greater cash
component. Following conclusion of negotiations, Holly's CEO, C. Lamar Norsworthy III, who
had agreed to recommend the reformulated deal to his board, determined not to recommend the
revised transaction to his board, in part due to a concern that he and his associates would be sued
if the Frontier stock issued in the transaction performed poorly, since the insider group clearly
planned to take the high cash option. Predictably, the Holly board rejected the transaction.
Thereafter, the chief executives of the two companies spoke by telephone. Frontier's
CEO presented a series of questions to Holly's CEO, including whether Holly was still prepared
to recommend the merger agreement to its stockholders. Holly's CEO replied that Holly was not
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prepared to recommend the transaction and that Holly's board was no longer willing to support
the merger agreement on its existing terms. The following day, Frontier filed an action in the
Delaware Court of Chancery for repudiation of the merger agreement. Frontier asserted that
Norsworthy's statements repudiated the merger agreement, which allowed Frontier to declare a
breach of the merger agreement and to sue for damages. Frontier also asserted a claim for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to Holly's conduct and sought
damages totaling $160 million.
In response to Frontier's repudiation lawsuit, Holly issued a notice claiming that the
Beverly Hills tort litigation constituted an MAE. In addition, Holly argued that the CEOs' phone
call could not form the basis of a repudiation claim because there was no clear expression of a
refusal to comply with the terms of the merger agreement, given that Holly still had avenues of
exit under the merger agreement. Holly also argued that Frontier breached its representations
and warranties in the merger agreement with respect to the tort litigation. Finally, Holly claimed
that Frontier's repudiation constituted a breach of contract, which entitled Holly to recover
damages.
In weighing Frontier's repudiation claim, the Court applied basic principles of contract
interpretation and stated that repudiation involves an unequivocal statement by a promisor that
he will not perform his promise. The Court noted, however, that the merger agreement was not
an ordinary contract and stated that while the existence of a fiduciary out does not preclude a
finding of repudiation, it does establish the context in which the parties' conduct is to be
assessed. The Court found that Holly had not repudiated the merger agreement because it had
not made an unequivocal statement that it would not perform its promise. The Court noted that
Norsworthy had not stated that Holly intended to ignore the terms of the merger agreement and
that his statement confirming that the Holly board would not recommend the merger agreement
was contractually permitted. The Court also found that by declaring a repudiation following the
call, Frontier deprived Holly of its right to exercise its fiduciary out or otherwise terminate the
merger agreement.
The Court also found that Holly did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Frontier argued that Holly's conduct stemmed in large part from its discovery that Holly
had substantially undervalued its MLP assets in the merger, and that it sought to avoid paying the
break-up fee by dragging on the negotiations past the "drop dead" date in the merger agreement.
The Court found, however, that Holly did not mislead Frontier. While Holly's board had not
formally opted to terminate the agreement and pay Frontier its break-up fee, the Court suggested
that Frontier's suing for repudiation effectively cut off that opportunity.
The Court also denied Frontier's claim for the break-up fee under the agreement. The
Court held that Holly's board never formally withdrew or modified its recommendation, even
though the directors had clearly determined individually not to proceed. In addition, the Court
found that Frontier's right to seek the break-up fee was conditioned upon its termination of the
merger agreement and rejected the argument that Frontier's institution of its litigation constituted
termination. Finally, the Court held that a consequence of Frontier's decision to sue for
repudiation was that it could not maintain a claim for relief under the contract.
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In a counterclaim, Holly sought damages from Frontier as a result of Frontier's alleged
repudiation and breach of representations and warranties in the merger agreement. The Court
found that Frontier's decision to file the anticipatory repudiation litigation and to abandon the
merger agreement constituted a breach of the merger agreement.
In assessing Holly's claim for damages as a result of Frontier's breach, the Court found
that Holly's proof of damages at trial was defective. The Court's decision not to grant Holly
damages was based in part on the finding that Holly, prior to Frontier's repudiation, had
determined that the merger agreement would not proceed on its terms and that, as a consequence,
the harm about which Holly complained was not caused by Frontier's breach. The Court
awarded Holly nominal damages of $1.00.
In reviewing Holly's MAE claim, the Court found that the burden of establishing an MAE
with respect to Frontier fell on Holly. The Court noted that while the notion of an MAE is
imprecise, the drafters of the merger agreement had the benefit of the analysis set forth in In re
IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 787 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001) ("IBP"), which discussed
whether an acquiring party in a merger could invoke an MAE to escape from the transaction.
The Court noted that the court in IBP, applying New York law, found that a buyer would be
required to make a strong showing to invoke an MAE exception, namely, a showing that the
complained of event would have a material effect on the long-term earnings potential of the
target company. While noting that IBP applied New York law, the Court found no reason why
Delaware law should prescribe a different approach. The Court found that since, under IBP a
defendant seeking to avoid performance of a contract due to its counterparty's breach of warranty
must assert that breach as an affirmative defense, it followed that the same defendant pursuing an
affirmative counter-claim would be charged with the burden as well.
Whether the Beverly Hills tort litigation was, or was reasonably likely to be, an MAE
was, in the Court's view, an issue with quantitative and qualitative aspects. Since Holly
presented no evidence, scientific or otherwise, relating to the substance of the California
plaintiffs' claims, the Court found that Holly failed to meet its burden. With respect to Holly's
claims that the defense costs alone of the litigation constituted an MAE, Holly variously had
estimated the defense costs of the litigation as ranging from $200,000 per month to $25 million
to $40 million and then from $40 million to $50 million. Frontier produced separate estimates
suggesting that the defense costs would be in the range of $11 million to $13 million. The Court
found that a reasonable estimate of the costs would be in the range of $15 million to $20 million
and concluded that this range of costs alone did not constitute an MAE.
In addition, the Court found that Frontier did not breach its warranty as to the absence of
material contracts (i.e., its guarantees). The Court found that the documents relating to the
guarantee would be material at the time of the merger agreement if the litigation risks related
thereto were sufficiently foreseeable and large. In light of the Court's holding relating to the
litigation, the Court found no breach of warranty.
The Frontier decision provides significant guidance to parties faced with decisions
relating to a merger agreement that is no longer attractive to one of the parties to the agreement.
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4.

Going-Private Transactions by Controlling Stockholders.
a.

Gesoff v. IIC Industries Inc., C.A. No. 19600 (Del. Ch. May 18,
2006).

In Gesoff v. IIC Industries Inc., C.A. 19600, Lamb, V.C. (Del. Ch. May 18, 2006), the
Delaware Court of Chancery found that the process leading up to the going-private merger at
issue was unfair and resulted in an unfair price to the minority stockholders. Accordingly, the
Court awarded damages to the individual plaintiffs and to the stockholders seeking appraisal in
an amount in excess of the consideration offered in the merger. The Court's conclusion was
based primarily on its finding that the single-person special committee charged with negotiating
the merger on behalf of the minority stockholders did not function properly. Nonetheless, the
Court found that the special committee director was entitled to rely on the exculpatory provision
adopted pursuant to Section 102(b)(7) of the General Corporation Law, which generally
authorizes corporations to eliminate or limit the liability of directors for personal monetary
damages arising out a breach of the duty of care, and was therefore not subject to liability for
monetary damages.
The plaintiff in Gesoff, a stockholder of IIC Industries Inc. ("IIC"), brought suit to
challenge the fairness of, and to seek an appraisal in connection with, the cash-out merger of IIC
effected at the direction of CP Holdings ("CP"), which owned approximately 80% of the shares
of IIC. The challenged merger arose out of the transactions beginning in December of 2000,
when CP's finance director was asked to review and consider CP's corporate structure. After
concluding the review, CP determined that it could obtain significant benefits, including a
reduction of regulatory costs and potential tax liability, by removing IIC as an intermediate
holding company of CP's other interests. Following this report, CP began investigating potential
transactions designed to eliminate the minority stockholders of IIC. In May of 2001, CP's board
of directors authorized a tender offer for IIC's shares at a price per share of $13, which would be
followed by a short-form merger under Section 253 of the General Corporation Law. In
connection with the proposed tender offer, IIC's board appointed a special committee consisting
of Alfred L. Simon, the only director who was both independent of CP and capable of fulfilling
the committee's responsibilities. Simon was vested with the power to present a recommendation
to IIC's full board and the public stockholders as to IIC's position with respect to CP's tender
offer. Simon was also given the authority to appoint outside auditors and counsel to assist him in
making the recommendation. Despite this relatively broad grant, Simon's authority was in fact
"closely circumscribed" in that he had no real authority to retain his own legal counsel or
financial advisor but was instead essentially forced to use advisors selected by or at the direction
of CP.
CP made an initial bid of $10 per share, a price that, though lower than the initial bid of
$13 per share considered by CP's board, was deemed to be a starting bid from which further
negotiations would proceed. The special committee's financial advisor conducted a valuation of
IIC purportedly for the benefit of the special committee in considering this bid. Unbeknownst to
Simon, however, CP was privy to the financial advisor's valuation numbers and analysis. After
negotiating over the terms of the offer, Simon and CP agreed on September 10, 2001 to a price of
$10.50 per share, which would be supported by a fairness opinion from the special committee's
financial advisor. The IIC board met later that day and discussed the process leading up to the
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$10.50 per share offer. At this meeting, Simon announced his decision to recommend the tender
offer to the stockholders as fair from a financial point of view. The full board, however, declined
to make a recommendation.
Due to the events of September 11, 2001, the commencement of the tender offer was
delayed until October 15, 2001. Despite three extensions of the offer period, the tender offer
resulted in only 20% of the unaffiliated shares being tendered, which increased CP's total
ownership to approximately 84%. Unable to effect a short-form merger, CP decided to proceed
with a conventional merger. In late January of 2002, CP's finance director discussed the
proposed merger with Simon and provided him with information regarding the performance of
IIC. The finance director advised Simon of the need to include the independent director's view
of the fairness of the merger consideration in the proxy materials. Believing that he had already
satisfied his duty to represent the minority stockholders, Simon conducted no new research as to
the fairness of the merger, engaged in no new negotiations with CP and did not seek or obtain a
new fairness opinion from the financial advisor. Nonetheless, he concluded that he was prepared
to recommend the merger to the IIC stockholders. On February 1, 2002, IIC's board convened to
vote on the merger. Simon was not in attendance but purported to appoint the finance director as
his proxy to vote in favor of the merger.
In examining the plaintiff's claims, the Court found that the merger was a self-interested
transaction subject to entire fairness review. Although the Court noted that the establishment of
an independent special committee could serve as evidence of fair dealing, it could only do so if
certain procedural safeguards were observed. In this regard, the Court reiterated the importance
of the composition of the special committee, stating that "independence is the sina qua non of the
entire negotiation process." The Court observed that multiple-member special committees are
entitled to more trust than single-member committees, noting that where a special committee by
necessity must be comprised of one member, such member must be beyond reproach. In
addition, the Court noted that a special committee should have a clear mandate, including "the
power to fully evaluate the transaction at issue and, ideally, to include what this court has called
the 'critical power' to say 'no' to the transaction." Finally, the Court noted that the discussions
between the parent and the special committee "should be conducted in a way that is consistent
with arm's-length negotiations" that are sufficiently vigorous to ensure that the parent and the
special committee are not "colluding to injure the minority stockholders."
In light of the foregoing, the Court found that the process followed by CP to effect the
merger did not establish fair dealing. The Court noted several flaws in the special committee
process, beginning with the appointment of Simon as the sole member thereof. That the special
committee was comprised of a single member caused the Court to examine the entire process
with a higher level of scrutiny. The Court indicated that the "moderating influence" of a second
director could have enhanced the process followed by the special committee by making it more
difficult for CP to exert such a significant degree of influence. Moreover, the Court noted that
Simon's mandate as a special director was "fatally incomplete" and that the resolution pursuant to
which he was appointed authorized him to provide only a "vague recommendation" as to the
transaction. Moreover, the authorization did not clearly empower Simon to veto the transaction.
The Court noted that after CP abandoned its tender offer and proceeded with the merger, it
undertook no significant formalities to ensure that the new transaction would be fair to the
minority stockholders and that the legal and financial advisors assisting Simon were far from
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independent. The Court specifically remarked upon the fact that CP's finance director was
receiving information from the special committee's financial advisor, noting that this flow of
information was "inimical to the special committee's power to negotiate a fair transaction."
Based on this record, the Court found that the merger was not the result of fair dealing, noting
that "any transaction that relies on so transparently corrupt a process cannot possibly be found to
satisfy the high standard of entire fairness."
In addressing the fairness of the price, the Court found the consideration offered in the
merger to be similarly inadequate. As to the defendants' claim that the attacks of September 11
resulted in a decrease in the value of IIC's stock, the Court noted that the defendants had failed to
show that the attacks had a significant effect on IIC. Further, the Court noted that the defendants
had offered no reason for the Court to believe that the price was fair on either side of September
11. In fashioning the remedy, the Court noted that "the calculation of damages in a consolidated
entire fairness and appraisal action decided on the basis of entire fairness is a flexible process"
and that the Court was empowered to fashion "'any form of equitable and monetary relief as may
be appropriate.'" Noting the inherent difficulty of assessing the value of IIC—which had wide
ranging holdings in divergent markets—the Court decided to evaluate the reports of the experts
furnished by both sides, to conduct its own discounted cash flow analysis based on those reports
and to test the results against the facts presented in the case. The Court found that because such
process would yield a value at least as high as a formal appraisal, it would not perform a separate
appraisal but instead use the value ascertained as a basis on which to compensate all individual
and class plaintiffs. Based on this approach, the Court arrived at a value of $14.30 per share of
IIC common stock.
The Court next addressed the question of Simon's liability in light of the exculpatory
clause of IIC's charter adopted pursuant to Section 102(b)(7) of the General Corporation Law.
The Court noted that all of the individual director defendants, other than Simon, implicitly
conceded that they were not entitled to protection under the exculpatory clause in IIC's certificate
of incorporation. Simon argued that even if the merger was unfair, and even if he breached his
duty of care in authorizing an unfair merger, he was entitled to raise the exculpatory clause as an
affirmative defense and thus could not be liable for monetary damages. In making this
determination, the Court stated that it was faced with the question of whether Simon violated his
fiduciary duty of loyalty or acted with a lack of good faith. The Court found no evidence that
Simon was personally conflicted in the merger or derived a personal benefit from it. Moreover,
the Court found that there was no evidence showing that Simon colluded with the interested
directors and IIC in their "scheme to squeeze out the IIC minority at an unfair price." The Court
found evidence showing that Simon was not aware of the key facts that made the merger unfair
from a process standpoint, noting in particular that Simon was unaware of the facts suggesting
that the financial advisor and legal counsel supplied to him had divided loyalties. In addition, the
Court noted that Simon's efforts to seek an increase in the price offered in the tender offer,
though based on the flawed analysis of the financial advisor, evidenced a good faith effort on the
part of Simon to negotiate with CP. Based on the foregoing, the Court found that Simon
attempted to fulfill his obligations as the sole member of the special committee but failed to do
so as a result of a breach of the duty of care—a breach that was brought about in part by the
efforts of the controlling stockholder and its agents. Accordingly, the Court held that Simon had
proved that he was entitled to exculpation under IIC's exculpatory provision and was thus not
liable for the damages awarded by the Court.
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b.

In re Cox Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., 79 A.2d 604
(Del. Ch. 2005).

In In re Cox Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., 79 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005), the
Delaware Court of Chancery used a ruling on an application for attorneys' fees to review and
comment on the standard of review applied under current Delaware law to mergers involving
controlling stockholders. The Vice Chancellor suggested that the Delaware courts may be
willing to consider modifying the standards set out in Kahn v. Lynch Communications, Inc., 638
A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
The Cox case arose out of a public announcement by the Cox family (the "Family"),
which owned 74% of Cox Communications, Inc. ("Cox"), of a proposal to acquire by merger all
of the publicly owned shares of Cox for a price of $32 per share (the "Proposal"). The Proposal
was conditioned on agreement to final merger terms with a special committee of the independent
directors of Cox (the "Special Committee"). After the public announcement of the Proposal, the
Cox board formed the Special Committee, the Special Committee hired legal counsel and
financial advisors, and merger negotiations began. During the same time period, a number of
Cox stockholders filed suit challenging the potential transaction. The plaintiffs then began
negotiations with the Family along a separate track. After several rounds of negotiations with
the Special Committee, the Family communicated its best and final offer of $34.75 per share,
conditioned on approval by a majority of the minority stockholders, a fairness opinion by
Goldman Sachs, settlement of the litigation, and negotiation of a definitive merger agreement.
The Family's litigation counsel contemporaneously informed the plaintiffs of the Family's offer.
The Special Committee accepted the offer and recommended it to the Cox board, and the board
unanimously approved the merger. The plaintiffs also accepted the Family's offer, with the
Family acknowledging that they took into account the desirability of settling the lawsuit and the
efforts of the plaintiffs' counsel in raising their offer and agreeing to the majority of the minority
approval condition. The following day the parties signed a merger agreement.
After the transaction was completed, the plaintiffs sought an award of attorneys' fees
based on the benefits conferred by the litigation. Other Cox stockholders filed an objection to
the fee petition. The objectors argued that "the common law rules that Delaware uses to govern
mergers with controlling stockholders create inefficient incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers and
corporate defense counsel, leading to lawsuits that exist . . . almost entirely as a vehicle for the
payment of attorneys' fees. . . ." In reviewing the applicable law, the Court noted that under
Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), a merger with a
controlling stockholder is always subject to the entire fairness standard of review, regardless of
whether the transaction was negotiated by a special committee or subject to the approval of a
majority of the minority stockholders. The use of such protective devices only shifts the burden
of persuasion on the issue of fairness from the defendants to the plaintiffs. The doctrine
therefore creates strong incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers to file lawsuits as soon as a negotiable
proposal is announced, then later claim partial responsibility for the inevitable price increase.
The Court suggested that such unintended side effects of Lynch could be eliminated through a
"relatively modest alteration of Lynch" in which "if a controller proposed a merger, subject from
inception to negotiation and approval of the merger by an independent special committee and a
Minority Approval Condition, the business judgment rule should presumptively apply. In that
situation, the controller and the directors of the affected company should be able to obtain
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dismissal of a complaint unless: 1) the plaintiffs plead particularized facts that the special
committee was not independent or was not effective because of its own breach of fiduciary duty
or wrongdoing by the controller (e.g., fraud on the committee); or 2) the approval of the minority
stockholders was tainted by misdisclosure, or actual or structural coercion."
The Court then turned to the fee application. The objectors argued that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to a fee award under Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966), because
their complaints were not meritorious when filed. Although the Court agreed that the complaints
were not meritorious when filed because they were premature, the Court found that Dann did not
apply to a situation where "an application for attorneys' fees . . . is objected to, not by objectors
who will be economically injured by the payment of the fee, but by objectors who, as a general
policy matter, find it offensive that the plaintiffs' counsel are being rewarded for bringing a
meritless suit." Instead, the Court held that "the views of an objector of that kind should be
considered by the court in applying the traditional factors that govern the size of the fee that
should be awarded to the plaintiffs when they have been party to a settlement that the court
found to be fair and reasonable to the class." After considering all of the factors, the Court
reduced the amount of the requested fee, holding that "no risk premium should be awarded in fee
applications in cases of this kind, when a plaintiff suing on a proposal settles at the same level as
the special committee."
Because Cox is a Court of Chancery decision, its comments on Lynch do not represent
controlling Delaware law. If adopted, however, the principles set forth in Cox would make it
more difficult for stockholder plaintiffs to challenge properly structured transactions. At the
same time, they would make it more difficult for defendants to settle cases and obtain class-wide
releases. The Cox approach also would enhance the bargaining leverage of special committees.
c.

In re Emerging Communications, Inc. S'holders' Litig., Consol.
C.A. No. 16415 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004).

In In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholder's Litigation, Justice Jacobs, sitting
by designation on the Court of Chancery, considered whether 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) could serve
to exculpate the former chairman and CEO of Emerging Communications, Inc. from alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty.
Jeffrey J. Prosser owned 100% of Innovative Communication Company, LLC ("ICC"),
which in turn owned 52% of Emerging Communications, Inc. ("ECM"). Prosser also was the
Chairman, CEO and a director of ECM. Prosser briefly considered merging an ICC subsidiary
into ECM (the "Aborted Merger"), and hired financial and legal advisors to advise him of its
fairness. Because the market significantly undervalued ECM, Prosser decided instead to take
ECM private through a cash-out merger in which ECM would merge into a wholly owned
subsidiary of ICC (the "Privatization"). He hired the financial and legal advisers from the
Aborted Merger to represent him in the Privatization.
Although Prosser had valued ECM at $13.25 per share, and his new financial advisors
had estimated (while working on the Aborted Merger) that $25-30 was a fair price, Prosser
proposed an acquisition at $9.125 per share, which represented a $2 premium over ECM's
market price. ECM's board formed a special committee of directors (the "Committee"), which
20
RLF1-3052265-3

retained financial and legal advisors and negotiated on behalf of its minority stockholders. The
Committee eventually pushed Prosser to $10.25 per share, a price that he falsely told the
Committee would strain the limits of his financing. After its financial advisors opined that
$10.25 was fair, the Committee recommended that ECM's board approve the Privatization,
which it did with Prosser abstaining. The Privatization occurred after receiving the approval of a
majority of ECM's minority stockholders.
The plaintiffs brought separate actions seeking appraisal and alleging breaches of
fiduciary duty by Prosser and the board. The actions were later consolidated. In deciding the
appraisal case, the Court determined ECM's fair value to be $38.05 per share. Although the
$10.25 merger price was clearly unfair, the Court considered the fair dealing aspect to determine
the nature of fiduciary breaches, for purposes of the defendants' Section 102(b)(7) defense. The
defendants had the burden of proof, because neither the Committee's nor the minority
stockholders' approval of the Privatization was based on proper disclosure. Prosser withheld
ECM's most recent financial projections from the Committee and its advisors, providing them
only to his financial advisor and lender, while proxy disclosures provided only earlier projections
and affirmatively misstated that it contained all the projections available to Prosser.
The Court found the structure of the Privatization to be unfair. The Court reasoned that
cash-out mergers by majority stockholders tend to involve unfair dealing. The Privatization also
was timed to take advantage of ECM's artificially depressed stock price. Prosser's co-opting of
advisers who represented ECM's minority stockholders in connection with the Aborted Merger
was similarly unfair. Further, a majority of the Committee and the ECM board were beholden to
Prosser by virtue of six-figure directors' fees, which they were told would continue after the
Privatization, and various longtime lucrative business relationships and current consulting
agreements with Prosser.
Although the one arguably independent Committee member did most of its work,
including all negotiations, he was rendered ineffective by Prosser's withholding of financial
projections and misrepresentation that a $10.25 price would strain the limits of his financing.
Further, his use of Prosser's secretary to send faxes to other Committee members, which he
attempted to justify as convenient, suggested he was careless to the possibility of disclosing
confidential inter-Committee communications to Prosser.
ECM's board approval was also ineffective due to an undisclosed agreement entered into
contemporaneously with the Privatization under which Prosser agreed to pay one director, who
was not a Committee member but who voted in favor of the Privatization as part of the full
board, $2.4 million for past services.
Minority stockholder approval of the Privatization was ineffective because the proxy
statement (i) did not disclose that the most recent financial projections had been given to
Prosser's advisors, but were withheld from the Special Committee and its advisors, (ii) did not
disclose the directors' compensation from other entities controlled by Prosser, and (iii) falsely
disclosed that a majority of the ECM board that voted to approve the transaction served on the
Committee, when in reality only 3 of the 6 voting directors were on the Committee.
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The Court held that Prosser could not benefit from a Section 102(b)(7) defense, as he
breached his duty of loyalty in seeking to profit at the expense of ECM's minority stockholders.
ICC and its subsidiary, the mechanisms through which Prosser accomplished the Privatization,
were found liable as aiders and abettors. Although he did not directly benefit from the
Privatization, the director who entered into the $2.4 million side agreement with Prosser, whom
the Court found had loyalties and economic interests that were tied solely to Prosser, breached
his duties of loyalty and/or good faith. Another director was held unable to prove a Section
102(b)(7) defense because his experience as a principal of an investment advisory firm that
specialized in telecommunications companies suggested that "he knew, or at the very least had
strong reasons to believe" that the merger price was unfair. The remaining directors at most
breached their duties of care and so were entitled to Section 102(b)(7) exculpation.
5.

Disclosures in Short-Form Mergers.
Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., C.A. No. 411-N (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2005).

In Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., C.A. No. 411-N (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2005) ("Motorola II"),
the Court of Chancery was required to fashion a remedy for the disclosure violation it found to
exist in Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 859 A.2d 80 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("Motorola I") in connection
with the second step of a going-private transaction involving Motorola, Inc. ("Motorola") and
Next Level Communications, Inc. ("Next Level"). The Court determined that a quasi-appraisal
remedy that replicated an appraisal proceeding was the appropriate remedy.
In 2003, Motorola, the holder of 74% of the common stock of Next Level, acquired
publicly held minority shares of Next Level in a tender offer. Following the tender offer, the
remaining minority stockholders of Next Level were cashed out pursuant to Delaware's shortform merger statute. In connection with the tender offer, but not the subsequent short-form
merger, comprehensive disclosures about Next Level and the transaction, including financial
information relating to Next Level, were disseminated to the Next Level stockholders. A former
stockholder of Next Level sued Next Level and Motorola, alleging that Motorola, as a
controlling stockholder of Next Level, violated its fiduciary duty of disclosure by not including
in the notice of merger and appraisal rights any information regarding the value of Next Level to
help the former stockholders of Next Level to decide whether or not to pursue their right of
appraisal. Motorola argued that, because it made public the requisite information in connection
with the tender offer, the duty of disclosure did not require it to include any financial information
in the merger notice. In Motorola I, the Court noted that while most Next Level stockholders
had no practical need for even a summary of the information, there were likely some
stockholders who were not so well informed or well equipped, who needed both the summary of
the financial information and references to the other sources of publicly available data. Thus, the
Court held that, despite the dissemination of Next Level financial information in connection with
the first-step tender offer, the defendants breached their fiduciary duty of disclosure by not
providing any disclosure relating to Next Level's financial condition in connection with the
second-step merger.
In fashioning the remedy for the disclosure violation, the Court in Motorola II rejected
the plaintiff's request of a class-wide quasi-appraisal remedy which would entitle all minority
stockholders eliminated in the short-form merger to receive the difference between the merger
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price already paid and the court-determined fair value of the shares, notwithstanding that most of
those stockholders already made an informed decision to forego their appraisal remedy. The
Court found that this remedy was extreme and unwarranted in light of the technical disclosure
violations. Instead, the Court opted to create a quasi-appraisal remedy that more closely
replicated an appraisal action. The Court noted that there were three characteristics of an
appraisal remedy. First, the appraisal statute requires that stockholders opt-in by making a
demand for appraisal. Second, the appraisal statute requires stockholders who seek appraisal to
forego the merger consideration and take the risk that the court-determined fair value is less than
the merger consideration. Finally, the appraisal statute awards minority stockholders the fair
value of the shares as of the merger date. In this case, the Court held that it would be appropriate
to require the minority stockholders to make a choice to participate in the action in order to
replicate the situation they would have faced if they had received proper notice. Thus, any of the
minority stockholders could affirmatively choose to have the fair value of their shares
determined by the Court. In addition, the Court structured the remedy to replicate some of the
risk that the minority stockholders would face if this was an actual appraisal action. Any
stockholder who opted into the action would be required to pay into escrow a portion of the
merger consideration they had already received. If the Court appraised the shares at less than the
merger consideration, the class would be exposed to a potential loss, but that loss was limited to
a maximum of $.14 per share. Finally, the Court held that the valuation would be the fair value
of the shares as of the merger date.
The Motorola II decision confirms that the Court of Chancery has broad discretion to
tailor a remedy for a disclosure violation regarding appraisal rights. In Motorola II, where there
was an unintentional technical disclosure violation and where most minority stockholders had
made a knowing decision not to seek an appraisal remedy, the Court determined that a quasiappraisal remedy that replicated a real appraisal action was appropriate.
6.

Allocation of Merger Consideration.
In re Tele-Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 16470 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 21, 2005).

In In re Tele-Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 16470, Chandler, C. (Del.
Ch. Dec. 21, 2005), the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an opinion denying, in part,
defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' class action claims alleging breaches of
fiduciary duties by the directors of Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI") in connection with TCI's
merger with a subsidiary of AT&T Corp. ("AT&T"). The Court found that the record raised
triable issues of fact as to whether the merger was entirely fair to certain stockholders and with
respect to certain disclosure claims. The Court thus denied summary judgment as to those
claims, but granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to all other claims.
Plaintiffs were holders of Series A TCI Group Common Stock ("TCOMA"), a tracking
stock reflecting the performance of the TCI Group division of TCI. Five of the director
defendants were holders of TCOMB, a second class of tracking stock that was entitled to ten
votes per share, compared to TCOMA's one vote per share. On June 23, 1998, the board of
directors of TCI (the "TCI Board") approved a merger agreement negotiated at arm's length
pursuant to which AT&T would acquire TCI. Under the terms of the merger agreement, each
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TCOMA share would be exchanged for .7757 of a share of AT&T common stock, while each
TCOMB share would be exchanged for .8533 of a share of AT&T common stock. TCI's
stockholders voted to adopt the merger agreement, and the merger was consummated on March
9, 1999. By that time, the market price of AT&T stock had risen such that holders of TCOMA
and TCOMB would receive premiums well above the 37% and 52% premiums for their
respective shares that had been contemplated on the date the TCI Board approved the merger.
Although AT&T was a third-party buyer that was previously unaffiliated with TCI, the
Court reviewed the merger under the entire fairness standard. Several factors led the court to
impose this stringent standard: (i) of the TCOMA and TCOMB shares held by the TCI directors,
nearly 70% were TCOMB shares; (ii) 84% of all outstanding TCOMB shares were held by five
of the director defendants, constituting a majority of the TCI Board; and (iii) those five directors
would have collectively received $220 million as a result of the TCOMB premium if the merger
had been consummated on the date it was approved by the TCI Board, but instead received $300
million as a result of the increase in the market price of AT&T stock. The Court stated that
"[b]ecause a clear and significant benefit of nearly $300 million accrued primarily (over 84% of
the total TCOMB premium proceeds) to such directors controlling such a large vote of [TCI], at
the expense of another class of shareholders to whom was owed a fiduciary duty, then a standard
of entire fairness applies." Because the five director defendants received sums ranging from
$500,000 to $100,000,000 as a result of the TCOMB premium, the Court found that such
consideration was material and substantial enough to render each of the five directors interested.
Under an entire fairness analysis, the defendants bear the burden of proving the fairness
of a transaction. Ratification of a transaction by a majority of disinterested directors may shift
the burden to the plaintiffs if the defendants establish that the special committee was
independent, fully informed and free to negotiate at arm's length. At this summary judgment
stage, when the Court was required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs,
the Court found that certain facts in the record suggested that the two-person special committee
was not fully disinterested. First, one member of the special committee held 246,271 shares of
TCOMB while both he and the other member of the special committee only owned 161,244
shares of TCOMA collectively, suggesting that such members' judgment may be biased in favor
of the holders of TCOMB. Second, each member of the special committee received $1 million
as compensation for his service on the special committee, an amount that was determined only
after the special committee had approved the transaction.
Because the defendants bore the burden of proof under the entire fairness review, they
were required, in order to prove fair dealing, to address any "flaws" in the process suggested by
the record. The Court found that the defendants had not adequately addressed such flaws, even
though they might be later explained at trial. The Court cited deposition testimony from the
special committee members suggesting that each of the two members understood his task on the
special committee differently, which the Court construed as "a structural flaw" because of the
"confusion" and "ambiguity" it created. The Court also viewed as a flaw the appointment to the
special committee of directors with potentially conflicting interests as a result of their stock
ownership. In addition, the Court noted that the defendants did not explain why another director
who suffered a loss of $13 million due to the TCOMB premium was not selected to be on the
special committee.

24
RLF1-3052265-3

The Court also found that the special committee's choice of financial advisor "raised
questions regarding the quality and independence of the counsel and advice received," creating
another issue of fact for trial. Departing from prior precedent, the Court suggested that the
contingent compensation of the financial advisor of $40 million created an issue as to whether
the financial advisor could provide an independent opinion with regard to the merger. The Court
also found fault with the special committee's failure to consider the historical transactional price
difference between TCOMB and TCOMA, noting that the plaintiffs had presented data showing
that, in the eighteen months leading up to the announcement of the merger, the historical
TCOMB premium over TCOMA was 10% or greater only during a single five-day trading
period.
The special committee's financial advisor rendered an opinion that concluded that the
consideration received by holders of TCOMA and by holders of TCOMB was fair. The Court
interpreted this to mean that the financial advisors considered the fairness of the consideration to
each class of stock in relation to its intrinsic value. Even though the price obtained by TCOMA
holders was substantially higher than the market price thereof and was within the financial
advisor's range of valuations, the Court suggested that the premium received by TCOMB holders
may be unfair to the TCOMA holders. The Court read Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader's
Digest Association, Inc.5 as requiring that "the relative impact of a preference to one class be fair
to the other class." This was so even though the TCOMB premium, as the court noted, only
lowered the price paid to holders of TCOMA by approximately 1.2%.
As this opinion was issued at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the
defendants in this case may still prevail at the trial stage. Nonetheless, the opinion provides
insight into the Court of Chancery's entire fairness analysis and the scrutiny the Court will apply
with respect to the structure, composition and conduct of special committees and of mergers in
which different classes of stock receive different premiums.
7.

Allocating Risk in Negotiating Acquisition -- Stock Purchase
Agreements.
ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del.
Ch. 2006).

In ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006), the
Delaware Court of Chancery established a bright-line rule regarding when a seller in a negotiated
acquisition may insulate itself against claims of fraud by contractually limiting a buyer's
remedies. The Court concluded that a seller may not so insulate itself where it makes
representations and warranties in an agreement that it knows are false but nonetheless misleads
or defrauds the buyer as to the accuracy of such representations and warranties. However, the
Court found that a seller may protect itself against claims based on misrepresentations as to
matters that the parties specifically agreed to leave outside the scope of the contract.

5

803 A.2d 428 (Del. 2002).
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The dispute in ABRY arose out of the sale by Providence Equity Partners (the "Seller")
of F&W Publications, Inc. ("F&W"), a portfolio company, to ABRY Partners, a private equity
firm (the "Buyer"), pursuant to a stock purchase agreement (the "SPA"). The SPA contained a
"non-reliance" provision whereby the Buyer agreed that neither F&W nor the Seller made any
representation or warranty as to the accuracy of any information about F&W except as set forth
in the SPA and that neither F&W nor the Seller would assume any liability for any extracontractual information made available to the Buyer in connection with the sale of F&W.
Therefore, under the SPA, the Buyer was precluded from relying on any representations of the
Seller or F&W not contained in the SPA itself or in an officer's certificate. The SPA also
contained an exclusive remedy provision that capped the Seller's liability for misrepresentation
to $20 million in damages (the "Indemnity Claims") and barred any rescission claim by the
Buyer. The SPA specifically provided that the exclusive remedy provision was bargained for
and was reflected in the sale price. The SPA also required Indemnity Claims to be arbitrated in
Massachusetts but governed by Delaware law.
Shortly after the closing of the SPA, the Buyer alleged that several of the representations,
including the representation as to F&W's financial statements, were materially false and that the
Seller knew they were false. Specifically, the Buyer alleged that the Seller and F&W
manipulated F&W's financial statements to fraudulently induce the Buyer into purchasing F&W
at an exorbitant price. F&W never gave the Buyer pre-closing notice of any problems, and the
Seller certified in an officer's certificate delivered at closing that no material adverse effect had
occurred prior to closing. After discovering the alleged problems and irregularities with F&W,
the Buyer requested that the Seller rescind the transaction. When the Seller refused to do so, the
Buyer sued for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement and sought rescission of
the SPA. The Seller moved to dismiss the rescission claim, arguing that the parties had carefully
negotiated and drafted the exclusive remedy provision so as to limit the Buyer to monetary relief.
The Buyer claimed that dismissing the rescission claim, and thereby immunizing the Seller from
such liability, would "sanction unethical business practices of an abhorrent kind and … create an
unwise incentive system for contracting parties that would undermine the overall reliability of
promises made in contracts."
The Court held that, despite the exclusive remedy provision set forth in the SPA, the
Seller could not insulate itself from the possibility of rescission if the Buyer could show that
either (i) the Seller knew that F&W's contractual representations or warranties were false or (ii)
the Seller itself lied to the Buyer about a contractual representation and warranty. This required
the Buyer to prove that "the Seller acted with an illicit state of mind, in the sense that the Seller
knew that the representation was false and either communicated it to the Buyer directly itself or
knew that [F&W] had." Conversely, the Buyer could not seek rescission where its claim was
premised on intentional misrepresentation by the Seller regarding those matters that the Buyer
expressly agreed to exclude from the scope of the representations and warranties in the SPA.
The Court reasoned that Delaware law permits sophisticated commercial parties to draft
contracts that insulate a seller from some rescission claims. However, in cases of actual fraud,
public policy considerations against outright fraud in commercial transactions trump traditional
principles of freedom of contract, even where both parties are sophisticated and have equal
bargaining power. Accordingly, the Court granted the Seller's motion to dismiss the rescission
claim based on negligent misrepresentation, but denied the motion as it related to the fraudulent
inducement claim.
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The Court also addressed the SPA's choice of law provision. The Buyer claimed that the
law of Massachusetts, not Delaware, governed the fraudulent inducement claim because the
Buyer's operations were located in Massachusetts. The Court rejected that argument, stating that
Delaware courts must respect the law chosen by the parties to govern an agreement as long as it
has a material relationship to the transaction. In this case, Delaware law clearly had a material
relationship to the transaction as the Seller was a Delaware corporation that sold a Delaware
corporation to a Delaware limited partnership that used a Delaware corporation to effect the
acquisition. The Buyer also argued that, while Delaware law governed the contractual
misrepresentation claim, it did not govern the fraudulent inducement tort claim. The Court
rejected the Buyer's proposed contractual misrepresentation/fraudulent tort misrepresentation
dichotomy, making it clear that whether the claim is asserted as a tort claim, contract claim or
otherwise should not affect the governing law when the parties plainly provide for disputes to be
governed by the law of a chosen jurisdiction.
B.

Stockholder Litigation.
1.

Director Independence.
a.

In re General Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 20269
(Del. Ch. May 4, 2005).

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against General Motors Corporation ("GM"), a group of
individuals who were directors of GM at all the relevant times (the "Individual Defendants")
(collectively, the "GM Defendants"), and The News Corporation Limited ("News") challenging a
series of transactions (the "Split-off") by which News acquired a significant interest in Hughes
Electronics Corporation (later renamed The DIRECTV Group, Inc) ("Hughes"). Hughes was
previously a wholly owned subsidiary of GM, and the plaintiffs were holders of GM's Class H
common Stock ("GMH"), which was a "tracking stock" representing the financial performance
of Hughes while Hughes was wholly owned by GM. Both the GM Defendants and News filed
motions to dismiss, which were granted on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
The operative complaint in this case (the "Complaint") contained seven counts, which
included allegations against the GM Defendants for breaches of the duty of loyalty, unjust
enrichment, breach of the duty of disclosure and breaches of GM's Restated Certificate of
Incorporation, and against News for aiding and abetting the Individual Defendants' breaches of
fiduciary duty. The Court found all of the allegations in the Complaint to be without merit and
labeled the Complaint a "'door stop' weight tome that … contains some facts, but also offers a
rich stew of conclusory allegations and legal arguments."
Included in the Complaint was an allegation that the Individual Defendants were neither
disinterested nor independent because their loyalties were to GM in order to preserve their
directorships, which put them in conflict with the soon to be spun-off GMH shareholders, and
that this conflict led the Individual Defendants to approve a transaction that secured liquidity for
GM's pension plan while unfairly allocating the consideration from the Split-off between the
GMH stockholders and GM and its other classes of stock. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that
the $200,000 annual retainer paid to non-employee GM directors motivated them to stay in GM's
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good graces and presented a conflict of interest in the Hughes transaction. However, the Court
noted that the Complaint failed to allege that the compensation paid to the non-employee
directors was in any way material to them. The Court also noted that although the Complaint did
allege that the two "professional directors" derived "substantial income" from serving on various
boards of directors, the Complaint did not allege that the income received from GM is material to
them. The Court did note that the Complaint did, however, allege that the financial well-being of
GM is material to board member John F. Smith, Jr., formerly GM's CEO, who receives a
substantial pension and other benefits from GM.
The plaintiffs also alleged that certain of the other Individual Defendants were conflicted
because of various business relationships with GM. For example, Lloyd D. Ward was on the
GM board and was also the CEO of the U.S. Olympic Committee (the "U.S.O.C."). The
Complaint alleged that because GM was a major sponsor of the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic
Games and contributed a total of $23.25 million in cash and vehicles to the U.S.O.C., Ward
would not oppose a transaction that was supported by one of the U.S.O.C.'s major sponsors.
However, the Court noted that the plaintiffs did not allege that GM's sponsorship conferred a
material benefit on Ward personally, and that the plaintiffs ignored the fact that U.S.O.C.
received significant donations from many other sponsors and could have obtained another
automobile sponsor in place of GM. Furthermore, GM's contribution to the Salt Lake City
Games occurred at least a year before the Split-Off occurred, leading to the Court's conclusion
that there was absolutely nothing in the Complaint that would suggest that GM's professional
relationship with the U.S.O.C. provided GM with any leverage over Ward so that Ward's
decision to approve the Split-Off was tainted by his desire to receive a material benefit that only
GM could bestow.
Similarly, the Court concluded that other alleged director conflicts were not strong
enough to rebut the business judgment rule. These conflicts include one director's service on the
boards of both GM and Hughes at the time the transaction was approved, another director's
service on the boards of both GM and Goldman Sachs (which was one of Hughes' financial
advisors in the Split-Off), and a third GM director who was the CEO of Merrill Lynch & Co.
(which was one of GM's financial advisors). The Court stated that a member of the Hughes
board would be required to act in the best interest of its parent company (GM) and its
shareholders (including the GMH holders) and therefore that director's fiduciary duties were not
misaligned. Regarding the other two directors, the Court concluded that neither director had the
ability to dominate or control the GM board, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiffs could
not impugn the entire GM board with any putative conflicts those two directors may have had.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the fact that GM was in the midst of a pension
funding crisis gave rise to a conflict due to the Investment Funds Committee of GM's board of
directors' role as an ERISA fiduciary for certain of GM's pension plans.6 The Court stated that
directors are frequently required to make difficult decisions that affect the allocation of value
between various classes of stock and that this fact alone does not necessarily implicate the
directors' good faith or loyalty.

6

Six members of the GM board of directors were on the Investment Funds Committee.
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As part of the Split-Off, Hughes paid GM a special dividend of $275 million in cash, and
GM also received additional cash and stock from News. The plaintiffs alleged that part of the
GM Defendants' motivation for entering into this transaction was to help solve a crisis created by
the underfunding of GM's pension plans and the downgrading of GM's debt rating, and that this
unjustly enriched GM at the expense of the GMH shareholders. Although the plaintiffs
acknowledged that a special dividend to GM would be necessary, they argued that the amount of
the dividend was excessive. GM responded that the dividend was justified because the GMH
shareholders were receiving increased value by becoming direct shareholders in Hughes as
opposed to holding tracking stock. The Court saw no reason to dispute the GM board's business
judgment in making this decision.
Part of the process that GM employed in dealing with the GMH holders was the creation
of the "Capital Stock Committee," which would determine the terms of any material transaction
between GM and Hughes and ensure fairness to all shareholders. In addition, GM obtained four
fairness opinions in connection with the Split-Off: two opinions stating that the Split-Off was
fair to GM, and two opinions stating that it was fair to Hughes. The plaintiffs attacked the
impartiality of the opinions on several grounds, including the fact that a large portion of the
financial advisors' compensation for the fairness opinion was conditioned on the consummation
of the Split-Off and that each of the four financial advisors had and would continue to have a
business relationship with GM, Hughes and/or News.
The plaintiffs further alleged that GM manipulated the shareholder vote because of the
fact that 35% of the GMH stock was held by various GM pension plans and other employee
benefits plans. The plaintiffs also alleged that the GM Defendants deliberately moved up the
mailing date for the shareholder solicitation because they knew that the GMH stock price was
about to increase.
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not assert the necessary facts or make
sufficient, well-pled allegations to rebut the presumption that the GM directors acted loyally. The
Court also concluded the plaintiffs' claims were largely without merit, that none of the alleged
violations or conflicts were significant enough to warrant the application of either the Blasius
standard or the entire fairness standard, and that the GM Defendants' conduct was protected by
the business judgment rule. The Court's decision to apply the business judgment rule was
buttressed by the fact that the shareholder ratification of the Split-Off was found to be valid and
free from any disclosure or "vote-rigging" violations. In addition, the Court found that there was
no breach of GM's Restated Certificate of Incorporation because one of the provisions in
question was permissive rather than mandatory and the other provision in question was amended
by the shareholder vote.
The plaintiffs' main assertion against News was that it aided and abetted the Individual
Directors' breach of fiduciary duty by agreeing to acquire a slightly smaller percentage of
Hughes in exchange for GM taking a bigger special dividend. Upon reviewing the timing of the
various components of the transaction and the fact that the percentage of Hughes that was
eventually acquired by News was within the original range set forth by GM, the Court concluded
that there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim against News and granted summary
judgment in favor of News.
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b.

In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 531-N
(Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the directors of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. ("JPMC")
(the "JPMC Directors") alleging that the JPMC Directors paid an unnecessary premium in
JPMC's acquisition of Bank One Corporation ("Bank One") (the "Merger"). On January 14,
2004, JPMC and Bank One published a joint press release announcing the Merger, which had
previously been approved by the boards of directors of both companies. The merger agreement
stated that JPMC would pay a 14% premium over the closing price of Bank One on the day of
the announcement of the Merger, and it also called for a succession plan which provided that
William B. Harrison, Jr., the JPMC CEO, would continue as CEO of the combined company for
two years, at which time James Dimon, the Bank One CEO, would succeed him. Harrison was
chairman of JPMC prior to the Merger, and he would continue in that role beyond his two-year
term as CEO. Dimon would serve as president and COO of the combined company until it was
time for him to ascend to the CEO position. The Merger closed on July 1, 2004. On June 26,
2004, The New York Times printed an article describing preliminary negotiations between Dimon
and Harrison. The article reported that Dimon offered to sell Bank One to JPMC at no premium
if Dimon were appointed CEO of the combined company immediately. The key sentence in the
article reads as follows: "Mr. Dimon, always the tough deal maker, offered to do the deal for no
premium if he could become the chief executive immediately, according to two people close to
the deal."7 The plaintiffs allege that this one sentence proves that JPMC could have acquired
Bank One at no premium and failed to do so for the sole reason that Harrison wanted to retain
the CEO title for two more years, and that the JPMC Directors acquiesced to Harrison's wishes
due to their lack of independence, resulting in a breach of their fiduciary duties. In the
alternative, the plaintiffs allege that Harrison secretly refused Dimon's no-premium offer and
withheld this information from the JPMC Directors.
The plaintiffs sought damages in the amount of the merger exchange ratio premium,
approximately $7 billion. They alleged that by approving the unnecessary premium, the JPMC
Directors diluted the plaintiffs' interests in JPMC, resulting in a smaller stake in the combined
company. The plaintiffs claimed that this dilution constituted a direct claim, rather than a
derivative one. The defendants argued that the claim was derivative and should therefore be
dismissed for failure to make an appropriate demand on the JPMC board of directors (the "JPMC
Board"). In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that if the suit was indeed derivative, demand
should be excused on futility grounds. The Court found that the suit was derivative and demand
was not excused. The Court therefore granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
In reviewing the plaintiffs' claim for demand futility, the Court applied the disjunctive
two-part test from Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). The first prong asks
whether a shareholder has pled with particularity facts that establish that demand would have
been futile because the directors are not independent or disinterested. The Court stated that
disinterested means that the director in question did not stand on both sides of the transaction,
which none of them did in this case. Independence means that a director's decision must be
7

Landon Thomas, Jr., The Yin, the Yang, and the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, §3
(Sunday Business) at 1.
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based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous influences.
The plaintiffs' claims center on independence and they argued that at least eight of the twelve
directors were not independent because the various business, charitable or family relationships
listed below disabled them from exercising independent judgment and that they were beholden to
Harrison and unable to act independently of Harrison's influence. The defendants argued that the
majority of the JPMC board was independent, and therefore the JPMC board's decision to
authorize the Merger should be governed by the business judgment rule. The independence of
eight of the JPMC Directors was challenged based on the following connections to JPMC and/or
Harrison:
1.

Riley Bechtel is the chairman, CEO, and a director of the Bechtel Group, Inc.
The Bechtel Group does business with the Trade Bank of Iraq, which is
managed by JPMC. JPMC and the Bechtel Group also share additional financial
interests, such as an investment partnership that is jointly owned by the partners
of the Bechtel Group and a private equity firm affiliated with JPMC.

2.

Lawrence Bossidy's son is employed as a JPMC vice president. The plaintiffs
allege that Bossidy would be unable to vote against Harrison because it would
potentially endanger his son's career.

3.

Ellen Futter is the president, as well as a trustee, of The American Museum of
Natural History. JPMC is a significant benefactor to the museum. Futter's
brother-in-law used to be employed as a managing director of JPMC. The Court
disregarded this fact because Futter's brother-in-law was terminated a week
before the JPMC board approved the Merger.

4.

Helen Kaplan is vice-chair and a trustee of The American Museum of Natural
History.

5.

William Gray is president and CEO of the United Negro College Fund ("UNCF").
In 2003, JPMC matched over $1 million in UNCF donations from its employees.
Since 1990, JPMC and its employees have contributed over $18 million to
UNCF. In addition, Harrison has served as the treasurer of UNCF.

6.

Frank Bennack is chairman of the executive committee and vice chairman of the
board of the Hearst Corporation. He was instrumental in creating Hearst-Argyle
Television, Inc., which has a credit facility with a consortium of banks led, in
part, by JPMC.

7.

John Stafford is a consultant to Wyeth and was chairman of the board of Wyeth
from 1986 until 2003. JPMC is the administrative agent and a lending bank
under Wyeth's credit facilities. JPMC serves as indenture trustee, paying agent,
and conversion agent for $4.5 billion of Wyeth's debt securities.

8.

M. Anthony Burns is the chairman emeritus and former CEO of Ryder Systems,
Inc. JPMC serves as indenture trustee for Ryder, including its recent August
2003 registration of $800 million of securities.
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The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof with regard to any
of the JPMC Directors. With regard to directors Bennack, Stafford and Burns, whose
independence was questioned due to certain financial ties, the Court noted that JPMC is a
national commercial and investment bank and that the fact that it provided financing to large
American companies should not come as a shock to anyone, and that these financial ties were the
only evidence the plaintiffs pleaded to attack the independence of these directors. The plaintiffs
failed to allege that there was any connection between financing arrangements between JPMC
and the companies these directors are involved with and these directors themselves. The Court
held that these allegations, without more, were simply not enough to raise a substantial question
about the independence of these three directors.
With regard to Bechtel, his dealings with JPMC were allegedly more substantial than
those of Bennack, Stafford and Burns. However, the plaintiffs failed to allege how these facts
impinged on Bechtel's ability to act independently of Harrison and did not allege that Bechtel's
continued relationship with JPMC would be jeopardized if Bechtel voted against Harrison.
Regarding Futter and Kaplan, the plaintiffs did not mention any potential influence that JPMC's
contributions to the museum may have had on them, nor did they indicate what percentage of the
museum's overall contributions were made by JPMC. The Court did note in a footnote that
philanthropic relationships with institutions may give rise to questions about a director's
independence, but held that the particularized facts pleaded in those cases were absent here.
The Court relied on NYSE corporate governance rules when considering Bossidy's
independence, and held that although family employment ties can give rise to concerns about the
ability of directors to act independently of a company's management, that fact that Bossidy's son
is not an executive officer and does not live with him renders him independent under the NYSE
rules. For that reason the plaintiffs' attack on Bossidy's independence fails. Finally, the Court
stated that upon first glance, the reciprocal relationship between JPMC and UNCF, as evidenced
by the positions held by Gray and Harrison, could call into question the independence of Gray.
However, the plaintiffs' failure to plead particularized facts caused their attack on Gray's
independence to fail.
In addition, the Court noted approvingly that the JPMC board is dominated by outsiders:
eleven of the twelve directors are not employed by JPMC and Harrison has no power to fire
them, nor can he vote them out because he is not a controlling stockholder. The Court also
concluded that the plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that would lead the Court to call
into the doubt whether the challenged transaction is entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule. To do so, the plaintiffs would have had to plead particularized facts sufficient to
raise (i) a reason to doubt that the action was taken honestly and in good faith or (ii) a reason to
doubt that the board was adequately informed in making the decision. Because the plaintiffs
failed to do so, the second prong of the Aronson test fails as well.
The Court stated that the current standard for determining whether a claim is direct or
derivative, as determined by the Delaware Supreme Court in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004), turns on the answers to the following two
questions: (i) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders
individually); and (ii) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the
corporation or the suing stockholders, individually). The Court determined that the alleged harm
32
RLF1-3052265-3

would have been suffered by the pre-merger JPMC as an entity rather than just the suing
stockholders individually, and that any recovery would belong to JPMC. Any harm suffered by
the stockholders would only be as a natural and foreseeable consequence of the harm to JPMC.
The Court reiterated prior precedent which stated that although dilution claims emphasizing
diminishment in voting power have been categorized as direct claims, they are only individual in
nature when a significant stockholder's interest is increased at the sole expense of the minority
(citations omitted). This was not the case here -- all JPMC shares would have been harmed
equally. The Court also noted that the Court's choice of consideration (cash or stock) has no
effect on the direct/derivative analysis.
c.

Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).

The Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey, retired from the
Court when now Chief Justice Steele was sworn in on May 26, 2004. In one of his last opinions
on corporate matters, the Supreme Court recently affirmed the Court of Chancery dismissal of a
plaintiff derivative action, see Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart,
833 A.2d 961 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("Beam I"), regarding Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.
("MSO") and the well-known allegations of insider trading against MSO's founder and
controlling stockholder, Martha Stewart. In Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004) ("Beam
II"), the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled Delaware principle that mere allegations
of friendship, without more, do not threaten director independence.
In Beam II, the plaintiff stockholder in MSO alleged that Stewart had breached her
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care by illegally selling her stock in ImClone Systems, Inc. on an
indirect tip from friend and ImClone CEO, Samuel D. Waksal, and mishandling the ensuing
media focus. The plaintiff argued that demand was futile based on the lack of independence of at
least half of MSO's six-member board of directors. The Court of Chancery concluded that only
two directors lacked independence and, thus, dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that additional directors were interested based upon social
ties with Stewart. The plaintiff prominently cited In re Oracle Corporation Derivative
Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). In Oracle, the company had appointed a special
litigation committee (an "SLC") to investigate charges of insider trading against the director
defendants. The SLC was composed of two tenured faculty members of Stanford University
(including Professor Joseph Grundfest, a well-respected former commissioner of the SEC), its
counsel interviewed seventy witnesses, and it produced a report totaling 1,110 pages.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the Court of Chancery rejected a motion to dismiss brought by the
SLC, basing its holding on extensive relationships between the SLC members, Stanford
University and the defendant directors. Id. at 947.
In a section of Beam II entitled "A Word About the Oracle Case," the Delaware Supreme
Court advocated a limited reading of Oracle. Chief Justice Veasey pointed out the difference
between the demand futility context and the SLC context, noting that in the latter the SLC (not
the plaintiff) has the burden of proof and discovery is available to the plaintiff. The Chief Justice
emphasized the fact that the extensive ties between the SLC and the defendant directors had gone
largely unrevealed by the SLC's otherwise lengthy report. Chief Justice Veasey pointed out that

33
RLF1-3052265-3

the nature of the relationships unearthed in Oracle were factually distinct from those alleged in
Beam II.
The Delaware Supreme Court also clarified Delaware law on the subject of social ties and
director independence in the demand futility context. Mere allegations that a director and the
interested person moved in the same social circles, attended the same weddings, developed
business relationships, and described each other as friends are insufficient to establish demand
futility. This should be true regardless of whether the relationship formed before or during board
membership. On the other hand, Chief Justice Veasey explained that reasonable doubt might
arise "either because of financial ties, familial affinity, a particularly close or intimate personal or
business affinity or because of evidence that in the past the relationship caused the director to act
non-independently vis à vis an interested director." In any event, the Delaware Supreme Court
pointed out the serious risk a director would take in protecting a social acquaintance at the
possible expense of the destruction of that director's hard-earned reputation. Thus, not only must
such allegations be factually specific, they must support a reasonable inference that the director
was more willing to risk his or her reputation than the relationship.
The plaintiff had alleged that director Darla M. Moore had a close personal relationship
with Stewart and Stewart's friend Charlotte Beers, that Moore had replaced Beers on the board,
and that Moore had attended a wedding reception for the daughter of Stewart's personal lawyer at
which Stewart and Waksal were present. The Court of Chancery had called the allegations a
"close call," Beam I, 833 A.2d at 980, but the Supreme Court disagreed: "In our view, these bare
social relationships clearly do not create a reasonable doubt of independence." Beam II, slip op.
at 20. The Court similarly rejected the plaintiff's other allegations of interestedness. Beam II
thus illustrates the high bar plaintiffs must meet in pleading demand futility based solely on
allegations of social relationships.
2.

Scrutiny of Settlements.
a.

In re Fairchild Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 871-N
(Del. Ch. May 18, 2005) (settlement hearing).

At the May 18, 2005 settlement hearing in the In re Fairchild Corporation Shareholder
Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 871-N (the "Action"), Vice Chancellor Strine declined to
approve the settlement that the parties presented to the Court.
The principal allegations of the consolidated derivative complaint (the "Complaint") in
the Action were that (i) The Fairchild Corporation (the "Company" or "Fairchild") improperly
paid legal expenses of approximately $5.5 million on behalf of its chairman and chief executive
officer Jeffrey Steiner ("J. Steiner") in connection with certain criminal and civil charges against
him in France involving Elf Acquitaine SA (the "French Litigation"), with respect to which J.
Steiner was recently acquitted except for one charge on which he was found guilty; (ii) payments
by the Company to J. Steiner, Eric I. Steiner, a director and president of the Company ("E.
Steiner" and together with J. Steiner, the "Steiners"), certain other of the Steiners' family
members and certain entities in which J. Steiner has interests were unjustified; (iii) the
Company's employment of certain members of J. Steiner's family was and is inappropriate; (iv)
loans made by the Company to certain members of the Fairchild board of directors (the "Board")
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and certain Fairchild officers to purchase Fairchild common stock were improper; and (v) the
Company made excessive and unjustified compensation, change of control, non-compete and
consulting payments to J. Steiner and certain other officers and directors.
The principal terms of the concessions made primarily by the Steiners in connection with
the proposed settlement of the Action were secured through simultaneous negotiations involving
the plaintiffs' counsel, a special committee of the Board and the Company's counsel. The terms
of the settlement as presented to the Court contained a very broad release of claims and included
(i) a payment by J. Steiner of $1,500,000 to the Company as reimbursement for certain legal
expenses advanced on his behalf in connection with the French Litigation; (ii) the adoption by
the Board of a bylaw specifying that any proposed transactions between the Company and any
director or officer of the Company (or any entity controlled by an officer or director of the
Company) will be submitted for approval to the Conflict Committee (which is a committee that
will be comprised of three disinterested directors of the Company who are not officers or
employees of the Company) and will be approved by the Board only with the prior
recommendation of the Conflict Committee; (iii) the amendment by J. Steiner and the Company
of J. Steiner's Employment Agreement to provide that J. Steiner's current term of employment
with the Company will be reduced by half to a two-and-one-half-year rolling term, and his base
salary from the Company and all its subsidiaries will be reduced by twenty percent; (iv) the
reconfirmation by the Board of the Company's policy that the Company will not lease any
aircraft or helicopters from Steiner-related entities; (v) the execution by the Company and J.
Steiner of an agreement confirming that the Company's obligations under J. Steiner's split-dollar
life insurance policy are irrevocably released; (vi) the execution by the Company and J. Steiner
of an agreement confirming that the Company and J. Steiner irrevocably release each other from
any and all obligations for any matters arising out of or relating to the French Litigation; and
(vii) the amendment by E. Steiner and the Company of E. Steiner's Employment Agreement to
provide that E. Steiner's current term of employment with the Company will be reduced by a
year to a two-year term and his base salary will be reduced by fifteen percent.
At the May 18 hearing, the Court cited its "fiduciary responsibilities" to the
unrepresented Fairchild stockholders and expressed four main concerns in declining to approve
the settlement: (i) the Court was not comfortable that the $1.5 million being paid by J. Steiner to
the Company as reimbursement for amounts advanced in connection with the French Litigation
was sufficient, given the fact that J. Steiner was advanced amounts and ultimately indemnified
by the Company in connection with charges that resulted in J. Steiner having been found
criminally liable in connection with actions that may not have been taken in his capacity as an
officer or director of Fairchild; (ii) the Company has historically granted "Barry Bonds sized"
compensation packages for "not Barry Bonds-level performance" operationally and in the
market; (iii) the Steiners and other executives have received consulting/change of
control/severance payments in connection with transactions that ultimately did not result in
significant gains/benefits to the Company and its stockholders; and (iv) the new Conflicts
Committee as proposed in the settlement would not have enough power or authority to bring real
reform to the way Fairchild operates and was subject to repeal by a stockholder vote (and J.
Steiner, as a controlling stockholder, can easily change the composition, power and authority,
and existence of the committee by his vote). The Vice Chancellor cautioned plaintiffs' counsel
that if they are going to bring "meaty" cases like this one in which it appears the claims brought
have some chance of success on the merits and in which significant corporate issues are raised,
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plaintiffs' counsel must either present the Court with a "real" settlement or be prepared to litigate
the cases.
The Court then suggested that it would be willing to consider approving the settlement if
the settlement terms were revised. In particular, the Court suggested (i) the Conflicts Committee
charter be redrafted to give the committee more power and involvement in general corporate
oversight, including compensation decisions, and to lock the committee in and protect it from
being abolished or modified by a controlling stockholder vote; (ii) the Company consider
revising its policies with respect to the reimbursement of the business expenses of its officers;
(iii) the Company provide in connection with a revised settlement a better explanation for the
issues raised in the French Litigation, how the claims brought in the French Litigation relate to J.
Steiner in his capacity as a director or officer of the Company, and how the $1.5 million
reimbursement by J. Steiner was sufficient consideration in light of the total amount advanced by
the Company on J. Steiner's behalf; (iv) the implementation of additional structural and
prophylactic reforms to provide greater involvement of outside directors in the oversight and
management of the Company; (v) the Company consider tying compensation of its executives to
the Company's performance; (vi) the Company consider adding one or two new independent
directors to its Board and (vii) a possible increase in the consideration being paid by defendants
in exchange for the broad release of claims sought in the original settlement agreement. The
Court instructed the parties to confer and report back in thirty days.
Following the court's instruction, the parties reconvened settlement negotiations to
address the court's concerns and suggestions. Additional discovery, including document
production and deposition testimony, was completed to address various existing and new issues
relating to the claims to be released as part of the settlement. The additional settlement
negotiations concluded with the parties' agreement to an Amended and Supplemental stipulation
of Settlement (the "Amended and Supplemental Settlement"). The terms of the Amended and
Supplemental Settlement incorporated the terms of the initial settlement with the following
modifications and additions: i) additional reimbursement to the company by J. Steiner totaling
two-thirds of the company's $5,645 million expenditure on behalf of J. Steiner in the French
Litigation; ii) the company's adoption of a bylaw creating an Oversight Committee, which will
be required to review and give prior approval for all transactions, compensation or other
payments resulting in benefits to any executive officer or director of the company; iii) substantial
reforms to the process by which business expenses are approved and reimbursed; iv) the
company's implementation and formalization of structural reforms to embrace the oversight of
the company's outside directors by increasing the role of the company's outside directors in
various ways; v) substantial compensation reform, including the adoption of policies requiring
that regular bonus and compensation be directly related to the company's performance; vi)
closure of the company's Paris office with $370,000 in estimated annual savings, and vii) several
other structural reforms. At the second settlement hearing on November 23, 2005, Vice
Chancellor Strine signed the Final order and Judgment approving the parties Amended and
Supplemental Settlement. No objection to the Amended and Supplemental Settlement was filed.
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b.

In re Prime Hospitality, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 652-N
(Del. Ch. May 4, 2005).

In In re Prime Hospitality, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 652-N (Del. Ch. May
4, 2005), the Court rejected a proposed class action settlement primarily due to concerns
regarding the quality of the confirmatory discovery conducted by class counsel. The plaintiff
stockholders in In re Prime Hospitality challenged the acquisition of Prime Hospitality, Inc.
("Prime") by certain affiliates of The Blackstone Group ("Blackstone"). The parties to the
litigation agreed to settle the action based upon the issuance of supplemental disclosures prior to
the stockholder vote. Following the consummation of the merger, Blackstone sold certain of the
assets previously owned by Prime. An article regarding the sale prompted a former Prime
stockholder to object to the proposed settlement.
In rejecting the settlement, the Court noted three areas of concern. First, the Court found
that the record with respect to Prime's market check was "full of gaps." Second, the Court noted
that it could not assess the reasonableness of the deal protection devices because it could not
determine from the record "whether or not the board possessed a reliable body of evidence."
Third, the Court was concerned that Prime's chief executive officer -- "the one Prime insider who
possessed the most information concerning the Blackstone transaction" -- was never deposed.
The Court summarized its concerns in the conclusion of its opinion:
It is the long-standing policy of this Court to favor settlement over
litigation--nothing here changes that. Still, in a class action suit,
the Court must remain vigilant in protecting the interests of the
unrepresented class. In this role, the Court must act as a fiduciary
for the absent members and must use its own business judgment in
weighing the terms of the settlement. This task necessarily
requires the proponents of a settlement to submit a sufficient
record. Sufficiency will be weighed on the facts of each case, but
at a minimum, blatant inconsistencies should be explored and
explained and adversarial assertions tested. Given the record
before me, however, it appears that counsel engaged in a discovery
process that was long on style and short on substance. I will not
approve the Proposed Stipulation and Agreement of Comprise,
Settlement and Release as presented.
3.

Section 102(b)(7) and Creditor Claims.
a.

Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,
C.A. No. 1571-N (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006).

Trenwick America involved a suit brought by a litigation trust created as a result of the
bankruptcy of a public company parent and its principal subsidiary. In the Court of Chancery,
the Trustee sued the directors of the public parent company and the advisors to that company,
alleging that various acquisitions by the parent had been ill advised and contributed to the
"deepening insolvency" of the subsidiary. The Court dismissed the case prior to discovery, and
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expounded upon the duties of directors of a subsidiary corporation, as well as several developing
bankruptcy law concepts such as the tort of "deepening insolvency".
In dismissing the claims asserted by the litigation trust, the Court focused on the fact that
both the parent and its subsidiary had failed and filed for bankruptcy and held that a claim for
"deepening insolvency" did not state an independent claim for purposes of Delaware state law.
The Court also found that the Trust had failed to plead any factual basis to support an inference
that the parent or its subsidiary were insolvent at the time of the transactions complained of.
Given the absence of any such facts, the Court concluded that settled law was that the holding
company owned no fiduciary duty to its subsidiary or the creditors of that entity.
The Court also offered guidance to directors of wholly owned, solvent subsidiary
corporations. The Court noted that, as a general rule, "a subsidiary board is entitled to support a
parent's business strategy unless it believes pursuit of that strategy will cause the subsidiary to
violate its legal obligations." The Court also noted that a subsidiary board was not expected "to
replicate the deliberative process of its parent's board when taking action in aid of its parent's
acquisition strategies."
b.

The Litigation Trust of MDIP, Inc. (formerly known as Mosler,
Inc.) v. Rapoport, C.A. No. 03-779 (GMS) (D. Del. Nov. 29,
2004).

In The Litigation Trust of MDIP, Inc. (formerly known as Mosler, Inc.) v. Rapoport, C.A.
No. 03-779 (GMS) (D. Del. Nov. 29, 2004), the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware declined to dismiss an action alleging breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent transfer.
In 1986 and 1990, Kelso & Co., Inc. ("Kelso") acquired control of Mosler, a manufacturer of
physical security products and systems, and installed the defendants Marquard, Wall and Young
(collectively the "Kelso Directors") on Mosler's Board of Directors. In 1995, defendant
Rapoport was hired as President and CEO of Mosler despite the fact that he had no prior
experience as a CEO of a company of Mosler's stature. The Kelso Directors allegedly consented
to his hiring on the basis of two lines in a one-page memorandum written by the outgoing CEO.
Plaintiff, Litigation Trust of MDIP, Inc. (the trustee of the now-bankrupt Mosler) alleged
that defendants breached the fiduciary duties of due care, good faith and loyalty in several ways.
First, in connection with Mosler's acquisition of another security business, LeFebure, from De La
Rue, Rapoport assumed responsibility for Mosler's due diligence without formal board approval
and the Kelso Directors agreed to the transaction without the benefit of any tangible information
concerning the proposed acquisition (which ultimately resulted in "a serious deterioration of
Mosler's liquidity" because Mosler grossly overpaid for LeFebure, Rapoport failed to retain key
personnel from LeFebure and otherwise mismanaged the integration of the two businesses). The
plaintiff claimed the defendants further breached their fiduciary duties in failing to exercise the
requisite care in connection with Mosler's attempted conversion to a new enterprise software
system, which was essential to the proper functioning of its business. Specifically, plaintiff
alleged that Rapoport and the Kelso Directors were advised by Mosler's in-house information
technology employees that this type of conversion would require them to hire outside specialists
but ignored this advice causing difficulty invoicing customers, collecting receivables and
tracking inventory for the next several years. Third, plaintiff argues that defendants breached
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their duty of good faith by ignoring reports of mismanagement, by failing to address the internal
problems that caused the company's accounts receivable to rise from $46 million in 1995 to
nearly $100 million in 1999 and by actively taking "steps to ensure that any additional concerns
of Mosler's employees would not be brought to the Board's attention."
In 1999 Mosler's financial problems because so serious that its outside auditor and
independent accountant, Deloitte & Touche, issued a reportable conditions letter. Neither
Rapoport nor the Kelso Directors took any corrective action in response to Deloitte's warning. In
November 2000, Deloitte issued another letter to the board this time identifying over fifty
problem areas, many of which were identified in the 1999 letter. Again, neither Rapoport nor the
Kelso Directors took any remedial action. In August, 2001, Mosler filed for bankruptcy and
several months later Mosler's assets were sold at auction for nearly $28 million. Mosler filed the
action in 2004 in an attempt to recover on behalf of the unsecured creditors of the company who
are owed more than $200 million damages for breach of fiduciary duties by Rapoport and Kelso
Directors, as well as management fees fraudulently transferred to Kelso by Mosler in the years
prior to bankruptcy.
The Kelso Directors argued that plaintiff's fiduciary duty claims are barred pursuant to 8
Del. C. § 102(b)(7). The Court held that Delaware law permits defensive use of § 102(b)(7)
provisions even when the suit is for the benefit of a creditor. However, "[w]here a director
consciously ignores his or her duties to the corporation, thereby causing economic injury to its
stockholders, the director's actions are either 'not in good faith' or involve 'intentional
misconduct' [of the type contemplated by § 102(b)(7)]." Thus, regardless of whether the claim is
labeled as a breach of the duty of care, loyalty, or good faith, when a Section 102(b)(7) provision
is involved the underlying alleged facts must tend to show that the defendants "knew that they
were making material decisions without adequate information and without adequate deliberation,
and that they simply did not care if the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholder to
suffer injury or loss." The Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary
duty claims, holding that that Mosler met this burden. The Court also declined to dismiss the
claims relating to the allegedly improper management fees transferred to Kelso on this basis.
c.

Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863
A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).

In Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch.
2004), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed an action for the appointment of a receiver
over a debtor corporation and, more importantly, discussed at length a claim that the directors of
the debtor corporation breached their fiduciary duties owed to a judgment creditor. In 1999,
Production Resources Group, L.L.C. ("PRG") installed computer controlled audio systems for
NCT Group, Inc. ("NCT"). When NCT failed to pay for the installation as required, PRG
entered into a "resolution agreement" with NCT, pursuant to which NCT agreed to pay PRG
$1,906,221 and to register 6.7 million shares of its stock in the name of PRG. After NCT
breached its obligations under the resolution agreement, PRG sought and obtained a judgment in
Connecticut state court against NCT in the amount of $2 million, plus interest and costs. Since
the Connecticut court's entry of judgment on January 17, 2002, PRG has been trying, with little
success, to collect the award. To protect its interests as a judgment creditor, PRG brought an
action under Section 291, which permits the Court of Chancery, upon application by a
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stockholder or creditor, to appoint a receiver over an insolvent corporation. In addition, PRG
alleged that NCT's directors had breached their fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty owed to
PRG.
In support of its Section 291 claim, PRG asserted several facts tending to show that NCT
was insolvent. PRG alleged, among other things, that NCT (i) had a working capital deficit
$57.1 million as of September 30, 2003; (ii) had negative net tangible assets of $53.7 million as
of December 31, 2002; (iii) had little cash and cash equivalents on hand and virtually no ability
to raise additional capital; and (iv) had issued close to all of the shares of stock it was authorized
to issue -- 642 million out 645 million -- and had no intention of seeking a shareholder vote on a
charter amendment to increase the authorized share capital until the filing of its S-1, the
occurrence of which, in light of NCT's condition, seemed dubious.
In assessing these claims, the Court noted that NCT, which had steadily lost money since
its inception, had been kept afloat only by the munificence of its primary creditor, Carole
Salkind, who from 2001 to the time of the decision had made secured loans in an aggregate
principal amount of approximately $28 million to NCT and, in connection therewith, had
obtained liens on nearly all of NCT's assets and had received numerous share pledges. As of
December 2003, Ms. Salkind and her affiliates owned more than 1.2 billion shares of NCT stock
on a fully converted basis -- far exceeding the 645 million shares authorized by NCT's charter.
NCT argued that PRG failed to allege facts sufficient to show that NCT is insolvent for
purposes of Section 291. The Court rejected this argument, noting that, to meet the burden to
establish NCT's insolvency, PRG was only required to show that (i) NCT's assets were not
sufficient to allow for its business to successfully continue or (ii) NCT was unable to meet its
obligations as they came due in the ordinary course of business. Although NCT essentially
conceded that its liabilities did exceed its assets, it maintained that PRG had not established that
NCT would have no reasonable prospect of continuing as a going concern. The Court disagreed,
finding that NCT would be deemed insolvent by almost any reasonable metric. The Court
pointed to, among other things, the fact that NCT's liabilities represented close to five times the
value of its assets and that NCT's working capital deficit and its net capital deficit exceeded its
combined revenue for the five years ending December 1, 2002. The Court also noted that NCT's
ability to forestall its complete demise by pledging billions of shares to its principal creditor, Ms.
Salkind, did not transform NCT into a viable going concern.
As an alternative argument, NCT asserted that PRG's sole purpose in bringing the Section
291 claim was to collect on a corporate debt and that the Court was not entitled to grant such a
request. In support of this argument, NCT pointed to Keystone Fuel Oil v. Del-Way Petroleum,
Co., 1977 WL 2572 (Del. Ch. June 16, 1977), where the Chancery Court stated that
"[appointment of] a receiver is normally a remedy of an auxiliary nature incidental to primary
relief bottomed upon fraud or inequitable conduct under the given circumstances, and the
appointment of a receiver should not be the sole object of a suit." In dismissing NCT's reliance
on Keystone as misplaced, the Court noted that the defendant in that case was solvent and that
there was accordingly no justification for appointing a receiver. The Court proffered its own
reading of Keystone; namely, that the Chancery Court should not undertake a decision to appoint
a receiver lightly. After undertaking a lengthy analysis of its own, the Court denied NCT's
motion to dismiss PRG's claim under Section 291.
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The Court then turned to PRG's claims charging the members of NCT's board of directors
and its chief financial officer with a breach of their fiduciary duties. In response to these claims,
NCT argued that PRG had raised derivative claims that were not properly pled in accordance
with Rule 23.1. In the alternative, NCT argued that PRG's fiduciary duty claims -- at least as to
the directors -- were nonetheless barred by the exculpatory provision in NCT's charter. PRG
countered that, as a creditor of NCT, its claims for breach of fiduciary duty were direct and that
the exculpatory provisions therefore did not apply.
The Court noted that, as a general matter, creditors may not allege fiduciary duty claims
against corporate directors, since creditors are capable of protecting themselves through
contractual arrangements and are additionally protected by the law of fraudulent conveyance. In
discussing this issue, the Court referred to the opinion in Credit Lyonnais, which generally held
that directors would be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule if they pursued a
less risky business strategy because they feared a riskier strategy would render the firm unable to
meet its legal obligations to creditors and other constituencies. The Court pointed out that some
legal observers had read the decision in Credit Lyonnais broadly so as to expose directors to a
new set of fiduciary duty claims -- those brought by disgruntled creditors. The Court queried
whether, once the myriad legal and contractual protections afforded to creditors were considered,
an inequitable conduct claim would be extant. Ultimately, the Court determined that it was not
required to resolve the issue as to whether directors owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when the
corporation is within the zone of insolvency.
The Court then recited what it referred to as "settled Delaware law" providing that once a
corporation has traveled through the "zone of insolvency" and entered the realm of actual
insolvency, its directors owe fiduciary duties to the creditors. According to the Court, the fact of
insolvency places creditors in the position normally occupied by the shareholders (i.e., residual
risk bearers). Once a corporation has become insolvent, its creditors become exposed to
substantial business risks as the entity goes forward -- e.g., poor decisions on the part of the
directors erode the value of the remaining assets, reducing the pool from which creditors will be
paid. The Court held, however, that the transformation of a creditor into one to whom a
fiduciary duty is owed does not change the nature of the underlying claim. Considering that any
recovery received by creditors in connection with any such claim would flow to the corporation
directly and benefit the creditor-plaintiffs indirectly, the claims would necessarily be derivative
in nature. Whether a corporation is solvent or insolvent, it owns a claim that a director has
mismanaged the corporation or otherwise engaged in activities that would otherwise damage the
corporation. The Court stated that Section 102(b)(7), which permits a corporation to exculpate
its directors from liability arising from certain claims, applies to all claims belonging to the
corporation itself, regardless of whether those claims are brought derivatively by stockholders or
creditors. The Court argued that there is no justification for carving derivative claims brought by
creditors out of Section 102(b)(7), stating that such protective provisions restrict third parties to
the extent that they seek to enforce rights on behalf of corporations.
The Court next raised the issue as to what pleading standard should apply to creditors
bringing derivative claims -- specifically, whether they should be required to plead demand
excusal. The Court declined to squarely address this issue but noted that, on one hand, the
specific pleading rules for derivative claims articulated in Aronson provide a useful framework
and should apply to all derivative claims. On the other hand, the Court expressed the view that
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the Aronson test should not apply to creditors bringing such claims since, unlike shareholders,
they are not entitled to elect directors and do not have rights to review the corporation's books
and records. Following this mildly peripatetic discussion, the Court expressed its relief in not
being required to rule on the matter.
Finally, the Court sought to locate the bounds of direct and derivative claims. PRG had
argued that all of its claims became direct as a result of NCT's insolvency. The Court
acknowledged that PRG's claim as a particular creditor of NCT had the flavor of a direct action,
but it declined to resolve the motion on these grounds. The Court held that insofar as PRG's
complaint advanced due care claims against the defendant directors, such claims were barred by
the exculpatory provision in NCT's charter. Denying NCT's motion to dismiss PRG's fiduciary
duty claims, the Court suggested that that PRG may succeed on a direct fiduciary duty claim and
on a derivative claim, but emphasized that its holding was not based on the notion that it is a
breach of fiduciary duty for the board of an insolvent company to engage in vigorous
negotiations with a judgment creditor.
4.

Preferred Stock Issues.
a.

Thoughtworks, Inc. v. SV Investment Partners, LLC, C.A. No.
1695-N (Del. Ch. June 30, 2006).

Thoughtworks, Inc. v. SV Investment Partners was a dispute relating to a put right owned
by a preferred stockholder and contained in the company's certificate of incorporation, as well as
the right of the preferred holder to approve the issuance of certain additional borrowings by the
company. The Court interpreted the plain language of the charter to require redemption of the
preferred and to prohibit a new $10 million borrowing absent the consent of the preferred holder.
The evidence at trial showed the preferred stockholder made its investment expecting a
quick IPO. The charter, however, provided for mandatory redemption of the preferred in five
years in the event that no IPO took place. However, the charter also defined the funds from
which the redemption would be made to include "funds legally available therefore" with the
caveat that the company would not be required to utilize funds for redemption "which have
been…designated by the Board of Directors as necessary to fund the working capital
requirements of the Corporation for the fiscal year of the Redemption Date…"
Since it was anticipated that the redemption could take place over a series of years, the
issue of interpretation turned on whether the carve out set forth above related solely to the initial
year in which the redemption was to take place, or whether the company's board could, in future
years, designate all of its funds as "working capital" funds, thereby effectively precluding the
redemption. After briefly reviewing the negotiating history of the provision, the Court
concluded that the "working capital" carve out was available only in the first year in which the
securities were to be redeemed, and did not apply thereafter.
The Court also addressed whether a prohibition on "any contractual arrangement" which
provided for the payment of more than $500,000 per year would prohibit the incurrence of a $10
million debt facility. While noting the absence of a material debt covenant in the preferred, the
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Court nonetheless applied the plain language of the charter to reach the proposed $10 million
borrowing (which would have involved payment of more than $500,000/year by its terms).
b.

Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. v. Granite
Broadcasting Corp., C.A. No. 2205-N (Del. Ch. June 29, 2006).

In Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. v. Granite Broadcasting Corp., C.A.
No. 2205-N, Lamb, V.C. (Del. Ch. June 29, 2006), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed
whether redeemable preferred stock of Granite Broadcasting Corporation ("Granite") constituted
a debt or equity instrument for purposes of determining whether a holder of such stock had
standing to sue Granite in the capacity as a creditor of Granite. For the reasons that follow, the
Delaware Court of Chancery found that the redeemable preferred stock represented an equity
interest in Granite and, as a result, any holder of such stock had no standing to sue Granite as a
creditor.
Plaintiff Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, LTD. ("Harbinger") owns
approximately 39% of Granite's 12¾% Cumulative Exchangeable Preferred Stock (the
"Preferred Stock"). The terms of the Preferred Stock require Granite to redeem the stock at a
fixed price plus accumulated dividends on April 1, 2009. Granite also has the exclusive right to
redeem such stock at any time prior to the redemption date, subject to certain conditions. If
Granite fails to redeem the stock or pay accumulated dividends on the redemption date, then
Harbinger's "exclusive remedy" is the right to elect the lesser of two Granite directors or that
number of Granite directors constituting 25% of the members of the Granite board of directors.
Further, the certificate of designations provides for certain additional contractual protections for
the holders of the Preferred Stock, inter alia, in connection with mergers, consolidations and
sales of Granite's assets.
Defendant Granite is an owner and operator of television stations. Granite, which has
been in financial distress, entered into agreements to sell two of its television stations in May
2006. Harbinger argued that the transactions violated the terms of an indenture governing senior
notes issued by Granite and fraudulent conveyance laws. Granite moved to dismiss the case on
the basis that Harbinger was not a creditor of Granite and, thus, had no standing to bring the
claims asserted. The Court began its analysis with the proposition that the rights of holders of
preferred stock are primarily contractual in nature and are strictly construed. According to the
Court, this contractual level of analysis will exhaust the judicial review of challenges as a wrong
to a holder of preferred stock except in the limited circumstances where the holder also has a
right to pursue its claims on fiduciary duty grounds. The Court then found that the body of case
law (primarily in the bankruptcy context) almost unanimously favored a finding that the
Preferred Stock was an equity interest in Granite. These cases focused on the fact that even
where a certificate of designation confers on the holders of preferred stock redemption and
dividend rights, such rights are not guaranteed in the way that a creditor's claim is guaranteed
since such rights are dependent on the solvency of the corporation. Similarly, the Court noted
that while holders of preferred stock often enjoy a preference on liquidation vis-à-vis holders of
common stock, the right of such preferred holders to a preference on liquidation is subordinated
to the rights of secured creditors.
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Harbinger argued that the 2003 change in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,
promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board under the name FAS150 required
Granite to treat the Preferred Stock as debt on its balance sheets and that such accounting rule
should control the outcome of the case. The Court rejected this argument on the basis that "the
foundational issue of standing pursuant to a statute limiting suits to a certain kind of plaintiff is
too weighty to rest on the slender reed of a corporation's decision to marginally revise its
financial reporting in order to comply with FAS150."
*

*

*

Harbinger is the first decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery directly addressing
whether preferred stock is a debt or equity instrument, although it is in the context of considering
the issue of standing for purpose of a New York fraudulent conveyance claim.
c.

Matthews v. Groove Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 1213-N (Del. Ch.
Dec. 8, 2005).

In Matthews v. Groove Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 1213-N, Chandler, C. (Del. Ch. Dec. 8,
2005), the Delaware Court of Chancery considered the application of a deemed liquidation
provision to the May 2005 merger between Groove Networks, Inc. ("Groove Networks") and
Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft"), pursuant to which Microsoft acquired Groove Networks.
The Groove Networks' common stockholders received no consideration in the merger based on
the application of the liquidation preference in Groove Networks' Certificate of Incorporation
(the "Liquidation Preference") to the merger. Prior to the merger, Groove Networks had eight
series of preferred stock and only one class of common stock. Under Groove Networks'
construction of the Liquidation Preference, all of the merger consideration was required to be
paid to the preferred stockholders with the common stockholders receiving nothing. The
plaintiff, a common stockholder of Groove Networks, sued and claimed that the Groove
Networks' interpretation of the Liquidation Preference was incorrect. Groove Networks and the
individual defendant directors of Groove Networks moved for summary judgment.
The Liquidation Preference expressly governed the distribution of Groove Networks'
assets upon the occurrence of a "Liquidation Event" -- a defined term that expressly included a
merger. Upon the occurrence of such event, the preferred stockholders were entitled to be paid
from "Distributable Assets," which included Groove Networks' assets "whether from capital,
surplus, or earnings." The Liquidation Preference expressly stated that, in the event of a sale of
Groove Networks' assets, "the Distributable Assets shall be the net proceeds of such sale." In
addition, the Liquidation Preference stated that, in the event Groove Networks was acquired by a
public company, the Liquidation Preference could be paid in common stock of the acquiring
company. The Liquidation Preference, however, did not state that in the event of a merger, the
merger consideration would constitute "Distributable Assets" payable to preferred stockholders.
The plaintiff thus argued that this omission was deliberate and that only Groove Networks'
"capital, surplus, or earnings" -- and not the merger consideration -- constituted "Distributable
Assets" payable to the preferred stockholders.
The Court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation and held that the Liquidation Preference
provided for only one preference scheme under which all of the merger consideration was
payable to the preferred stockholders. The Court found that the plaintiff's competing
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interpretation of the Liquidation Preference (i.e., that only the "capital, surplus and earnings"
should be distributed to the preferred stockholders) was nonsensical because, in a merger, the
"capital, surplus and earnings" of the target corporation are not distributed to the target's
stockholders; rather, they are transferred to the acquiring corporation in exchange for the merger
consideration. The plaintiff's interpretation also failed to account for the Liquidation
Preference's statement that the stock of an acquiring corporation could constitute "Distributable
Assets" payable to the preferred stockholders. The Court reasoned that this express provision,
which would seem to apply to a merger in which the consideration paid to the target was the
acquirer's stock, would be rendered meaningless under the plaintiff's restrictive reading of
"Distributable Assets." Accordingly, the Court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
Groove Networks is one of the first Delaware cases addressing a deemed liquidation
provision and illustrates some of the uncertainty that can arise when a corporation must
determine how to apply a deemed liquidation provision to the distribution of merger
consideration in a merger if the provision is not clearly drafted.
d.

FGC Holdings Ltd. v. Teltronics, C.A. No. 883-N (Del. Ch. Sept.
14, 2005).

In FGC Holdings Limited v. Teltronics, C.A. No. 883-N, Parsons, V.C. (Del. Ch. Sept.
14, 2005), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed, inter alia, whether a provision in a
certificate of designation providing that the holders of a series of preferred stock with an
"exclusive and special right" to elect one director "voting separately as one class" meant that, if
the preferred stockholders failed to elect a director pursuant to their special director election
rights, the holders of the corporation's common stock were precluded from electing a director to
fill the preferred stock directorship. The Court found that the holders of common stock could
elect a director to fill the preferred stock directorship, but the director so elected held the
directorship subject to defeasance by the preferred stockholders at any time.
Section 4(b) of the Series B Certificate of Designation of Teltronics, Inc. ("Teltronics")
provided, in pertinent part:
The holders of the Series B Preferred Stock, voting separately as
one class, shall have the exclusive and special right at all times to
elect one (1) director ("[the Series B director]") to the Board of
Directors of the Corporation provided, however, that so long as
any shares of Series B Preferred Stock are outstanding, the Board
of Directors shall not consist of more than five (5) members. The
[Series B director] shall be elected by the vote of the holders of a
majority, and removed by the vote of the holders of two-thirds
(2/3), of the shares of Series B Preferred Stock then outstanding....
Thus, Section 4(b) provided the holders of the Series B Preferred Stock with the
"exclusive and special right" to elect one director "voting separately as one class" and limits the
size of the Teltronics board of directors to five directors. At the 2001-2004 Tectonics annual
meetings, the holder of Teltronics' Series B Preferred Stock did not elect a Series B director, and
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the common stockholders elected five directors. In September 2004, FGC Holdings Limited
("FGC") acquired all of Teltronics' Series B Preferred Stock, and in November 2004 (after the
2004 annual meeting), FGC purported to elect a Series B director by written consent. After
Teltronics declined to recognize FGC's designee, FGC brought this action seeking, among other
things, an order compelling Teltronics to recognize immediately its designee as the Series B
director.
The Court agreed with FGC's contention that the Series B Certificate of Designation vests
FGC with the right to elect a Series B director at any time. Teltronics argued, but the Court
rejected, that FGC only had a right to elect a director if the board consisted of less than five
members. The Court found that the limitation on the size of the board did not divest FGC of its
right to designate a director at any time. Rather, the Court found that, in the absence of any
language providing that the holders of common stock had "only" the right to elect four directors,
the common stockholders had a right to elect a fifth director in the event that the holders of the
Series B Preferred Stock failed to elect a Series B director. However, such fifth director held a
directorship that was subject to defeasance by the holders of the Series B Preferred Stock at any
time. The Court further noted that "as a practical matter, [] Teltronics would need to identify the
'fifth director' in connection with the stockholders' election of directors, because the terms under
which the person would be serving as a director would differ from the other common directors."
Having failed to do so, and there being no mechanism in the Series B Certificate of Designation
by which FGC's designee could be easily seated on the board, the Court declined to order that
FGC's designee take its place on the board prior to Teltronics' next annual meeting of
stockholders.
Pursuant to this decision, it is not enough to state that preferred stockholders have the
"exclusive and special right" to elect directors "voting separately as one class" in order to assure
that a "designated director seat" remains just that. Rather, common stockholders also should be
specifically denied the right to elect a director to a designated director seat. Alternatively, a
specific mechanism could be put in the certificate of designation by which the preferred
stockholders may exercise their immediate right to have a preferred designee seated on the
board.
e.

Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana Inc., 891 A.2d 150 (Del.
Ch. 2005), aff’d., __ A.2d __ (Del. Aug. 24, 2006).

In Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana Inc., plaintiff Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. (“BOT”)
sued Benihana Inc. (“Benihana”), the directors of Benihana and BFC Financial Corporation
(“BFC”) in connection with the issuance of Benihana convertible preferred stock to BFC (the
“Transaction”).
Benihana needed capital to fund its plan to construct new restaurants and renovate its
older restaurants (the “Plan”). The Board considered borrowing money from a commercial bank,
but ultimately deemed that financing option unsatisfactory due to performance covenants insisted
upon by the bankers. Benihana retained the investment banking firm of Morgan Joseph & Co.,
Inc. (“Morgan Joseph”) to discuss financing options. After reviewing Benihana’s financial
projections and the Plan and determining that Benihana needed long-term capital, Morgan
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Joseph recommended that Benihana issue convertible preferred stock. Eventually an agreement
was made for BFC to purchase the preferred stock.
BOT, the largest holder of Benihana stock, challenged the Transaction on several
grounds: (1) the Transaction violated Section 151 of the DGCL and Benihana’s charter; (2) the
Board adopted the Transaction for an improper primary purpose of diluting BOT’s interest in
Benihana and entrenching Benihana’s directors; and (3) Benihana’s directors breached their
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care in approving the Transaction.
BOT first argued that the Transaction was invalid based on Section 151 and the lack of
authorization in Benihana’s charter for the Board to issue stock with preemptive rights. Section
151(a) states that the voting powers, designations, preferences, rights and qualifications,
limitations or restrictions of any class or series of a corporation’s stock may be made dependent
on facts ascertainable outside the charter, provided that the manner in which such facts will
operate shall be set forth in the charter or a board resolution providing for such issuance.
Benihana’s charter stated that no stockholder shall have preemptive rights. However, the
Agreement, which the certificate of designation for the convertible preferred stock incorporated
by reference, granted BFC preemptive rights. The Court concluded that boilerplate language
like that in Benihana’s charter is included only to clarify that a stockholder lacks preemptive
rights under common law. Such language does not limit or prohibit Benihana from contractually
granting preemptive rights. Therefore, the Board was authorized to issue preferred stock with
preemptive rights under Benihana’s charter and the DGCL.
As to the other claims, the Court had to determine whether the entire fairness standard or
the business judgment rule applied. The Transaction was an interested transaction based on the
interest of John Abdo, a Benihana director, in BFC. Therefore, the defendant directors had to
demonstrate that, under Section 144(a)(1) of the DGCL, a majority of informed, disinterested
and independent Benihana directors approved the Transaction.
The Court found that BOT was unable to prove that the Transaction was not approved by
a majority of independent and disinterested directors. Because the defendants satisfied the
requirements of Section 144(a)(1), the Transaction was not void or voidable solely because of
the conflict of interest. The Court went on to address the entire fairness standard based on
BOT’s entrenchment claim, and found that even if BOT’s alleged facts demonstrated an
entrenchment effect, the effect alone failed to prove that the primary purpose for the Transaction
was entrenchment. The Court concluded that the Board’s primary purpose in approving the
Transaction was to secure the necessary funds for the Plan, not to entrench itself.
Having found that a majority of disinterested and independent directors approved the
transaction in good faith and that the directors did not breach their duties of loyalty and care, the
Court held that the Board validly exercised its business judgment in approving the Transaction
that led to dilution of BOT’s voting power. The Court, therefore, denied all of BOT’s claims.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s interpretation of the Benihana
certificate of incorporation and deferred to the trial court’s findings of fact relating to the
directors’ motivation.
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f.

Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225 (Del. 2005).

In Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225 (Del. 2005), the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed a decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery holding that Section 151(c) of the
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware ("Section 151(c)") does not require that
preferred stock confer dividend rights. The Court held that Delaware corporations may lawfully
issue preferred shares without any dividend rights.
Plaintiff-appellant Shintom Co., Ltd. ("Shintom") initially purchased shares of noncumulative preferred stock of Audiovox New York. Subsequently, Audiovox New York merged
with defendant-appellee Audiovox Corporation, a Delaware corporation ("Audiovox"). As a
result of the merger, the noncumulative preferred stock held by Shintom was converted into
shares of non-dividend preferred stock of Audiovox. Shintom alleged that Section 151(c)
requires, as a matter of law, that holders of preferred stock receive at least some dividends in
some circumstances, and that because Audiovox's non-dividend preferred stock does not grant
any dividend rights under any circumstances, it is void under Section 151(c).
Section 151(c) provides that holders of preferred stock "shall be entitled to receive
dividends" based on the rates, times and conditions stated in the corporation's certificate of
incorporation or applicable resolution. Section 151(a) of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware provides that a corporation "may" issue one or more classes of stock with
varying rights and preferences as so stated in its certificate of incorporation or applicable
resolution. The Court found:
Section 151(c) does not mandate that all preferred stock confer a
right to payment of dividends. Instead, it confirms--consistent with
the enabling language of section 151(a)--that a corporation "may"
determine to issue preferred stock that "may" have a contractually
determined dividend right as one of its preferences. If preferred
stock is issued, however, section 151(c) provides that the holders
of such stock "shall" only be entitled to receive dividends at the
rate and under the conditions stated in the certificate of
incorporation or applicable resolution(s).
Under Delaware law, preferred stock must have some bona fide preference over other
stock. A dividend right is only one of several permitted preferences. Accordingly, Audiovox's
non-dividend preferred stock was valid because the Audiovox Certificate of Incorporation
conferred upon preferred stockholders a liquidation preference. The liquidation preference,
without more, was sufficient to create preferred stock.
The Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp. decision reaffirms that under the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, preferred stock must have some bona fide preference
over other stock, and holds that Delaware corporations may lawfully issue preferred stock
without any dividend rights.
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g.

VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d
1108 (Del. 2005).

In VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., No. 127, 2005 (Del. May 5,
2005), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision
refusing to apply provisions of California law that purport to govern the internal affairs of nonCalifornia corporations. Rather, under the internal affairs doctrine, the Supreme Court found that
the law of the state of incorporation applied to the dispute.
Plaintiff-Appellee Examen, Inc. ("Examen") was a privately held Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in California. Defendant-Appellant VantagePoint Venture
Partners 1996 ("VantagePoint") was a Delaware limited partnership that owned 83% of
Examen's preferred stock. In February 2005, Examen entered into a merger agreement with a
subsidiary of Reed Elsevier, Inc. In connection with the anticipated merger, VantagePoint
asserted that Examen was a "quasi-California" corporation pursuant to California General
Corporations Law Section 2115 ("Section 2115"). Broadly speaking, Section 2115 provides that
non-California corporations that are privately held and satisfy a set of factual tests (including
conducting a majority of their business in California and having a majority of their stockholders
with California addresses) are "quasi-California" corporations subject to certain provisions of
California's corporation law. If applied in this situation, Section 2115 would provide Examen's
preferred stockholders a separate class vote on the merger.
In response to VantagePoint's assertion, Examen brought suit in the Delaware Court of
Chancery seeking a declaration that Section 2115 did not apply to the voting rights of its
stockholders. Examen argued that the internal affairs doctrine required application of Delaware
law. The Court of Chancery agreed and granted Examen's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that the internal affairs doctrine was
based on the premise that corporations should not be subject to inconsistent legal standards
among the several states. The internal affairs doctrine requires that the law of the state of
incorporation be applied to matters pertaining to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its officers, directors and stockholders. In discussing the development of the
doctrine, the Court reaffirmed its holding in McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987),
that the internal affairs doctrine "is mandated by constitutional principles." Specifically, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court found that corporate directors,
officers and stockholders have a right to know what law will apply to their actions and/or govern
the accountability of their representatives. Further, under the Commerce Clause, the Court noted
that a state "has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations." The Court
stated that the internal affairs doctrine is trumped only where "the law of the state of
incorporation is inconsistent with a national policy on foreign or interstate commerce."
Turning to Section 2115, the Court found that application of the statute to foreign (i.e.,
non-California) corporations would "produce inequalities, intolerable confusion, and uncertainty,
and intrude into the domain of other states that have a superior claim to regulate the same subject
matter." The Court was particularly troubled by the notion that a foreign corporation could fall
within the ambit of Section 2115 one year but not the next due to the "vicissitudes of the everchanging facts." Moreover, the Court reasoned that the application of Section 2115 would run
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afoul of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics
Corporation of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), and Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, 500 U.S.
90 (1991). In CTS, the United States Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause "prohibits
States from regulating subjects that 'are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan of regulation'" and acknowledged that the internal affairs of a corporation is a
subject that requires uniform regulation. Similarly, the Kamen Court rejected the imposition of a
federal universal-demand requirement upon the corporate law of the states, in part because of the
uncertainties that could result from differences in federal and state corporation law.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision to apply Delaware
law, rather than California law pursuant to Section 2115, to determine VantagePoint's voting
rights.
The Court went on to address VantagePoint's claim that the California courts would apply
Section 2115 in these circumstances. In making this argument, VantagePoint relied primarily
upon the decision of the California Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources,
Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216 (1982), which upheld the application of California law to a Utah
corporation pursuant to Section 2115. VantagePoint asserted that if Delaware refused to apply
Section 2115, there would be an inconsistency among the states and litigants would engage in
unseemly forum shopping. The Supreme Court firmly rejected this argument. The Court noted
that Wilson was decided before CTS, Kamen and McDermott. Further, ten years after Wilson, the
California Supreme Court cited with approval the Delaware Supreme Court's analysis of the
internal affairs doctrine in McDermott. Finally, only two years ago, the California Court of
Appeals questioned the continued validity of Wilson and also cited McDermott approvingly.
Thus, the Court concluded that it "had no doubt" that today the California courts would apply
Delaware law to the internal affairs of a Delaware corporation.
The VantagePoint decision reaffirms Delaware's strong commitment to the internal
affairs doctrine and makes clear that the doctrine will be applied even where the law of a sister
state purports to mandate a contrary rule.
h.

WatchMark v. Argo Global Capital, C.A. No. 711-N (Del. Ch.
Nov. 4, 2004).

In WatchMark Corporation v. ARGO Global Capital, LLC, C.A. No. 711-N (Del. Ch.
Nov. 4, 2004), the Delaware Court of Chancery added to a long line of Delaware cases holding
that protective provisions in a certificate of incorporation that provide for a separate series vote
on an amendment to the corporation's certificate of incorporation that results in the diminution of
the rights of the holders of such series does not apply to an amendment effected by merger,
absent an express provision in the charter to the contrary.
In August, 2004 the board of directors of WatchMark Corp. ("WatchMark"), a privately
held Delaware corporation, determined to raise capital for a pending acquisition through the
offering of a new series of preferred stock, the Series F Preferred Stock (the "Series F"). The
authorization of the Series F triggered protective provisions in WatchMark's certificate of
incorporation that provided each existing series of preferred stock with a separate series vote on
any amendment to the WatchMark certificate that altered the preferences, rights, privileges or
powers of such series so as to affect them adversely. Thereafter, defendant ARGO Global
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Capital, LLC ("ARGO"), the predominant holder of WatchMark's Series B Preferred Stock (the
"Series B"), indicated that ARGO would veto the transaction through its separate series vote.
Faced with ARGO's threatened veto of the Series F financing, the WatchMark board
determined to merge a wholly owned subsidiary into WatchMark and amend the WatchMark
certificate of incorporation in the merger to remove the separate series voting requirements for
each series of WatchMark's preferred stock. However, the proposed certificate of incorporation
(as proposed to be amended) retained all other material provisions of the pre-merger WatchMark
certificate of incorporation, including a provision requiring the affirmative vote of the holders of
seventy percent (70%) of the outstanding preferred stock, voting together as a single class, to
approve a merger. The WatchMark certificate also contained a "no impairment" provision,
requiring WatchMark to seek the consent of the preferred stockholders whenever such consent
was required by the protective provisions in the certificate of incorporation and otherwise act in
good faith in the performance of its obligations under the certificate of incorporation.
WatchMark brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the rights of the
holders of the Series B to vote as a separate series on the proposed merger. ARGO brought a
counterclaim against WatchMark and its board of directors alleging that the proposed merger
violated contractual and fiduciary obligations owed to the holders of Series B and moved for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the proposed merger. For the reasons that follow, the Court
denied ARGO's request for a preliminary injunction, and found that the holders of the Series B
were not entitled to a separate series vote and that the Watchmark board did not breach any
fiduciary obligations to the holders of the Series B, each in connection with the proposed merger.
Relying on a long line of Delaware cases, including the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Elliot Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corporation, 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998) the Court
found that the holders of Series B were not entitled to a separate series vote on the merger since
the provision providing for a separate series vote on amendments to the WatchMark certificate
did not expressly reference mergers. In addition, the Court found that the "no impairment"
provision of WatchMark's certificate of incorporation did not provide the holders of Series B
with any additional voting rights, but merely required WatchMark to perform its existing
obligations under the certificate in good faith when undertaking a particular transaction, which in
this case the Court found to be the obligation to obtain the vote of seventy percent (70%) of the
holders of the preferred stock, voting together as a class, on the proposed merger. Finally, the
Court found that ARGO failed to rebut the business judgment rule with respect to its fiduciary
duty claims since ARGO did not show that the WatchMark board treated the holders of Series B
disparately in connection with the proposed merger. On the contrary, the Court found that the
proposed merger would accomplish only one objective -- the removal of the separate series votes
of each of the series of WatchMark preferred stock on an amendment to the certificate of
incorporation that adversely affected the rights of such series. Since this change affected all
series of preferred stock equally, the Court found no disparate treatment.
The WatchMark decision reaffirms a long line of Delaware decisions holding that
protective provisions giving blocking rights on charter amendments that do not expressly
reference mergers do not provide any protection in connection with an amendment to a charter
by merger. The WatchMark decision also is only the second decision of a Delaware court
addressing "no impairment" clauses. Even more so than its predecessor, Kumar Racing Corp. of
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Am. Inc., C.A. No. 12039 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 1999), the WatchMark decision suggests that
impairment clauses will not afford investors any substantive protection on their investment.
5.

Section 211 Annual Meeting Requirement.
Newcastle Partners, L.P. v. Vesta Insurance Group, Inc., C.A. No. 1485N (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2005), aff'd, No. 562, 2005 (Del. Nov. 16, 2005)
(Table).

In Newcastle Partners, L.P. v. Vesta Insurance Group, Inc., C.A. No. 1485-N, Lamb,
V.C. (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2005), the Delaware Court of Chancery ordered a Delaware corporation
to hold an annual meeting even though the corporation was unable to distribute an annual report
containing audited financial statements prior to the meeting. The Court held that SEC
regulations requiring distribution of the annual report prior to the meeting do not conflict with
the requirement of an annual meeting under Section 211 of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware ("Section 211").
Plaintiff Newcastle Partners, L.P. ("Newcastle"), a stockholder of defendant Vesta
Insurance Group, Inc. ("Vesta"), brought suit in July 2005 under Section 211 to compel Vesta to
hold an annual meeting of stockholders. Newcastle also announced its intent to conduct a proxy
contest to elect three nominees to Vesta's eight-member classified board of directors at the
meeting. At the time the action was filed, Vesta had not held a meeting of its stockholders since
June 1, 2004, and had failed to file 10-Qs and 10-Ks since the 10-Q for the quarter ending June
30, 2004. After the action was instituted, but before trial, Vesta's board of directors scheduled
the annual meeting for November 22, 2005.
The Court of Chancery held trial on August 19, 2005. At trial, Vesta's witnesses
(including the CEO, the CFO and the chairman of the Audit Committee) testified that the
corporation had been unable to complete its audited financial statements in a timely manner due
in part to accounting errors in prior periods and the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but
that Vesta expected that the auditing work would be completed by the end of September 2005, so
that audited financial statements would be available in time for the scheduled November 22
meeting. Accordingly, at trial Vesta sought to hold the meeting on November 22. Newcastle
requested that the Court order a meeting to occur as soon as possible, and in no event later than
late September 2005.
Vesta also argued in the alternative that federal securities regulations prohibited the
corporation from holding an annual meeting of stockholders for the election of directors when
the corporation was unable to file an annual report containing audited financial statements.
Specifically, Vesta argued that Rule 14a-3 requires prior dissemination of an annual report if a
registrant intends to solicit proxies for the election of directors at a meeting, and that Rules 14c-2
and 14c-3 require prior dissemination of an annual report and an information statement if a
registrant intends to hold an annual meeting to elect directors but does not intend to solicit
proxies. Accordingly, Vesta argued that the Court should allow or order the meeting to take
place on November 22, when the annual report was expected to be available.
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In an oral ruling at the conclusion of trial on August 19, 2005, the Court ordered Vesta to
hold its annual meeting on or before November 17, 2005, 90 days after trial. The Court declined
to base its ruling on a possible conflict between Section 211's requirement of an annual meeting
and the SEC rules' requirement of distribution of an annual report prior to an annual meeting.
Instead, the Court based its ruling on its discretionary power under Section 211 and on the
evidence suggesting that Vesta expected in good faith that the necessary filings would be ready
by approximately the end of September. Accordingly, the public policy favoring an informed
stockholder electorate counseled in favor of a meeting at a time when the annual report would be
available. The Court issued an order of final judgment implementing its ruling, without written
opinion, on September 1, 2005.
On November 10, 2005, Vesta moved for relief from judgment under Rule 60. In support
of its motion, Vesta presented an affidavit from Vesta's CEO explaining that, contrary to the
expectation expressed at trial, the audited financial statements were still not ready, and that Vesta
could not predict with confidence when they would be ready. Vesta also presented an affidavit
from outside counsel describing certain communications between the company's counsel and the
SEC, the latest of which had occurred on November 10, concerning the possible conflict between
the Court's order and the SEC rules described above. According to the affidavit, Vesta's outside
counsel advised the SEC staff members that Vesta had determined that audited financial
information would not be available in time to distribute an annual report and information
statement prior to the November 17 meeting. According to the affidavit, the SEC staffers told
Vesta's outside counsel that the staff did not want to be in the position of having to decide what
position to take if Vesta held the meeting under court order without complying with the
regulations requiring distribution of an annual report prior to the meeting. The SEC staffers then
orally asked Vesta not to hold the meeting without complying with the proxy rules.
The Court heard oral argument on Vesta's application for relief from judgment on
November 14, 2005, and denied the application from the bench at the conclusion of argument.
In a written opinion issued on November 15, 2005, the Court further explained its rationale. The
Court noted that it had allowed Vesta 90 days after trial (a period the Court regarded as "the
outer bounds of … discretion"), rather than "the usual period of 30 to 45 days," to hold its
meeting based on Vesta's trial witnesses' confident and factually supported predictions that the
required disclosures would be ready in time for a mid-November meeting. Because Vesta could
no longer predict with confidence when the audited financial statements would be available, the
Court noted that Vesta's application for relief from judgment effectively sought an indefinite
delay of the meeting.
The Court then turned to the potential conflict between Delaware's annual meeting
requirement and the SEC's disclosure requirements. The Court noted that it had recognized at
trial that "Vesta could not, of its own volition, convene a meeting at this time in conformity with
SEC proxy regulations." However, the Court held that the evidence Vesta had presented in
support of its motion was insufficient to show that the SEC would interpret its regulations to
prohibit Vesta from holding the annual meeting pursuant to a Court order. The Court noted that
the SEC staff members who had discussed the matter with Vesta had not threatened any
enforcement action, nor stated definitively whether the SEC's position would be that federal
regulations prohibited Vesta from holding a court-ordered meeting when audited financial
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statements were not available. The Court concluded, "Obviously, [Vesta's communication with
the SEC] falls far short of a definitive interpretation of the SEC rules."
The Court then discussed the legislative history and purpose of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and of Sections 14(a) and 14(c), concluding, "[n]othing in either that
statute or regulation suggests any purpose to interfere with the power of state courts to require
that stockholder meetings be held in accordance with the requirements of state corporation law in
situations where the registrant corporation is delinquent in its SEC filing obligations and, thus, is
unable to comply with the literal terms of the SEC proxy rules." The Court also noted that its
order pursuant to Section 211 was "paradigmatically within the internal affairs doctrine," and
held that any suggestion of an irreconcilable conflict between the Court's order and the SEC
regulations would "both misconstrue the scheme of federal proxy regulation and weaken a basic
premise of American corporate law that is a defining characteristic of our federal system."
Accordingly, the Court denied Vesta's application for relief from judgment.
On November 15, 2005, Vesta appealed to the Supreme Court of Delaware. The
Supreme Court issued an order the following day, affirming "on the basis of and for the reasons
assigned by the Court of Chancery in its well-reasoned decision." Vesta Insurance Group, Inc. v.
Newcastle Partners, L.P., No. 562, 2005 (Del. Nov. 16, 2005) (Table). Vesta held its annual
meeting of stockholders, pursuant to the Court of Chancery's order, on November 17, 2005.
Ultimately the Vesta Insurance decision indicates that Delaware courts will enforce
Delaware's statutory annual meeting requirement on all corporations, even those that are unable
to hold meetings of their own volition due to an inability to comply with SEC disclosure
requirements.
6.

Validity of Advance Notice Bylaw.
a.

Accipiter Life Sciences Fund, L.P. v. Lifepoint Hospitals, Inc., __
A.2d __, C.A. No. 2057-N (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2006).

Plaintiff Accipiter Life Sciences Fund, L.P. is a hedge fund which owned a position in
Lifepoint Hospitals, Inc. Lifepoint, having received a shareholder proposal for its upcoming
annual meeting, determined to trigger its advance notice by-law provision by giving notice of its
upcoming annual meeting, thus causing any other potential shareholder proposals to be put forth
promptly or barred. Having previously drafted and prepared for filing a press release relating to
its earnings, Lifepoint added a sentence to that release relating to the setting of its annual
meeting without specially calling attention to the fact that the press release dealt with the
announcement of an annual meeting, either by special heading or sub-heading.
Accipiter's principals read the press release, but failed to notice the disclosure relating to
the annual meeting. When they later nominated candidates for election at the meeting, and
learned that they had missed the deadline, they sued seeking an order of the Court of Chancery
setting aside the advance notice by-law's application on grounds that the failure to file a separate
press release or otherwise call out the disclosure concerning the annual meeting was an
inequitable manipulation of the corporate machinery, proscribed by Delaware law.
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The Court denied the relief requested and entered judgment in favor of Lifepoint. While
the Court made clear that the disclosure of the annual meeting date could have been enhanced by
the simple expedient of a heading in the financial press release or a separate press release, the
Court declined to find that the information was "buried" or otherwise not available upon the
exercise of simple diligence. The fact that two principals of the plaintiff had missed the
information was not, in the Court's view, enough to enjoin the operation of the by-law. After
finding that the company did not act with the specific intent of limiting a dissident slate from
emerging (the company had no word of the Accipiter's possible slate until it was filed), the Court
determined that it would not exercise its equitable powers because the case lacked "compelling
circumstances" suggesting that the company "unfairly manipulated the voting process in such a
serious way as to constitute an evident or grave incursion into the fabric of the corporate law."
b.

Oliver Press Partners, LLC v. W. Patrick Decker, C.A. No. 1817N (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 2005).

On December 2, 2005, plaintiffs in Delaware filed Oliver Press Partners, LLC v. W.
Patrick Decker, C.A. No. 1817-N, which challenges the facial validity of the 120-150 day
advance notice bylaw enacted by MatrixOne, Inc. ("MatrixOne") in connection with its initial
public offering in March 2000. The advance notice bylaw at issue states, in part:
To be timely, a stockholder's notice shall be delivered to the
Secretary at the principal executive offices of the Corporation not
later than the close of business on the one hundred twentieth
(120th) day nor earlier than the close of business on the one
hundred fiftieth (150th) day prior to the first anniversary of the
date of the proxy statement delivered to stockholders in connection
with the preceding year's annual meeting; provided, however, that
if either (i) the date of the annual meeting is more than thirty (30)
days before or more than sixty (60) days after the first anniversary
date of the preceding year's annual meeting or (ii) no proxy
statement was delivered to stockholders in connection with the
preceding year's annual meeting, notice by the stockholder to be
timely must be so delivered not earlier than the close of business
on the ninetieth (90th) day prior to such annual meeting and not
later than the close of business on the later of the sixtieth (60th)
day prior to such annual meeting or the close of business on the
tenth (10th) day following the day on which public announcement
of the date of such meeting is first made by the Corporation.
In April 2005, MatrixOne announced that it was conducting an internal investigation into
its revenue accounting. The investigation led to a restatement of MatrixOne's financial
statements that was not completed until early November 2005. On November 21, 2005,
MatrixOne filed proxy materials for its 2005 annual meeting, noticing the meeting for December
22, 2005. Historically, the annual meeting has been held by MatrixOne between November 5
and November 9.
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Plaintiffs desire to nominate a slate of directors for election at the annual meeting of
MatrixOne; however, the advance notice bylaw prevents them from doing so. Therefore,
plaintiffs filed an action to invalidate the advance notice bylaw on grounds that the bylaw is
unreasonable and inequitable on its face and to delay the annual meeting. Rather than seeking
injunctive relief, plaintiffs sought to conduct an expedited trial prior to the December 22 annual
meeting. After oral argument, the Court denied plaintiffs' request for expedition based upon an
unreasonable delay in filing suit and a lack of imminent irreparable harm to plaintiffs.
In drafting or providing advice regarding an advance notice bylaw, practitioners should
be aware of the allegations (by at least one set of plaintiffs) that a 120-150 day advance notice
bylaw is invalid per se.
7.

Section 141(a) Stockholder Power.
Unisuper, Ltd. v. News Corp., C.A. No. 1699-N (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005)

In Unisuper, Ltd. v. News Corp., C.A. No. 1699-N, Chandler, C. (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2005), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed the claim by a group of Australian
institutional stockholders that News Corp. had breached its alleged agreement to implement and
uphold a board policy providing that it would not extend its rights plan past a specified period in
the absence of stockholder approval. The dispute in this case was borne out of News Corp.'s
reorganization and migration to Delaware from Australia in April of 2004, the consummation of
which was contingent on stockholder approval. In response to the proposed reorganization, the
Australian Council of Super Investors Inc. ("ACSI") and Corporate Governance International
("CGI") raised several concerns with respect to the rights of stockholders and corporate
governance issues. Specifically, they noted that, under Delaware law, News Corp.'s board of
directors would have the power to adopt a rights plan without stockholder approval, while
stockholder approval would be required under Australian law. To alleviate this concern, ACSI
and CGI proposed an amendment to News Corp.'s post-reorganization charter that would
prohibit News Corp.'s board from adopting a rights plan. News Corp.'s general counsel indicated
that the proposed amendment was impractical due to time constraints imposed by the
reorganization and related transactions. The plaintiffs alleged that a representative of News
Corp. proposed that, as an alternative, the rights plan issue could be addressed through a board
policy requiring a stockholder vote to approve the extension, past a one-year period, of any rights
plan adopted by the board. The plaintiffs also alleged that a representative of News Corp. had
agreed that News Corp.'s board would not circumvent the policy by adopting successive oneyear rights plans with substantially similar terms and conditions. In October of 2004, News
Corp. issued a press release disclosing that its board had adopted such a policy and sent a letter
to its stockholders informing them of the policy.
On October 26, 2004, News Corp.'s stockholders, including the plaintiffs, voted to
approve the reorganization. On November 8, 2004, Liberty Media Corporation emerged as a
potential hostile acquirer of News Corp. and, in response thereto, News Corp.'s board adopted a
rights plan. In the press release announcing the adoption the rights plan, News Corp. indicated
that, on a going forward basis, it would determine whether to implement the board policy based
on a consideration of the facts and circumstances existing at the relevant time. On November 8,
2005, News Corp.'s board extended the rights plan without obtaining a stockholder vote.
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As a result of the foregoing actions, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging claims based
on breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and equitable
fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiffs alleged that News Corp., in agreeing to adopt
the board policy, entered into a contract with the plaintiffs. They further claimed that they had
agreed to vote in favor of the reorganization in consideration of the promises contained in such
contract. News Corp. moved to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims. News Corp. conceded, for
purposes of the motion, that it had entered into an agreement with the stockholders in respect of
the policy, but argued that the parties never negotiated to make the policy irrevocable and that, in
any event, Delaware law provides that a board policy is non-binding and revocable by the board
at any time. In addition, News Corp. argued that, even if such a contract existed, it would be
unenforceable as a matter of law.
In arguing that the contract was unenforceable, News Corp. first claimed that Section
141(a) of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, which generally provides that
the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation shall be managed by its board of directors,
essentially prohibits a board from contractually ceding its powers to the stockholders.
Specifically, News Corp. claimed that any limitation on the power of a board must be
memorialized in the certificate of incorporation. The Court rejected that argument, stating that
the "fact that the alleged contract in this case gives power to the shareholders saves it from
invalidation under Section 141(a)." The Court further stated that when the stockholders exercise
their right to control the corporation, the board "must give way [because] the board's power -which is that of an agent's with regard to its principal -- derives from the shareholders, who are
the ultimate holders of power under Delaware law."
News Corp. also claimed that any such contract should be unenforceable because
Delaware law prevents a board from entering into an agreement that requires it to refrain from
acting where it is compelled by its fiduciary duties to act. News Corp. cited several well known
Delaware cases in support of this proposition, but the Court ultimately rejected the argument,
stating that it was "an attempt to use fiduciary duties in a way that misconceives the purpose of
fiduciary duties." In this regard, the Court noted that where the principals (i.e., the stockholders)
have made their intentions known to the agent (i.e., the board), the agent must act in accordance
with the principals' instructions.
The Court ultimately granted News Corp.'s motion as to the claims of fraud, negligent
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty, but held that the complaint adequately stated
claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. As to such claims, the Court concluded
that the plaintiffs stated a claim with respect to the alleged promise that the stockholders would
be entitled to vote on any extension of a rights plan, even though the complaint did not describe
such agreement with detail. The Court thus noted that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving
that a contract or promise providing that the board policy would be irrevocable had been made.
Following this decision, the defendants sought certification of interlocutory appeal as to
the portions of the Chancery Court's opinion and order addressing whether the contract was
unenforceable as a matter of law. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., C.A. No. 1699-N (Del. Ch. Jan.
20, 2006). The Chancery Court certified the interlocutory appeal, but the Delaware Supreme
Court refused to hear the appeal.
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The Court's suggestion, in dicta, that a board must defer to the will of a majority of
stockholders would be a significant departure from a long line of case law indicating that Section
141(a) vests management authority in the board of directors. Until clarified after trial or on
appeal, we believe the Court's comments regarding Section 141(a) should be limited to a context
where the board enters into an agreement and induces action premised on an agreement to limit
its management authority, and not read to encompass unilateral efforts by stockholders to limit
board management authority.
8.

Construction and Validity of Charter and Bylaw Provisions.
Lions Gate Entm't Corp. v. Image Entm't Inc., C.A. No. 2011-N (Del.
Ch. June 5, 2006).

In Lions Gate Entm't Corp. v. Image Entm't Inc., C.A. No. 2011-N, Chandler, C. (Del.
Ch. June 5, 2006), the plaintiff, Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. ("Lions Gate"), sought
declaratory relief in conjunction with various provisions of the certificate of incorporation (the
"Charter") and bylaws (the "Bylaws") of the defendant, Image Entertainment, Inc. ("Image").
Specifically, Lions Gate sought a declaration as to (i) the effect of the staggered board provision
set forth in the Bylaws (namely, the time at which it implemented the staggered director terms),
(ii) the validity of Bylaw purporting to authorize Image's board of directors to amend the Bylaws
and (iii) the validity of the provision of the Charter purporting to authorize Image's board to
amend the Charter unilaterally. Image answered the complain, raised affirmative defenses and
sought reformation of the Charter and Bylaws. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of
Lions Gate as to all claims, affirmative defenses and counterclaims asserted in connection with
the complaint.
The issues in Lions Gate arose in connection with the reincorporation of Image as a
Delaware corporation (the "Reincorporation"). As part of the Reincorporation, which was
approved at Image's 2005 annual meeting of stockholders, Image adopted the Charter and
Bylaws. In September 2005, Lions Gate filed a Schedule 13D with the Securities and Exchange
Commission disclosing its purchases of Image stock and offering to acquire Image at a
substantial premium. The Board ultimately rejected Lions Gate's offer, and after determining
that it had lost confidence in the desire and/or ability of the Board to maximize stockholder
value, Lions Gate disclosed that it was considering nominating a slate of six directors for Image's
2006 annual meeting.
As part of the Reincorporation, the Board included a classified board provision in the
Bylaws (the "Classified Board Provision"), which constituted the initial bylaws of Image as a
Delaware corporation. Pursuant to Section 141(d) of the General Corporation Law, a Delaware
corporation may adopt a classified board structure by including a classified board provision in
the corporation's certificate of incorporation, by an initial bylaw or through a bylaw adopted by a
vote of the corporation's stockholders. The Classified Board Provision stated that, "[a]t the 2006
annual meeting of stockholders, Class I directors shall be elected for a one-year term, Class II
directors for a two-year term and Class III directors for a three-year term." A plain reading of
this provision suggests that the entire Image board would stand for election at Image's annual
stockholders meeting to be held during calendar year 2006, thereby permitting Lions Gate to
nominate a full slate of directors.
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In an effort to thwart Lions Gate's attempt to gain control of the Board, Image argued that
the phrase "2006 annual meeting" in the Classified Board provision was intended to refer to the
annual meeting to be held in fiscal year 2006, rather than calendar year 2006. Because Image's
fiscal year 2006 ran from April 1, 2005 until March 31, 2006, interpreting the Classified Board
Provision as being effective as of the annual meeting held during fiscal year 2006 would mean
that the Board was classified as of the annual meeting held during September 2005, and that
Lions Gate would only be able to nominate candidates for the two directorships whose one-year
terms would expire one year after that meeting.
In determining whether the Classified Board Provision established a classified board that
would become staggered at the annual meeting to be held during the calendar year 2006 or if the
Board became staggered at the annual meeting held during the calendar year 2005, the Court
applied the "plain meaning rule." This rule is applicable to construction of corporate charters
and bylaws as well as statutes, contracts and other written instruments. The Court held that use
of the phrase "2006 annual meeting" in the Classified Board Provision did not create any
ambiguity, and that the plain meaning of that phrase leads to the conclusion that the board would
become staggered at the annual meeting to be held during the calendar year 2006. This holding
was buttressed by the fact that the Bylaws also state that "[e]lected directors shall hold office
until the next annual meeting and until their successors shall be duly elected and qualified." The
Court noted that this language is inconsistent with an immediately effective classified board and
that allowing for an immediately effective classified board would violate one of the Delaware
canons of interpretation, which states that "[w]hen a corporate charter [or in this case, the
Bylaws] is alleged to contain a restriction on fundamental electoral rights of stockholders under
default provisions of law … the restriction must be 'clear and unambiguous' to be enforceable."8
The Court also refused Image's request to consider Image's proxy statements as parol evidence,
but held that even if it were to consider such evidence, it would not change the outcome.
Turning to the second provision of the Bylaws at issue, the Court held that Section 109 of
the General Corporation Law states that after a corporation has received any payment for any of
its stock, a board of directors has the power to amend the corporation's bylaws only if the
certificate of incorporation "confer[s] the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the
directors." Because the General Corporation Law explicitly requires that a board of directors can
only be given the power to adopt, amend or repeal the bylaws by virtue of a provision in the
corporation's certificate of incorporation, the provision was deemed to be invalid.
Regarding the Charter amendment purporting to grant the Board unilateral authority to
amend the Charter, the Court held that the provision was invalid because it was in direct
violation of Section 242 of the General Corporation Law, which requires the approval of both a
corporation's board of directors and stockholders in order to amend the corporation's certificate
of incorporation after it has received payment for its capital stock.
Finally, the Court rejected Image's argument that the contested provisions should be
reformed in order to cure the aforementioned deficiencies, which were allegedly mutual or
unilateral mistakes. The Court noted that although it has jurisdiction to reform a corporation's
8

Harrah's Entm't v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 309 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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governing documents to conform to the original intent of the parties, it may exercise such
jurisdiction only when it is clear that all present and past stockholders intended the provisions to
be included within the certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws and there is no intervening
third-party interest. The Court noted that, aside from the fact that Image has thousands of
stockholders and confirming their intentions regarding the governing documents would be
virtually impossible, it was clear that Lions Gate, by virtue of its status as the plaintiff in this
action, clearly did not share Image's intentions regarding the proposed reformation of the
contested provisions. Therefore, Image was unable to meet the burden of proof required for
reformation.
9.

Effectiveness of Majority of the Minority Vote Provision.
In Re PNB Holding Co. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 28-N (Del Ch.
Aug. 18, 2006).

Recently, the courts have suggested that the presence of a non-waivable "majority of the
minority" vote provision may provide meaningful protection in certain types of transactions.
What has been unanswered, until now, is how to calculate whether a "majority of the minority"
has voted for a transaction: including all "minority" shares, whether or not voted, or only
counting those shares which are actually voted?
In Re PNB Holding Co. provides the first detailed analysis of the question as a matter of
Delaware law, and concludes that the proper calculation takes into account in the denominator of
the fraction all of the minority shares outstanding, and not merely those actually voting, thus
making the "majority of the minority" potentially more difficult to achieve (and potentially more
valuable as a "cleansing" device).
C.

Executive Compensation.
1.

Recent Decisions.
a.

Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana v. Aidinoff, C.A. No.
20106 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2006).

In Teachers' v. Aidinoff, the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of American International
Group (AIG) against Maurice R. Greenberg and others, relating to an alleged compensation
scheme, pursuant to which senior AIG executives became stockholders of a separate company
which collected substantial commissions and other payments from AIG, effectively for no
separate services rendered. In upholding the complaint as against defendants' motions to
dismiss, the Court rejected as determinative the defense that the relevant arrangements were
approved annually by the board and focused upon the complaint's allegations that the Board
relied "blindly" on Greenberg, an interested defendant, to approve the relationship "after hearing
a short song-and-dance from him annually." The Court also noted that the outside directors "did
not employ any integrity-enhancing device, such as a special committee, to review
the…relationship and to ensure that the relationship was not tainted by the self-interest of AIG
executives who owned large stakes" in the second company. Id. at 22. While stressing that the
"informed approval of a conflict transaction by an independent board majority remains an
important cleansing device under our law and can insulate the resulting decision from fairness
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review under the appropriate circumstances," the Court also made clear that to avail itself of that
cleansing device, "the conflicted insider gets no credit for bending a curve ball past a group of
uncurious Georges who fail to take the time to understand the nature" of the transactions at issue.
Id. at 23.
b.

In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., __ A.2d __, No. 411, 2005
(Del. June 8, 2006).

In the greatly anticipated decision on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court, in In re Walt
Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., No. 411, 2005, Jacobs, J. (Del. June 8, 2006), affirmed Chancellor
William B. Chandler III's post-trial opinion in which he found that the members of the board of
directors of The Walt Disney Company ("Disney" or the "Company") did not breach any of their
fiduciary duties and did not act in bad faith in connection with the hiring and subsequent firing of
Michael Ovitz as Disney's president or the structuring of his employment contract.
This case began in January 1997 when several Disney stockholders brought derivative
actions in the Court of Chancery on behalf of Disney against Ovitz and the directors of Disney,
claiming that after only 14 months of employment, the $130 million termination payout on
Ovitz's employment contract was the product of fiduciary duty and contractual breaches by Ovitz
and breaches of fiduciary duty by the Disney directors and constituted a waste of the Company's
assets. After trial, Chancellor Chandler entered judgment in favor of all defendants as to all
claims in plaintiffs' second amended complaint, holding that none of the defendants had
breached any fiduciary duty or committed waste. Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. represented
13 of the 18 defendants. After thorough briefing and oral argument en banc, the Supreme Court
upheld the Chancellor's 174-page opinion with an 89-page opinion of its own.
In the wake of the untimely death of Disney's prior president and the need for a potential
successor to Chairman and CEO Michael Eisner, attention focused by the summer of 1995 on
Ovitz, then-head of a powerful Hollywood talent agency. Negotiations with Eisner and Irwin
Russell, Chairman of Disney's Compensation Committee, resulted in a proposed 5-year
compensation arrangement as set forth in the Ovitz Employment Agreement (the "OEA"). This
arrangement included stock options as well as non-fault termination ("NFT") payments in the
event that Ovitz's termination was not for "good cause" under the OEA.
Russell and fellow committee member Ray Watson conferred multiple times with
compensation expert Graef Crystal to solicit his views on Ovitz's proposed compensation and
analyze his calculations as well as historical comparables and Watson's spreadsheets reflecting
various scenarios. Russell and Watson also had telephone conversations with the two other
members of the committee, Sidney Poitier and Ignacio Lozano. Meanwhile, Eisner called each
board member to inform them of his desire to hire Ovitz. On September 26, 1995, the
Compensation Committee met for what the Court found was one hour and (among other topics)
discussed Ovitz's proposed compensation package; the full board met thereafter and elected
Ovitz President. On October 16, the Compensation Committee met to award Ovitz his stock
options under his contract, which contract, although becoming effective as of October 1, was not
actually executed until December 16.
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Ovitz's tenure at the Company did not work out as planned or hoped. Disney's directors
had discussions at various times about these difficulties, discussions which eventually turned to
Ovitz's anticipated termination. While Ovitz's tenure at the Company had been disappointing,
Sanford Litvack, Disney's General Counsel, advised Eisner and other directors that the Company
did not have cause to avoid the NFT payment. Eisner therefore reluctantly decided to terminate
Ovitz on a not-for-cause basis, a decision which board members were informed of and supported.
After 37 days of trial testimony and post-trial briefing, the Chancellor found no liability on
behalf of any defendant with regard to the above-described events. Plaintiffs then appealed their
case to the Delaware Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court analyzed plaintiffs-appellants' claims of error in two separate
groupings: (i) the claims against Disney's directors; and (ii) the claims against Ovitz.
Claims against Disney's directors were that they breached fiduciary duties of care and
good faith by approving the OEA and approving the NFT payment to Ovitz upon his termination.
This payment was also alleged to have amounted to corporate waste. Plaintiffs did not contend
that the Disney directors were directly liable for these actions; rather, plaintiffs argued that these
breaches of duty required the defendants to prove the entire fairness of their actions because they
were no longer entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule; thus, it was the
defendants' burden of proof to carry. The Court rejected this theory stating that it was plaintiff's
initial burden to prove such a breach had occurred in order to rebut the presumptions of the
business judgment rule.
Although plaintiffs argued that the Chancellor had conflated the fiduciary duty of care
and the duty to act in good faith in determining whether the defendants should be held liable, the
Supreme Court parsed the Chancellor's opinion and found that he had, in fact, applied the legal
tests separately. Rather than reviewing the good faith conduct of the directors in the Section
102(b)(7) context, as plaintiffs argued occurred, the Chancellor had correctly reviewed the good
faith conduct of the directors in determining whether plaintiffs had rebutted the presumptions of
the business judgment rule. The Court held that, although a bad faith determination can
eliminate charter-authorized exculpation from monetary damage liability after liability has been
established, a determination of bad faith can also be used to rebut the presumptions of the
business judgment rule before liability is established.
Duty of Care
In determining whether any of the defendants had acted with gross negligence in the
hiring and firing of Ovitz or the approval of the OEA, the Court held that the board was not
required to approve the OEA as it had appropriately delegated decisions relating to employment
and compensation of Company officers to its Compensation Committee, and nothing in the
General Corporation Law mandates that such decisions cannot be delegated. Plaintiffs also
asserted that the Chancellor erred in determining liability on a director-by-director basis rather
than in a collective manner, despite the fact that they themselves had analyzed the issue that way
in their arguments below. The Court dismissed this assertion, noting that plaintiffs could not
show that they were prejudiced in any way by this method. Because the Chancellor had found
each director not liable, plaintiffs bore the burden to show how a collective analysis would have
yielded a different result—a burden they failed to carry.
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In determining whether the compensation committee members breached their duty of
care in the negotiation and approval of the OEA, the Court found no reason to overturn the
Chancellor's conclusion that all of the members were adequately informed. This included Poitier
and Lozano, who plaintiffs alleged had been uninvolved in the OEA negotiation process and
were thus materially uninformed. The Court concluded that the evidence supported a finding
that discussions regarding payout scenarios and total compensation had occurred and been
analyzed among all of the Compensation Committee members. Most significantly, the Court
held that under Section 141(e) of the General Corporation Law, Poitier and Lozano were entitled
to rely on their fellow committee members to inform them of the status of the contract, just as the
committee as a whole was entitled to rely on their executive compensation expert Graeff Crystal.
The Court concluded that it was not legally relevant that Crystal had not attended the committee
meetings nor had ever even met Poitier or Lozano, as long as Crystal's analysis and information
were relayed by Russell, which they were. Thus, the committee members were entitled to rely
on the expert's analysis.
Duty of Good Faith
In this appeal, plaintiffs claimed that the Chancellor used a different definition of good
faith in his post-trial opinion than he did in an earlier motion to dismiss decision. In its analysis
of the issues of good faith, the Supreme Court made clear that it was not holding, nor would it
analyze in any way, "whether the fiduciary duty to act in good faith is a duty that, like the duties
of care and loyalty, can serve as an independent basis for imposing liability upon corporate
officers and directors." Rather, the Court discussed the categories of good faith or lack thereof
that Delaware common law has developed.
The Court noted that there is the obvious type of lack of good faith – namely, conduct
that is motivated by an actual intent to harm. On the opposite end of the spectrum is conduct that
is grossly negligent without accompanying malevolent intent. This latter category, the Court
held, cannot be a basis for a breach of the duty to act in good faith. If that were not so, the Court
noted, the Delaware General Assembly would never had drawn the distinctions that exist in
Section 102(b)(7) and Section 145 of the General Corporation Law between due care and good
faith. A third category of conduct that falls between these two categories is that which the
Chancellor attempted to capture in his opinions (both pre-trial and post-trial). Here, behavior
motivated by an "intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities"
is the type of bad faith that would both rebut the business judgment rule presumptions as well as
fall outside conduct that is otherwise exculpable and indemnifiable.
Using these guidelines, the Court found that the Chancellor's holding that the directors
did not breach their duty to act in good faith in connection with Ovitz's termination was entirely
correct. First, the board was not required to act in this regard. There was sufficient ambiguity in
the Company's governing documents for the Court to conclude, based upon extrinsic evidence,
that the board and Eisner as CEO had concurrent authority to terminate the president of the
Company. Because Eisner had already undertaken the responsibility to effect such termination,
the board did not have to do so. Finally, the determination that there was no cause to terminate
Ovitz (and thus no grounds to avoid making the payout under the OEA) was made by Eisner and
Litvack who, based upon facts supported by the Chancellor's credibility determinations that must
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be accepted on appeal, found that no such cause existed. The board was also allowed, for the
same reasons discussed above relating to Section 141(e), to rely on this determination.
No Waste if Rational Business Purposes Exists
Lastly, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of waste noting that such claims arise
only in the rarest of circumstances and are extremely difficult to prove. Because the payment to
Ovitz was based upon a contractual obligation, such payment could not be considered waste
unless the underlying contractual obligation irrationally squandered or gave away corporate
assets. Thus, instead of analyzing the NFT payment, the Court analyzed the rationale underlying
the creation of the OEA 14 months earlier. In that examination, the Court found that the NFT
provisions had a rational business purpose—to induce Ovitz to leave his former employment in
order to join Disney.
No Breach Before or After Fiduciary Relationship Created
The plaintiffs' claims against Ovitz were that he had breached his fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty to Disney by negotiating for and accepting the NFT provisions of the OEA and
negotiating a full NFT payout in connection with this termination. In a summary judgment
opinion prior to trial, the Chancellor dismissed claims against Ovitz that had been based on a
theory that he owed fiduciary duties prior to commencement of his employment. The Chancellor
held, and the Supreme Court upheld, that until Ovitz became president and a director of Disney,
he did not owe any fiduciary duties and thus could not breach them. The Court was not
convinced by plaintiffs' argument that Ovitz had been a de facto officer before the start of his
contract due to receipt of financial information, his use of Company letterhead and other acts.
Rather, the Court found that Ovitz did not assume the duties of an officer before October 1—he
merely prepared for taking office. After his employment ended, plaintiffs argued that he was not
terminated but was acting to "settle out his contract" such that he had a duty to convene a board
meeting to consider terminating him for cause. The Court viewed the overwhelming evidence
that Ovitz was, in fact, terminated as dispositive as to the question whether Ovitz breached any
duties with regard to settling up his contract. Having presented no authority either legal or
factual to support their argument that Ovitz was obliged to call a meeting to discuss his
termination, plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof that Ovitz breached any duty in that
regard. In fact, after December 27, 1996, Ovitz was no longer an officer or director of Disney,
so could no longer be considered a fiduciary subject to liability for breaches of duties to
stockholders.
*

*

*

The Disney decision demonstrates the continuing application of the bedrock business
judgment rule to boards of directors of Delaware corporations with respect to subjects such as
executive compensation, hiring and termination payments, and it clarifies the relationship
between the fiduciary duty of care and the duty to act in good faith. Although both Chancellor
Chandler's post-trial decision as well as the Supreme Court's decision on appeal describe what
would have amounted to "best practices" in the hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz (and for which
both decisions should be studied), such descriptions amounted to aspirational guidelines the
failure of which to attain did not, under these circumstances, result in a finding of liability.
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c.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health
Services, Inc. v. Elkins, C.A. No. 20228-NC (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,
2004).

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Services, Inc. v.
Elkins, C.A. No. 20228-NC (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004), the Court of Chancery addressed
executive compensation in the wake of an opinion which had then denied defendants' motion to
dismiss in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (the
"Disney Motion To Dismiss Opinion"), leading to the post-trial opinion which is discussed
above. In the mid-1980s, defendant Robert N. Elkins ("Elkins") founded Integrated Health
Services, Inc. ("IHS") to operate a national chain of nursing homes. IHS operated successfully
until February 2000, when IHS commenced a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding after suffering
the adverse effects of certain federal legislation. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
(the "Creditors") commenced certain actions on behalf of the estates of the debtors of IHS,
including an action against former and current directors of IHS for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with their approval of certain compensation packages for Elkins. Because the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware abstained from hearing the fiduciary duty
dispute, the Creditors filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery.
The Creditors challenged eleven compensation arrangements that involved various loans,
option grants and loan forgiveness programs in favor of Elkins. The Creditors alleged that
Elkins and the other IHS directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving compensation
packages without regard to the best interests of IHS and without adequate information,
consideration or deliberation. Finally, the Creditors alleged that the defendants wasted corporate
assets by approving certain compensation agreements. The defendant directors filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the Creditors failed to state a claim and that the directors were
entitled to the protections of an exculpatory clause contained in the IHS certificate of
incorporation.
After finding that the challenged compensation arrangements were approved by a
majority of disinterested directors, the Court focused its inquiry on whether the defendant
directors "knew that they were making material decisions without adequate information and
without adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if the decisions caused the
corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss" such that their decisions could not have
been made in good faith. A finding that the decisions were not made in good faith would
preclude the defendant directors from availing themselves of the exculpatory provision in IHS's
certificate of incorporation.
In finding that the Creditors had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty with respect
to some of the compensation arrangements but not others, the Court drew a distinction (based on
the Disney Motion To Dismiss Opinion) between allegations of nondeliberation and allegations
of not enough deliberation.9 For example, the Court dismissed a claim that the defendants

9

In comparing the facts in Elkins with those presented in the Disney Motion To Dismiss
Opinion, the Court stated:
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breached their fiduciary duties by failing to consult a tax expert on the tax consequences of a
compensation consultant's report and failing to set up a monitoring mechanism with regard to a
loan program because the complaint did allege that the directors engaged in discussion regarding
the report and the loan program, respectively. The Court noted that while the directors' actions
may or may not have been negligent (or even grossly negligent), the Court could not draw an
inference that its decision was not made in good faith, and therefore the Section 102(b)(7)
provision of IHS's certificate of incorporation precluded the imposition of monetary liability. In
contrast, the Court found that the Creditors had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty with
respect to a loan made where the directors approved the loan without deliberation and one
director justified the action by stating that he knew Elkins would never "pull anything behind
anyone's back." The Court found that "directors of a public corporation must exercise more than
blind faith in approving loans."
The Court also refused to dismiss the fiduciary duty of loyalty claim against Elkins. The
Court noted that employees negotiating employment agreements have the right to seek the best
terms possible for themselves. However, once the employee becomes a fiduciary, "he has a duty
to negotiate further compensation agreements 'honestly and in good faith so as not to advantage
himself at the expense of the [entity's] stockholders.'" With respect to Elkins' compensation
packages, the Creditors alleged that Elkins: (i) sent out the agendas for the meetings, (ii) attended
the meetings, (iii) spoke with the directors outside of the meetings, (iv) negotiated his
agreements with the board and compensation committee, (v) spoke with a compensation
consultant hired by the board, (vi) reviewed and revised the compensation consultant's reports,
(vii) pressured the compensation consultant to justify his compensation, (viii) presented
inaccurate facts to the board, (ix) caused IHS to disburse funds to him without corporate
authority, and (x) insisted that IHS institute a loan forgiveness program with respect to all loans
against the advice of a compensation consultant. The Court found that while individually these
facts may not be sufficient to support a breach of loyalty claim, together they suggested that
Elkins may have breached his fiduciary duties by dealing in self-interested transactions.
In contrast, the Court rejected the Creditors' waste claim. The Court noted that waste is
an extreme test which is rarely satisfied. To succeed in proving waste, the Creditors had to plead
facts showing "an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound
The facts in this case are different from those in Disney. Elkins
founded IHS and had been an executive of the company for over
10 years at the time of the first Challenged Transaction. Ovitz was
at Disney for one year. No expert was retained by Disney, while
[the compensation consultant] (regardless of questions over the
method of his selection) was retained by IHS. Thus, a change in
characterization from a total lack of deliberation (for that matter, a
difference between the meaning of discussion and deliberation, if
there is one), to even a short conversation may change the outcome
of the Disney analysis. Allegations of nondeliberation are different
from allegations of not enough deliberation.
Id. at 38 n.58 (last emphasis added).
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judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration." The Court
also noted that decisions regarding executive compensation are entitled to great deference. IHS's
proxy materials stated that the purpose of the compensation packages was to retain key
employees, and Delaware law recognizes that the retention of key employees may be a corporate
benefit. The Court found that the compensation arrangements subject to the waste claims could
have induced Elkins to stay and therefore benefited IHS.
2.

Indemnification and Advancement.
a.

Levy v. Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc., C.A. No. 1395-N (Del. Ch.
Apr. 5, 2006).

In Levy v. Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc., C.A. No. 1395-N, Lamb, V.C. (Del. Ch. Apr. 5,
2006), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that, absent a contractual duty, a newly formed
holding company was not obligated to indemnify its operating subsidiary's former directors, and
declined to read a prior written demand requirement into an otherwise silent indemnification
agreement.
The dispute in Levy initially arose in September 2001, when the former outside directors
of Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc. ("Old Hayes"), the plaintiffs in this case, were sued by Old
Hayes' stockholders and bondholders for various statutory violations and breaches of fiduciary
duty in connection with materially misleading financial statements issued by Old Hayes (the
"2001 Suit"). In December 2001, Old Hayes entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy. While Old Hayes
was in bankruptcy, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") began an investigation
into the misstated financials, which was pending at the time this decision was issued. Old Hayes
emerged from bankruptcy in June 2003 as an operating subsidiary of a successor company also
called Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc. ("New Hayes"). The reorganization plan excluded the
former directors of Old Hayes from any release of Old Hayes' indemnification obligations in the
bankruptcy, but capped those obligations at $10 million beyond any amount paid pursuant to Old
Hayes' directors and officers insurance policies.
In June 2005, Old Hayes and former officers of Old Hayes (but none of the former
directors) received "Wells Notices" from the SEC indicating that the SEC intended to
recommend enforcement against them. Also during that month, the former directors settled the
2001 Suit for $27.5 million of which they personally paid $7.2 million (the "Settlement
Payment"). Following the settlement, the former directors sought indemnification in connection
with the Settlement Payment from both Old Hayes and New Hayes pursuant to their
indemnification rights under the Old Hayes' bylaws, their indemnification agreements with Old
Hayes and their rights under the reorganization plan. Both Old Hayes and New Hayes informed
the former directors that they would not indemnify them for the Settlement Payment. As a result,
the former directors filed their complaint in this case without delivering a written demand to the
board of directors of either Old Hayes or New Hayes. Several months later, though, the former
directors sent a letter to both defendant companies "reiterating" their demand for
indemnification. Old Hayes refused to indemnify them until they agreed "to follow the
procedures set forth in the Indemnification Agreements." Old Hayes' letter also requested that
the former directors provide a wide range of information that would enable Old Hayes to make
what the letter called an "informed decision" regarding the demand.
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The defendant companies moved to dismiss all claims against them. They first argued
that all claims against New Hayes should be dismissed because the former directors were never
directors of New Hayes and because the reorganization plan did not extend Old Hayes'
indemnification obligations to New Hayes. In response, the former directors argued that because
the reorganization plan limited both Old Hayes' and New Hayes' liabilities, it necessarily implied
that New Hayes was also bound by Old Hayes' indemnification obligations. The Court found
that if the reorganization plan was meant to impose such indemnification obligations on New
Hayes, it could have been drafted to reach that result. Because the reorganization plan did not
explicitly impose such obligations on New Hayes, the Court found that there was no reason to
believe that the indemnification provisions of the reorganization plan had any effect other than to
limit New Hayes' indemnification liability. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the claims against
New Hayes.
The only remaining claims for indemnification were against Old Hayes. In connection
with those claims, the defendant companies argued that, whatever the former directors' eventual
rights to indemnification, their case to compel payment was premature because they failed to
satisfy certain contractual provisions of the indemnification agreements. The indemnification
agreements stated that "the Company shall indemnify Indemnitee to the fullest extent permitted
by law as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than thirty days after written demand is
presented to the Company." The defendant companies argued that such provision would only
make sense if read to extend "the thought … beyond the word 'practicable' to include the phrase
'after written demand is presented to the Company.'" Read that way, the defendant companies
argued that such provision established a strict demand requirement and a contractually mandated
thirty-day consideration period for any indemnification claim. The Court, however, found that it
was designed to protect the potential indemnitee by requiring Old Hayes to respond to a request
for indemnification "as soon as practicable" and by allowing the former directors to start the
clock against Old Hayes by delivering a written demand.
The defendant companies also argued that the former directors violated their implied
duties to perform the indemnification agreements with good faith and fair dealing when they
refused to respond to Old Hayes' information requests. The Court recognized that a contracting
party can violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an indemnification agreement by
withholding information. However, it also noted that an implied covenant would be an
"extremely curious" way for sophisticated parties to structure the exchange of key documents.
Given that so few facts about Old Hayes' requests were known at the time, the Court declined to
conclude at that time that the former directors violated their implied duties of good faith and fair
dealing as a matter of law.
Finally, the defendant companies claimed that the Court should stay the former directors'
indemnification action because, arguably, the Court could not determine whether the former
directors acted in "good faith" and in the "best interests" of Old Hayes, as required by Sections
145 of the General Corporation Law, until the SEC concluded its investigation of the misstated
financial statements. Although no Wells Notices were issued against the former directors, and
no litigation was pending against them individually, Old Hayes claimed that it could not
indemnify the former directors without violating its statutory and fiduciary duties until the statute
of limitations for action by the SEC against the former directors ran in 2007.

68
RLF1-3052265-3

The Court noted that the defendant companies were correct in stating that Section 145
requires the board of directors of an indemnifying company to make a full determination of
whether the indemnitees are entitled to indemnification, including an investigation as to whether
the indemnitees acted in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation, and that such duty would be made easier if an SEC
investigation produced additional information. While acknowledging that such concerns were
legitimate, the Court held that the board of directors of Old Hayes could not use that rationale to
abrogate its responsibility to determine the former directors' indemnification rights with respect
to the Settlement Payment. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denied dismissal of the claims
against Old Hayes.
b.

Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204 (Del. 2005).

In Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204 (Del. 2005) (an appeal from a decision
discussed infra), the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the Chancery Court's decision regarding
advancement of legal expenses and found that advancement serves the same public policy as
indemnification: to attract the most capable individuals into corporate service. While
advancement of defense costs benefits individual officers, indemnification and advancement
rights afforded directors and officers provide more important benefits to shareholders, by
providing "a desirable underwriting of risk by the corporation in anticipation of greater
corporate-wide rewards."10 Such benefit will be achieved only if indemnification agreements are
enforced even when corporate officials are accused of serious misconduct.
After discovering accounting irregularities and subsequently restating its financial
statements for several periods, Homestore, a Delaware corporation, and its directors and officers
were named as defendants in civil actions, and became the subjects of an administrative
investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and of a criminal
investigation by the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). Tafeen, as a former officer of Homestore,
has incurred and continues to incur substantial legal fees related to these investigations, civil
actions, and to a criminal indictment. He brought this action in October, 2003 to compel
advancement of his expenses in defending himself in these matters, and of his expenses incurred
in seeking advancement. Homestore's relevant bylaws provide for indemnification of expenses a
director or officer incurs "by reason of the fact" that he is a director or officer, and for the
mandatory advancement of all such expenses.
At the trial level (discussed infra), the Chancery Court rejected cross motions for
summary judgment and rejected as a matter of law all but one of Homestore's affirmative
defenses. The Chancery Court further found that Tafeen was entitled to advancement of all
reasonable expenses in connection with both his defense and with his action seeking
advancement. When Homestore disputed the reasonableness of Tafeen's expenses, the Chancery
Court appointed a Special Master to review the issue. The Special Master concluded that Tafeen
was entitled to 96% of the fees and expenses incurred, and to pre- and post-judgment interest.
The Chancery Court confirmed the Special Master's findings in April, 2005. Homestore filed
this appeal the following month.
10

Citing Scharf v. Edgcomb Corp., 1997 WL 762656, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1997).
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In its appeal, Homestore contested the denial of its laches and its "official capacity"
defenses, the discovery restrictions placed on its ability to establish its unclean hands defense,
the finding that Homestore failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to its unclean hands
and unfair dealing affirmative defenses, and the adoption of the Special Master's Final Report on
the reasonableness of Tafeen's expenses. The Court affirmed the Chancery Court's rulings in all
respects.
Regarding the laches argument, Homestore argued that it was prejudiced because
Tafeen's delay of eighteen months in seeking advancement would make it more difficult for
Homestore to seek repayment should it ultimately be found that Tafeen was not entitled to
indemnification. The Court affirmed the Chancery Court's rejection of this argument, finding
that any error the Chancery Court may have made regarding this issue was harmless because
Homestore had failed to show that Tafeen intended to shelter his assets from creditors.
The Court then considered the public policy purposes of advancement and
indemnification, and found advancement to be especially important because it provides
immediate relief from the financial burden of conducting a defense. Section 145(e) of Delaware
General Corporation Law governs advancement, and allows corporations to advance expenses to
a director or officer without an assurance that the director or officer will repay any sums to
which he is ultimately not entitled. While the advancement allowed by Section 145(e) is
permissive, many corporations, such as Homestore, have made it mandatory in their bylaws or
corporate charter. The right to advancement, mandatory or otherwise, is independent of the right
to indemnification, and does not require that the director or officer be successful on the merits,
but recognizes that any sums advanced must be repaid if it is ultimately determined that the
official is not entitled to be indemnified.
After this discussion of advancement generally, the Court considered the Chancery
Court's rejection of Homestore's "official capacity" argument. Homestore argued that Tafeen
was not entitled to advancement because the actions that necessitated his defense were motivated
by personal greed rather than his "official capacity." The Court affirmed the Chancery Court's
decision, explaining that "if there is a nexus or causal connection between any of the underlying
proceedings contemplated by Section 145(e) and one's official corporate capacity, those
proceedings are 'by reason of the fact' that one was a corporate officer, without regard to one's
motivation for engaging in that conduct." Tafeen was a party to the underlying proceeding
because of his alleged role in perpetrating the accounting irregularities. Here, advancement is
more narrowly focused than indemnification, and provides for broader rights -- although Tafeen
may not ultimately be entitled to indemnification, he is at least entitled to advancement.
The Court further found that the discovery restrictions the Chancery Court had placed on
Homestore's ability to establish its unclean hands defense were appropriate as a proper exercise
of discretion, and that the Chancery Court had properly based its rejection of Homestore's
unclean hands and unfair dealings defenses on credible and sufficient evidence in the record.
Finally, the Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's determination that the Special Master's Final
Report was reasonable.
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c.

Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., C.A. No. 023-N (Del. Ch. Mar. 22,
2004), aff'd, 886 A.2d 502 (Del. 2005).

In this action for advancement, the Court denied the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment on the basis that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the defendant's
affirmative defense of unclean hands, given the plaintiff's alleged intentional conduct of
sheltering assets to defeat a potential claim for reimbursement of legal fees and expenses paid by
the company on behalf of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff Peter Tafeen is a former officer of defendant Homestore, Inc. ("Homestore")
who seeks advancement of legal fees and expenses in connection with various civil actions in
which he was named as a defendant as well as ongoing investigations by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ").
Homestore is a Delaware corporation engaged in providing on-line media and technology to the
real estate industry. Pursuant to Section 145 of the DGCL, Homestore's bylaws contained
indemnification and advancement provisions for legal fees and expenses incurred by its directors
and officers. Following an investigation by Homestore's audit committee, it was revealed that
Homestore overstated its revenues by $41.4 million for fiscal year 2000 and $119 million for the
first three quarters of fiscal year 2001. While the audit committee was conducting its
investigation, the SEC and DOJ announced that they had commenced investigations into
Homestore's prior accounting practices and financial reporting. Ten civil actions, both derivative
and direct, were also filed against Homestore, where the plaintiff in this action was named as a
defendant to the shareholder actions. In a letter request, the plaintiff sought advancement of
legal fees for the defense of the government investigations as well as the ten civil actions (the
"Proceedings"). In response to the plaintiff's request for advancement and indemnification,
Homestore required that the plaintiff sign an undertaking to repay any legal fees advanced should
he not ultimately be entitled to indemnification under Section 145. The plaintiff refused and the
instant action ensued.
Homestore moved for summary judgment on nine of its affirmative defenses. The Court
segregated the nine affirmative defenses into three categories: (i) those involving the plaintiff's
conduct in the Proceedings; (ii) those involving the plaintiff's conduct in seeking advancement;
and (iii) those not involving the plaintiff's conduct at all.
The Court first addressed the category encompassing the plaintiff's conduct in the
Proceedings. Homestore first alleged that the plaintiff was not entitled to advancement because
he was not a party to any of the Proceedings "by reason of the fact" that he was an officer of
Homestore. The Court noted that the test for such a challenge was whether there was a causal
connection or nexus between the underlying proceeding and the corporate function or official
corporate capacity, noting that motivation of the individual is not a factor in the test. Reasoning
that to follow Homestore's argument would be to transform the advancement provisions of its
bylaws into invitations to a trial on the merits of the underlying action, the Court denied as a
matter of law Homestore's "by reason of the fact" defense. Homestore next alleged that the
plaintiff fraudulently induced Homestore to enter into an employment contract which entitled
him to the protections of the advancement bylaw. The Court noted that application of the
advancement bylaw was not dependent upon the plaintiff's employment contract but rather was
to be determined under Homestore's governing rules. Accordingly, the Court denied as a matter
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of law Homestore's motion as to its contract argument. Similarly, the Court also denied as a
matter of law Homestore's estoppel and ultimate entitlement arguments.
The Court next addressed Homestore's defenses involving the plaintiff's conduct in
seeking advancement. Homestore advanced unclean hands and laches defenses. Regarding the
unclean hands defense, Homestore alleged that the plaintiff should not be permitted to claim his
entitlement in a court of equity when he purchased an expensive home in Florida, a state that has
extremely protective "homestead" provisions against creditor claims, allegedly in order to shelter
assets and avoid repayment should the plaintiff's claims ultimately be found to be nonindemnifiable. The Court reasoned that whether the plaintiff intentionally engaged in sheltering
of assets (which would increase the difficulty of reimbursement should his advancement claims
be found non-indemnifiable) was a question of fact to be determined at trial. The Court
concluded that should these facts be true, such conduct would be sufficient to invoke the doctrine
of unclean hands. Accordingly, Homestore's motion for summary judgment was denied, with
trial on the merits to proceed. Homestore's motion for summary judgment as to the laches
defense was denied as a matter of law in that any delay in filing suit was not the cause of any
alleged prejudice; rather, the cause of the alleged prejudice was the plaintiff's sheltering of assets.
Lastly, the Court addressed the third category of defenses that did not involve the
plaintiff's conduct at all. Homestore attempted to advance an argument that the bylaw provisions
for a direct claim carve-out encompassed a stockholder derivative action that named the plaintiff
as one of several defendants. The Court denied this motion as a matter of law, as Homestore's
advancement carve-out applied only to actions brought directly by the corporation not actions
brought derivatively. Homestore also advanced the defense that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's
prohibition against personal loans to directors or officers limited Section 145's application.
Reasoning that the plain language of Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies only to
current directors and executive officers and the plaintiff was a former executive officer, the
Court concluded that Section 402 had no application to the instant action.11 Accordingly,
Homestore's motion for summary judgment as to the limiting language of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act was denied as a matter of law. Finally, Homestore argued that the company, would be
placed in position of severe financial hardship if it had to advance expenses to the plaintiff. The
Court concluded that this argument, without more, was not a legally cognizable defense to
advancement as Section 145(e) allowed for Homestore to lessen its credit risk simply by drafting
its bylaws differently. The Court cautioned: "Given the high incidence of advancement
proceedings, directors should be mindful of their fiduciary duties to stockholders and the
possibility of stockholder action, when reviewing and adopting advancement and
indemnification bylaws. In my view, the fact that Section 145 is a broad, enabling statute does
not confer license to adopt loosely written bylaws and impose excessive credit risks on a
company and its stockholders." Accordingly, Homestore's motion for summary judgment as to
undue financial hardship was denied as a matter of law.

11

Also noting that, as such, the underlying issue of the application of Section 402 of the
Sarbanes-Oxely Act to Section 145 was not ripe for discussion.
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d.

In re Delta Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 18604 (Del. Ch. July 26,
2004).

In In re Delta Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 18604 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2004), the Court of
Chancery addressed the nature of the claims of a corporation's former directors and officers
under an indemnification provision contained in the corporation's certificate of incorporation for
purposes of Section 281(b) of the General Corporation Law. Section 281(b) requires a
corporation to pay or make provision to pay certain types of claims in its plan of dissolution.
The Court found such indemnification claims to be present, contingent contractual claims under
Section 281(b)(i) of the General Corporation Law for which the corporation was required to
make reasonable provision in its plan of dissolution.
Delta Holdings, Inc. ("Delta") was a Delaware corporation that had been in the business
of acquiring and holding insurance and reinsurance companies, including Delta Re, of which
Robert E. Norton, Hugh C. Brewer III and James D. McGurty were officers and directors (the
"Objectors"). Delta's certificate of incorporation provided for mandatory indemnification of
directors and officers to the fullest extent permitted under Section 145 of the General
Corporation Law. In 1997, Delta voluntarily dissolved under Section 275 of the General
Corporation Law. Subsequently, a court-appointed receiver sought approval of Delta's plan of
dissolution under Section 281(b) of the General Corporation Law. The receiver proposed to
reserve $124,000 of Delta's $9.57 million in liquid assets for miscellaneous post-distribution
expenses and $81,000 for the payment of premiums for D&O insurance providing $1 million in
coverage for a period of six years -- with the remaining $9.365 million to be distributed to
Delta's stockholders. Since Delta began liquidation, its directors and officers had incurred over
$32 million in legal defense costs. The Objectors claimed that the plan of dissolution failed to
make sufficient provision for their mandatory indemnification rights under Delta's certificate of
incorporation in the event they were sued because of their status as former managers of Delta Re.
Section 281(b) requires that a dissolved corporation that has opted to follow the shortform dissolution procedures in Section 281(b) of the General Corporation Law pay or make
reasonable provision to pay: (i) all known claims, including contingent contractual claims, (ii)
claims that are the subject of pending proceedings, and (iii) unknown claims that, based on facts
known to the corporation, are likely to arise within ten years. The Court found that
"[i]ndemnification rights (including the right to advancement) that are contained in a mandatory,
expansive indemnification provision, are present contractual rights, contingent only on meeting
the requirements of Section 145."
Next, the Court analyzed whether Delta's D&O policy reasonably provided for the
Objector's indemnification claims. In determining the reasonableness of the D&O policy, the
Court took into account "the likelihood of the contractual indemnification claim vesting, the
likely value of that claim, and the financial condition of the distributing company." While the
Court thought it unlikely that the Objectors would be found personally liable for Delta Re's
obligations under its insurance policies under a common-law indemnification theory, or for its
reinsurance obligations as nonsignatory officers of a signatory corporation, the Court found that
it was possible that the Objectors could be found liable in tort, relying on New York precedent
suggesting tort claims survive liquidation. Nonetheless, the Court believed that the possibility of
such claims surviving any jurisdiction's statute of limitations was low. In addition, the Objectors
73
RLF1-3052265-3

would have to prove their good faith as a condition precedent to the vesting of indemnification
rights. Given these factors, it was not necessary to set aside enough money to cover all potential
claims to meet Section 281(b)'s reasonableness standard. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the
receiver set aside an additional $120,000 (2.1% of net liquid assets) to pay for a D&O policy
providing for $5 million in coverage for a period of twenty years.
D.

Equitable Limits on Acts By Controlling Stockholders.
a.

Superior Vision Services, Inc. v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., C.A. No.
1668-N (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2006).

Perhaps the first question to answer when dealing with case law concerning "controlling
shareholders" is 'what is a controlling shareholder'? Of course, shareholders who hold more than
50% of the outstanding stock of a company present the easy case. The more nuanced (and often
difficult) case is presented by a less than majority owner who exerts some degree of actual
control over the company and its affairs.
In Superior Vision Services the Court of Chancery dismissed, at the motion to dismiss
stage, a complaint asserting that a 44% stockholder which held a veto right over the payment of
dividends was a "controlling" stockholder under Delaware law. The Court focused on the
stockholder's lack of direct control over the board of directors of the company in reaching the
conclusion that it was not a controlling stockholder. Importantly, the Court held that the mere
ownership of a contract right, even a "strong" contract right which prevented the company from
paying dividends, did not equate to the "actual exercise" of control over the company. Instead,
the Court held that the less than majority stockholder, in order to be impressed with fiduciary
duties, had to hold powers which gave it "the ability to dominate the corporate decision-making
process." In light of the fact that the board here had passed a dividend (an act disfavored by the
supposedly controlling stockholder), and in light of the lack of actual control of that stockholder
over the board, the Court found that the stockholder's 44% stock ownership position was not
enough, even when coupled with contractual veto rights, to give rise to controlling stockholder
status (and concomitant fiduciary duties).
The Superior Vision Services Court also disposed of a claim that the failure of the
stockholder to consent to the payment of dividends breached the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Interestingly, the Court's analysis focused on whether the law would imply a
"reasonableness" standard where the contractual right to withhold consent to payment of the
dividend was not expressly so conditioned, and other provisions of the contract were. Holding
that the Court would not impose a "reasonableness" term where sophisticated drafters knew how
to do so and didn't, the Court dismissed this claim, as well.
b.

Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., C.A. No. 1845-N (Del. Ch.
July 5, 2006).

In Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp. the Court of Chancery dismissed claims asserted
against a controlling stockholder which asserted that the selling stockholder should have known
that the buyer would extract illegal benefits from a non-wholly owned subsidiary. Finding that
the complaint failed to plead any facts which would tend to show that the selling stockholder
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knew that it was being paid for rights other than the right to control the company, and that the
pleading was "vague, unspecific, and conclusory" with respect to post purchase conduct of the
new controlling party, the Court held that "pure control premium envy is not a cognizable claim
for a minority stockholder under Delaware law." The Court further characterized the
circumstances in which a controlling stockholder might not be free to sell its stock at a premium
as "very narrow" under Delaware law.
In dicta, the Court also questioned whether a controlling stockholder was entitled to rely
on an exculpatory provision in the company's certificate of incorporation, and whether a
negligence based claim would survive against a controller. The Court reasoned that since the
"premise for contending that the controlling stockholder owes fiduciary duties in its capacity as a
stockholder is that the controller exerts its will over the enterprise in the manner of the board
itself" it follows that the statutory protections available to the board should arguably be available
to the controlling party. Further development of this issue, however, must await another day.
Given that the power to exculpate for duty of care liability is statutory and in derogation of the
common law, the Court's ruminations in dicta may not necessarily indicate how the matter would
be decided if properly presented to an appellate court.
c.

Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004),
aff'd, Consol. Nos. 130, 2004, 292, 2004 and 304, 2004 (Del.
Apr. 19, 2005).

In a recent decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed statutory and equitable
limitations with respect to stockholder-adopted bylaws as well as the permissibility of a
corporation adopting a stockholder rights plan to prohibit the stockholders of the corporation's
controlling stockholder from selling the controlling stockholder to a third party.
Specifically, in Hollinger International, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004),
plaintiff Hollinger International ("International") sued Conrad M. Black ("Black"), the indirect
controlling stockholder of Hollinger, Inc. ("Inc."), International's controlling stockholder, as well
as Inc. (Inc. and Black collectively, (the "Defendants")) to (i) enjoin the sale of Inc. to a third
party, (ii) obtain a declaratory judgment as to the invalidity of bylaw amendments adopted by
Inc. (the "Bylaw Amendments"), and (iii) obtain a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the
stockholder rights plan (the "Rights Plan") adopted by a committee of the International board of
directors which would essentially prohibit the sale of Inc. to a party not approved by
International's board of directors.
In June 2003, International's board formed a special committee (the "Special
Committee") to investigate the propriety of non-competition payments in excess of $70 million
made to Black and certain other executives of Inc. and International. The Special Committee
subsequently concluded that certain of the non-competition payments may not have been
appropriately authorized or publicly disclosed.
On November 15, 2003, Black and
representatives of International entered into a "Restructuring Proposal," the terms of which
included, among other things, the repayment of the disputed non-competition payments, Black's
agreement to devote his time and energy towards a strategic process (the "Strategic Process")
whereby International would seek to consummate a transaction (including a sales transaction) for
the benefit of all of International's stockholders and to not take actions to negatively affect
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International's ability to consummate a transaction resulting from the Strategic Process, and
Black's retirement as chief executive officer of International.
Black subsequently negotiated and entered into a transaction whereby Inc. would be sold
to the Barclay family (the "Barclay Brothers"). Following the public announcement of the
transaction with the Barclay Brothers on January 18, 2004, the International board of directors
formed a board committee designated the Corporate Review Committee (the "CRC") comprised
of all directors except for Black, his wife and an alleged affiliate of Black. The CRC was
delegated broad authority to act on behalf of International, including the ability to adopt a
stockholder rights plan. In response to the formation of the CRC, Inc. purported to act by
written consent to adopt the Bylaw Amendments to, among other things, disband all board
committees (including the CRC) other than the Special Committee and audit committee, and to
require unanimous board approval of all "special board matters" (including a merger, sale of
assets having a value in excess of $1 million, and changing the number of directors on the
International board). Two days later, the CRC met and adopted the Rights Plan, which would be
triggered by, among other things, consummation of the transaction with the Barclay Brothers.
In a 130-page decision, the Court held that Black had breached the Restructuring
Proposal and his fiduciary duties to International with respect to the transaction with the Barclay
Brothers in various respects, including (i) Black's failure to inform the International board of an
earlier indication of interest from the Barclay Brothers with respect to one of International's most
valuable assets and Black's unilateral rejection of such offer; (ii) Black's disclosure of inside
confidential information to the Barclay Brothers to encourage the Barclay Brothers to make a bid
for Inc.; and (iii) Black's failure to disclose to the International board of directors his dealings
with the Barclay Brothers "under circumstances in which full disclosure was obviously
expected."
Of particular interest to corporate practitioners is the Court's analysis of the Bylaw
Amendments and Rights Plan. With respect to the Bylaw Amendments, International contended
that the bylaw amendment that abolished the CRC was statutorily invalid because (i) Section
141(c)(2) of the DGCL (which authorizes the creation and regulation of board committees in a
corporation's bylaws) does not explicitly authorize a bylaw to eliminate a board committee and,
(ii) such bylaw amendment ran afoul of Section 141(a) of the DGCL (which generally provides
for the management of the business and affairs of a corporation by the board of directors). The
Court rejected these arguments, first concluding that Section 141(c)(2)'s specific reference to the
regulation of board committees through the bylaws was sufficient to include the elimination of
committees by stockholders through a bylaw amendment. The Court likewise found that the
bylaw amendment to eliminate the CRC did not violate Section 141(a) of the DGCL, holding
that Section 109 of the DGCL (which broadly provides for stockholder amendments to bylaws),
when read together with express language of Section 141(c)(2), clearly permitted a stockholderadopted bylaw such as the one at issue.
Although finding the Bylaw Amendments to be statutorily permissible, the Court
nonetheless invalidated the Bylaw Amendments. Citing Frantz Manufacturing Co. v. EAC
Industries, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985), the Court stated that the Schnell doctrine – that inequitable
action does not become permissible because it is legally possible – applies to bylaw amendments
and that bylaw amendments adopted by majority stockholders may be reviewed to ensure that
76
RLF1-3052265-3

they are consistent with common law rules and were reasonable in application. The Court
concluded that, unlike in Frantz where the bylaws at issue were adopted by a majority
stockholder who committed no acts of wrongdoing and acted to protect itself from dilution, the
Bylaw Amendments here were "clearly adopted for an inequitable purpose and have an
inequitable effect." While noting the significance of striking down bylaw amendments adopted
by a controlling stockholder, the Court stated that "action is required here because those
amendments complete a course of contractual and fiduciary improprieties … to end-run the
Strategic Process [Black] had agreed to lead and support."
With respect to the Rights Plan, the Court stated that the Defendants' primary argument
was the assertion that common law principles prohibit the "board of a non-wholly owned
subsidiary from using a rights plan that would deter the ability of the parent company to sell
itself (or its control bloc of subsidiary shares)." Framing the issue as the extent to which
equitable duties owed by directors to a controlling stockholder preclude those directors from
using a rights plan to inhibit such controlling stockholder from alienating its shares or other
property, the Court noted, "put bluntly, the permissibility of the Rights Plan hinges on the
equities."
The Court analyzed the adoption of the Rights Plan under the Unocal standard of review,
concluding that the CRC easily passed the first prong of the two-prong Unocal standard -identifying a threat to the corporation's best interests after reasonable investigation -- in light of,
among other things, the fact that, if consummated, the transaction with the Barclay Brothers
would "thwart the effective and thorough completion of the Strategic Process Black had
contractually promised to support." The Court then addressed the second prong of Unocal -whether the Rights Plan is a proportionate response to the threat posed. While noting that, in the
ordinary case, the adoption of a rights plan would be a disproportionate response because the
replacement of a subsidiary's controlling corporate stockholder with another through a
transaction at the parent level should not pose a threat to the subsidiary, the Court nonetheless
found the deployment of the Rights Plan to be proportionate "in view of the extraordinary
circumstances International confronts." In so holding, the Court noted that corporate law has
recognized circumstances in which a subsidiary has a legitimate right in contesting a parent's sale
of its control position -- such as a sale to a known looter. The Court reasoned that if actual
dilution of the controlling stockholder may be justified in certain instances, the less extreme act
of adopting a rights plan should not be eliminated as a permissible response to "serious acts of
wrongdoing" by a controlling stockholder to a corporation. Although rejecting the application of
the "compelling justification" standard under Blasius to the adoption of the Rights Plan, the
Court stated that, even if Blasius did apply to the Rights Plan, "a sufficiently compelling
justification exists for any incidental burden on Inc.'s voting rights."
Following the Court's decision, the Defendants moved for certification of an interlocutory
appeal. Hollinger Int'l. Inc. v. Black, C.A. No. 183-N (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2004) (TRANSCRIPT).
In denying the application, the Court rejected the Defendants' claims that the earlier opinion
decided novel issues of Delaware law, stressing the primary importance to its decision of its
finding that Black breached the Restructuring Proposal. The Court summarized that it found that
"there was a contract in place, signed by Mr. Black, who was a fiduciary of International, and
that contract limited him in a very significant way, as the ultimate controlling stockholder of Inc.,
… and he breached that obligation."
While the Supreme Court declined to certify the
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interlocutory appeal, it did grant an appeal of the aspects of the decision that were made final,
i.e., the claims involving the bylaws and the rights plan and delayed consideration of that appeal
until the summary judgment decision on the remaining non-expedited claims was made. In late
May 2004, Vice Chancellor Strine granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the
remaining non-expedited claims. In April 2005, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this and
the issues tried to final judgment contained in Vice Chancellor Strine's March 2004 decision.
The Hollinger decisions indicate that where the Delaware Court of Chancery determines
that a controlling stockholder has engaged in inequitable conduct with a subsidiary corporation
involving breaches of contractual obligations to such subsidiary corporation, the Court will
utilize its equitable powers to prohibit otherwise valid action by the controlling stockholder and
permit the subsidiary corporation to employ significant defensive mechanisms to protect its
interests. Hollinger also confirms the broad power of stockholders under the DGCL to amend a
corporation's bylaws to alter the powers of, or eliminate altogether, board committees in light of
specific provisions of Section 141(c) of the DGCL providing for board committees to be
regulated through a corporation's bylaws.
d.

Oliver v. Boston Univ., C.A. No. 16570-NC (Del. Ch. Apr. 14,
2006).

In Oliver v. Boston Univ., C.A. No. 16570-NC, Noble, V.C. (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2006), the
Delaware Court of Chancery found that a controlling stockholder and the directors of the
corporation it controlled breached their fiduciary duties for not valuing potential derivative
claims in connection with the allocation of merger consideration where they had "inquiry notice"
of such claims. Moreover, after finding that the defendants' actions were to be evaluated under
the entire fairness standard, the Court found that the fair price aspect of the standard had been
met, but not the fair dealing element—a rare result.
In June 1995, Seragen Inc. ("Seragen") was in severe financial distress. At that time,
Boston University ("BU") was Seragen's controlling stockholder, and the board of directors of
Seragen was comprised of three persons who were affiliated with BU (Messrs. Cassidy, Condon
and Silber), two persons who were members of management of Seragen (Messrs. Prior and
Nichols) and one independent director (Mr. Jacobs). BU and persons affiliated with BU entered
into a series of transactions with Seragen that were designed to infuse Seragen with the
additional working capital it desperately needed. These transactions involved: (1) the
assumption by BU, Cassidy and Condon of certain of Seragen's loan obligations in exchange for
the issuance of warrants and newly issued "Series B" preferred stock; (2) the issuance by Seragen
to BU of newly created "Series C" preferred stock; (3) the sale by Seragen of its operating
division to Marathon Biopharmaceuticals, LLC ("Marathon"), an entity created by BU expressly
for that purpose; and (4) the grant of certain intellectual property rights by Seragen to United
States Surgical Corporation ("USSC"), a corporation founded by Hirsch. No fairness opinions
were obtained and no independent committee was formed in connection with any of the
transactions set forth above. In addition, the same law firm represented both BU and Seragen in
connection with the Series B and Series C transactions.
Despite the foregoing transactions, Seragen was still suffering financially. As a result,
Seragen entered into merger talks with Ligand Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Ligand") in early 1998.
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Under the proposed merger, Ligand would acquire Seragen and its operating assets, including
Marathon, for $75 million. Although the initial agreement allocated $70 million of the merger
proceeds for Seragen and the remaining $5 million for Marathon, the final agreement allocated
$67 million to Seragen and $8 million to Marathon (the "Accord Agreement").
The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that BU and the Seragen directors breached their
fiduciary duties by not considering the value of potential derivative claims deriving from the premerger transactions when allocating the portion of the $67 million allocated to Seragen's
minority stockholders in connection with the merger. The plaintiffs further claimed that the
allocation of the merger consideration under the Accord Agreement was not entirely fair. For the
reasons that follow, the Court found that the defendants were on "inquiry notice" of four
potential derivative claims and breached their fiduciary duties by failing to consider such claims
when allocating merger consideration to the minority stockholders of BU. Moreover, the Court
found that the allocation of merger consideration pursuant to the Accord Agreement was not
entirely fair. Entire fairness applied to the claims since a majority of Seragen's directors were
interested in the transactions, either personally or because of their relationship with BU.
The Court found that Seragen's board of directors was required to value potential
derivative claims when allocating merger consideration in this context. According to the Court,
any fair allocation of those proceeds could not ignore Seragen's derivative claims because the
purpose of the process was to determine the relative entitlements of the Seragen stockholders to
the $75 million in aggregate merger proceeds. Therefore, the Seragen directors should have
evaluated the possible derivative claims of which they had "inquiry notice" during the
negotiation and merger processes, and their failure to do so resulted in a breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. "Inquiry Notice" was defined by the Court as existing "when the directors
become aware of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry
which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery of the injury." According to the Court, the board
had inquiry notice of four potential derivative claims that could have affected the merger
consideration allocation process because of the interested nature of the pre-merger transactions
and the fact that a small group of Seragen's stockholders, including one of the plaintiffs in this
action, had made their concerns about the pre-merger transactions known to the Seragen board.
These four claims were: (1) equity dilution and other harm to Seragen from the Series B
transaction that resulted from a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty; (2) equity dilution and
other harm to Seragen from the Series C transaction that resulted from a breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty; (3) waste of corporate assets in connection with the Marathon transaction that
resulted from a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty; and (4) a breach of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty in connection with the USSC transaction.
As to the first two of the four derivative claims, the Court found that the directors should
have assessed the Series B and Series C transactions as derivative claims because the BU
defendants were on both sides of the transaction and there were no procedural safeguards to
assure the fairness of the transactions. The Court then considered whether the Series B and
Series C transactions were entirely fair. The Court found that, in light of the defendants' expert
testimony and the poorly supported testimony of the plaintiffs' expert (who was merely an
appraiser who took "a leap of faith (not logic)" in valuing Seragen's stock), the price for the
Series B and Series C transactions was fair. In particular, the defendants' expert demonstrated
that: (1) the Series B transaction did nothing to change the value of Seragen's common stock,
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since it created no new liabilities or obligations for Seragen; (2) the Series C transaction was
functionally an interest-free loan from BU to Seragen which benefited Seragen's minority
stockholders, since no other lender would provide such loan without charging interest; and (3)
the market did not react negatively to the Series B and Series C transactions, and, in fact, the
price of Seragen's common stock increased on the day of the announcement of the Series B
transaction. However, the Court found that the defendants were unable to prove that the
treatment, during the negotiation of the Accord Agreement, of the Series B and Series C
transactions was fair because there was no process to protect the interests of the minority
common stockholders. Therefore, although the BU defendants breached their duty of loyalty and
were unable to demonstrate the entire fairness of the Series B and Series C transactions, the price
was fair and the weight the defendants gave the derivative claims—zero—was fair. The Court
assigned only nominal damages based on this claim.
In evaluating the possible derivative claim relating to the Marathon transaction, the Court
found that the sale of the facility to a BU-controlled entity did not amount to corporate waste.
Marathon was sold to BU for $5 million plus a significant agreement to meet Seragen's ongoing
operating expenses. The plaintiffs could offer no basis, beyond the fact that Ligand later paid
$8 million for Marathon, to bolster their claim that the consideration BU paid was so little as to
amount to corporate waste. The Court next assessed whether the Marathon transaction was
entirely fair. As with the Series B and Series C derivative claims, the Court found that the price
paid was fair but the process was deficient, and thus only nominal damages were warranted.
The Court then evaluated the potential derivative claim arising from the USSC
transaction. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant directors breached their duty of loyalty in
this transaction because of their relationship with Hirsch, a major benefactor and the founder of
USSC, and therefore the claim had value that the defendants failed to assess. The Court rejected
this claim, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that any special benefit devolved upon
any of the defendants as a result of the transaction. Moreover, the defendants produced evidence
that showed that the USSC transaction was at a fair price, and thus the potential derivative claim
had no value as a bargaining chip in the allocation negotiations. Any harm that resulted from
failing to consider the claim was merely procedural. Thus, damages for the failure to consider
the potential derivative claim from the USSC transaction were only nominal.
The Court next considered whether the allocation of the merger proceeds in the Accord
Agreement was entirely fair. As in the pre-merger transactions, the Court found that the process
was not fair to the minority stockholders because there was no representative who negotiated on
behalf of the minority common stockholders. According to the Court, this defect in process
resulted in mis-allocations of $4,809,244, which the Court awarded to the plaintiffs as actual
damages. The Court also awarded the plaintiffs nominal damages for the other process failures
associated with the negotiation and implementation of the Accord Agreement.
*

*

*

Oliver v. Boston Univ. again makes clear that in controlling stockholder transactions,
there must be a process in place to protect the controlled corporation's minority stockholders.
Otherwise, the fair-dealing prong of the entire fairness standard will be found not to have been
satisfied.
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E.

Directors' Duties of Oversight and Disclosure.
1.

Duty of Oversight.
a.

Saito v. McCall, C.A. No. 17132-NC (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2004).

Saito v. McCall, C.A. No. 17132-NC, (Del. Ch. Dec 20, 2004), is the latest addition to a
line of cases dealing with directors' duty of oversight under the standard set out in In re
Caremark International Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). In Saito, the
plaintiffs brought a derivative suit to recover damages from the directors, senior officers, merger
advisors and outside accountants of each of HBO & Company ("HBOC"), McKesson
Corporation ("McKesson") and McKesson HBOC, Inc. (the "Company"), the surviving
corporation in the 1999 merger of HBOC and McKesson. The plaintiffs' principal allegations
were that: (i) HBOC's directors and officers presided over a fraudulent accounting scheme; (ii)
McKesson's officers, directors and advisors uncovered HBOC's accounting improprieties during
their due diligence, but nonetheless proceeded with the proposed merger; and (iii) the Company's
board did not act quickly enough to rectify the accounting fraud following the merger. The
defendants moved to dismiss all counts. The Court dismissed most of the claims on procedural
grounds, with the notable exception of the claim against the Company's directors alleging
Caremark violations.
In 1998, the audit committee of HBOC, a healthcare software provider, met with
representatives of Arthur Andersen ("Andersen"), HBOC's outside auditor, to discuss HBOC's
1997 audit. During this meeting, Andersen informed the audit committee that the 1997 audit was
"high risk." Andersen then discussed with the audit committee risks affecting software
companies in general and risks related to HBOC's sales practices in particular. Although a
subsequent SEC investigation established that HBOC was misapplying GAAP, the Andersen
partner overseeing the HBOC audit at the time did not inform HBOC of this fact, but instead
reported that there were "no significant problems or exceptions and that Andersen enjoyed the
full cooperation of HBOC management."
During the summer of 1998, HBOC held discussions with McKesson, a healthcare supply
management company, regarding a potential merger. McKesson engaged Deloitte & Touche
LLP ("Deloitte") and Bear Stearns & Company ("Bear Stearns") to assist it in evaluating the
proposed merger. On July 10, 1998, in a meeting with Deloitte and Bear Stearns, McKesson's
board of directors discussed the proposed merger and the due diligence issues raised in
connection therewith. At this meeting, McKesson's board first learned of HBOC's questionable
accounting practices; however, there was no indication that the McKesson board actually knew
of any of HBOC's material accounting violations. Shortly after this meeting, Deloitte held a
conference call with McKesson's chief financial officer and Bear Stearns and identified three
areas where HBOC's accounting practices were questionable, two of which implicated violations
of GAAP.
In October 1998, after a brief suspension of merger negotiations, the parties resumed
discussions and agreed upon a modified deal structure, but they did not resolve the issues related
to HBOC's accounting practices. On October 16, 1998, with awareness of some of HBOC's
accounting irregularities, McKesson's board approved the merger and agreed to acquire HBOC
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for $14 billion in McKesson stock. Following the effective time of the merger, the Company's
audit committee met with its advisor to discuss the transaction. During this meeting, they
discussed certain accounting adjustments to HBOC's financial statements; however, the audit
committee knew that the adjustments were insufficient to remedy the accounting improprieties
that Deloitte had previously identified. The Company took some remedial action in April 1999,
when it announced that it would restate its prior earnings downward and, a few months later,
terminated the senior management responsible for the accounting improprieties.
After the merger was consummated, the plaintiffs brought a duty of oversight claim
against the directors of the Company alleging, inter alia, that the Company directors had failed
to (i) correct HBOC's false financial statements, (ii) monitor the accounting practices of the
Company, (iii) implement sufficient internal controls to guard against wrongful accounting
practices that were uncovered following the merger, and (iv) disclose HBOC's false financial
statements. The Court noted that, under Caremark, "a derivative plaintiff must allege facts
constituting 'a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight -- such as an utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information reporting system exists.'" To survive a
motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs were required to show that the Company board should have
known that the alleged accounting problems had occurred or were occurring and made no good
faith effort to rectify the accounting improprieties. Noting that the plaintiffs were entitled to the
benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from the applicable facts, the Court concluded that the
facts at hand implicated the Caremark standard. The Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged
sufficient facts to infer that the boards of each of McKesson and HBOC -- members of which
comprised the board of the Company -- knew, or should have known, of HBOC's accounting
irregularities. To support this finding, the Court noted that HBOC's audit committee became
aware of the accounting problems when it learned that its 1997 audit was "high risk" and that the
McKesson board learned of some of the problems during the July 1998 board meeting at which
due diligence issues were discussed. In addition, the Court noted that the Company's audit
committee had considered, but failed to act swiftly upon, HBOC's accounting problems. On
these facts, the Court concluded that the Company board knew or should have known that
HBOC's accounting practices were unlawful and that, despite this knowledge, failed to take any
remedial action for several months. While noting that facts later adduced could prove that the
Company directors did not violate their duties under Caremark, the Court allowed the plaintiffs'
claim to survive a motion to dismiss. While the Company's certificate of incorporation included
an exculpatory provision adopted pursuant to Section 102(b)(7), the parties did not raise, and the
Court did not address, the impact of that provision.
The Saito v. McCall decision demonstrates that the Delaware Court of Chancery will not
dismiss well-pled allegations of a breach of the duty of oversight.
b.

David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Plan v. Armstrong, C.A. No.
1449-N (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006) and Stone v. Ritter, C.A. No.
1570-N (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2006).

In both David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Plan v. Armstrong, C.A. No. 1449-N, Lamb, V.C.
(Del. Ch. February 13, 2006), and Stone v. Ritter, C.A. No. 1570-N, Chandler, C. (Del. Ch.
January 26, 2006), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed so-called "Caremark" claims that
the directors of Citigroup, Inc. ("Citigroup") and AmSouth Bancorporation ("AmSouth")
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breached their fiduciary duties by failing to take appropriate oversight responsibility, resulting in
liability to their respective corporations.
In Shaev, plaintiffs brought a derivative action on behalf of Citigroup alleging that the
directors' failure to exercise reasonable and prudent supervision over the management, policies,
controls and financial affairs of Citigroup resulted in the directors breaching their fiduciary
duties because they failed to detect and stop improper transactions involving Citigroup's clients,
WorldCom and Enron. As a result, Citigroup incurred $5 billion in write-offs, settlement costs
and fines. Defendants moved to dismiss the action on grounds that the plaintiffs failed to make a
demand under Rule 23.1. The Court noted that "when a board fails to act, under Delaware law, a
claim will survive a motion to dismiss based on Rule 23.1 only if the plaintiff presents wellpleaded facts to suggest a reasonable inference that a majority of the directors consciously
disregarded their duties over an extended period of time." Plaintiffs alleged that only a board
violating its fiduciary duties could have remained ignorant of Citigroup's relationship with Enron
and WorldCom. The Court found these allegations were "precisely the type of conclusory
statements that do not constitute a Caremark claim." While accepting that a director could be
found liable for remaining ignorant of large fraud occurring in plain sight, even where there are
supervisory controls, the Court concluded that plaintiffs' allegations provided no basis to believe
that the Citigroup directors had ignored a mammoth fraud. The Court, therefore, granted
defendants' motion to dismiss.
In Stone v. Ritter, plaintiffs brought a derivative action on behalf of AmSouth alleging
that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to institute sufficient internal controls
to guard against violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering regulations,
resulting in AmSouth paying a $50 million fine. Plaintiffs' claims were based upon a report of
the United States Department of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network which
concluded that AmSouth's anti-money laundering program "lacked adequate board and
management oversight." The Court noted that plaintiffs' complaint only restated the conclusions
set forth in the report and did not plead with particularity the facts underlying the report. The
Court also found that plaintiffs did not plead any facts showing the board was aware that
AmSouth's internal controls were inadequate or that the board chose to do nothing about
problems they knew existed. The Court found that plaintiffs' allegations were conclusory.
While hindsight showed the internal controls were inadequate, the Court held that this was not
sufficient to force the conclusion that a majority of the board was disqualified from considering
the demand. Thus, the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 23.1.
It is interesting to note that, in both cases, the plaintiffs took advantage of the "tools at
hand" (i.e., they made a books and records demand), but were unable to uncover sufficient facts
to survive a motion to dismiss. Shaev and Stone demonstrate the difficulty in alleging a
Caremark claim and make clear that, for such a claim to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
23.1, a plaintiff must make more than conclusory allegations.
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2.

Duty of Disclosure.
a.

Shamrock Holdings of California, Inc. v. Iger, C.A. No. 1330-N
(Del. Ch. June 6, 2005).

In Shamrock Holdings of California, Inc. v. Iger, C.A. No. 1330-N (Del. Ch. June 6,
2005), the Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging that certain
defendant directors of The Walt Disney Company (the "Company") had violated their duty of
disclosure by making statements in connection with the selection of the Company's new CEO.
Plaintiffs Roy Disney and Stanley Gold are former directors of the Company. In
November 2003, Disney and Gold resigned as directors as a result of disputes with management.
Disney and Gold were outspoken critics of the Company's corporate governance and campaigned
to have stockholders vote to withhold authority to vote on Michael Eisner, George Mitchell and
Judith Estrin as directors at the Company's 2004 Annual Meeting. Despite the absence of a
competing slate, a significant percentage of stockholders withheld their votes from these
candidates, including 45.37% for Eisner.
In September 2004, Eisner announced that he would retire as CEO of the Company
effective September 30, 2006. Thereafter, on September 13, 2004, fearing that the Company
would appoint Robert Iger as the Company's new CEO, Disney and Gold sent a letter to the nonemployee directors of the board encouraging them to begin an outside search for a replacement
for Eisner and threatening to propose an alternative slate of directors if this was not done.
Shortly thereafter, the board released a statement indicating its intention to engage in a
"thorough, careful and reasoned" CEO search and to consider both internal and external
candidates. The Company also announced that Eisner would step down as CEO and as a director
as soon as a replacement was installed.
On the basis of this announcement, Disney and Gold determined not to run a 2005 slate
of directors. After the 2005 Annual Meeting, the Company held a press conference in which it
announced that Iger would succeed Eisner as CEO. Disney and Gold filed suit against certain of
the Company's directors and officers, alleging that defendants' false and misleading statements
had breached their duty of disclosure and constituted equitable fraud. Plaintiffs alleged that the
Company had not in fact engaged in a good faith search for a CEO as it had promised. Plaintiffs
alleged that only one external candidate was interviewed, that Mitchell told her that "she was not
a serious candidate," and that Eisner was present or was expected to be present at interviews of
external candidates in what was intended to, and did, chill their candidacies.
With respect to plaintiffs' disclosure claim, the Court held that the facts in the complaint
allowed it to reasonably infer that the board materially misled and deliberately misinformed
plaintiffs and the other stockholders regarding its intent to conduct a bona fide executive search
process. The Court also held that the complaint adequately pled equitable fraud by alleging that
these material misstatements were intended to, and did, induce plaintiffs not to nominate a 2005
slate of directors.
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Quickly after the Court's decision, the suit was settled in an agreement by which the
Company agreed to make Roy Disney a nonvoting director emeritus and consultant to the
Company in return for Disney agreeing to support Iger as CEO.
b.

In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holders Litig., No. 218, 2005
(Del. Mar. 8, 2006).

In In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholders Litigation, No. 218, 2005 (Del. Mar. 8,
2006), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
disclosure claim. Plaintiffs brought a derivative and class action lawsuit in the Court of
Chancery challenging the merger through which J.P. Morgan Chase ("JPMC") acquired Bank
One Corporation ("Bank One") in July 2004.
The transaction at issue was a stock-for-stock merger between JPMC and Bank One.
Pursuant to the terms of this merger, JPMC issued JPMC common shares to Bank One
shareholders at a premium of 14% over the closing price of Bank One's common stock at the
time the merger was announced. JPMC and Bank One announced the proposed merger in
January 2004, and filed a joint proxy statement with the SEC in February of that year. In May,
over 99% of JPMC's shareholders voted in favor of the merger, and the merger closed on July 1,
2004.
Plaintiffs -- who were stockholders of JPMC -- brought suit solely on the basis of a
newspaper article in the New York Times which reported that James Dimon, the CEO of Bank
One, offered to sell Bank One to JPMC at no premium on the condition that he be appointed
CEO of the merged entity immediately after the merger closed. On these facts, plaintiffs alleged
that JPMC's board caused JPMC to overpay Bank One's shareholders to the extent of the 14%
premium. Plaintiffs also alleged that JPMC's board breached its duty of disclosure by failing to
report Dimon's offer in its proxy statement.
Plaintiffs claimed that the JPMC directors had breached their fiduciary duties in two
ways: (1) by approving a merger exchange ratio that paid an unnecessary and excessive premium
to Bank One shareholders; and (2) by publishing a proxy statement that contained materially
inaccurate or incomplete disclosures. The Court of Chancery dismissed the overpayment claim
under Rule 23.1, because that claim was derivative in nature and plaintiffs failed to make a presuit demand or demonstrate that they were excused from doing so. The Court of Chancery also
dismissed the proxy disclosure claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), because the
disclosure claim did not state a cognizable claim for money damages. The Court of Chancery
rejected plaintiffs' argument that a breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure automatically
warrants an award of nominal damages. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal only as to the proxy
disclosure claim.
In their appeal, plaintiffs claimed that the Court of Chancery erred in dismissing the
proxy disclosure claim, because plaintiffs were entitled to recover compensatory damages for the
allegedly incomplete disclosure, or, in the alternative, at least nominal damages. Plaintiffs
argued that they were entitled to compensatory damages equal to the $7 billion premium that the
JPMC board paid to Bank One's shareholders. The Court of Chancery ruled that a claim for
compensatory damages arose out of the underlying claim of overpayment, which was derivative
85
RLF1-3052265-3

rather than direct and the Supreme Court agreed. Plaintiffs did not dispute that the overpayment
claim was derivative, but argued that the disclosure claim was direct and therefore entitled
plaintiffs to recover the entire $7 billion in compensatory damages.
Plaintiffs argued that where a disclosure violation arises from a corporate transaction and
results in the dilution of economic and voting power, that the shareholders are entitled to recover
the same damages on their disclosure claim that the corporation would be entitled to recover on
its derivative claim. Thus, under plaintiffs' theory of recovery, the JPMC board could be liable
to the corporation for $7 billion, and to the shareholders for $7 billion. The Supreme Court
stated: "That simply cannot be." Plaintiffs attempted to rely on In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. as
support for the proposition that shareholders may recover compensatory damages where a
corporate transaction that harmed their economic or voting rights is consummated through the
directors' breach of their duty of disclosure. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and
clarified that Tri-Star stands for the proposition that where a breach of the duty of disclosure has
impaired economic and voting rights, the shareholders may be entitled to recover at least
nominal damages.
Alternatively, plaintiffs requested nominal damages under Tri-Star, claiming Tri-Star
established a per se rule of damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure. The Supreme
Court held that under Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., that there is no such per se rule,
and that shareholders will recover damages only where "disclosure violations are concomitant
with deprivation to stockholders' economic interests or impairment of their voting rights." The
Supreme Court stated that dilution claims are direct claims only where a significant shareholder's
interest is increased at the sole expense of the minority. Since the merger of JPMC and Bank
One was not such a case, the Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that they were entitled to
nominal damages. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's dismissal
of plaintiffs' disclosure claim and awarded plaintiffs no damages.
II.

2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW.
The below amendments to the General Corporation Law were effective August 1, 2006.
A.

Director Resignations.

Pursuant to Section 141(b) of the General Corporation Law, any director may resign as a
director of the corporation at any time upon notice given in writing or by electronic transmission
to the corporation. The amendment to Section 141(b) provides that a resignation may be made
effective upon the happening of a future event or events, coupled with the authority granted in
the same section to make certain resignations irrevocable. By permitting a corporation to
enforce a director resignation conditioned upon the director failing to achieve a specified vote for
reelection, e.g., more votes for than against, coupled with board acceptance of the resignation,
these provisions permit corporations and individual directors to agree voluntarily, and give effect
in a manner subsequently enforceable by the corporation, to voting standards for the election of
directors which differ from the plurality default standard in Section 216 (see below). Such
amendments do not, however, address resignations submitted in other contexts may be made
irrevocable.
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B.

Classified Board of Directors.

Section 141(d) of the General Corporation Law permits the certificate of incorporation
(or an initial bylaw or a bylaw adopted by stockholders) to divide the board of directors into one,
two or three classes with staggered terms usually of three years each. The amendments to
Section 141(d) (i) clarify that the classified terms of directors commence after the classification
of the board of directors becomes effective, thereby expressly permitting certificate of
incorporation or bylaw provisions that provide for classification effective at a point in time after
such provisions are adopted and (ii) provide that the certificate of incorporation or bylaw
provision dividing the directors into classes may authorize the board of directors to assign
members of the board already in office to such classes at the time such classification becomes
effective.
C.

Required Vote for Election of Directors.

Section 216 provides that, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation or
bylaws, directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or
represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors. If the
bylaws specify the requisite vote for the election of directors, then, pursuant to Section 109(a)
General Corporation Law, the stockholders may adopt an amendment to such a provision, unless
otherwise prohibited by the certificate of incorporation. The amendment to Section 216 provides
that a board of directors is prohibited from further amending any bylaw amendment adopted by
the stockholders which specifies the requisite vote for the election of directors. The amendment
does not address any other situation in which the board of directors amends a bylaw adopted by
stockholder vote.
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